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Exhibit A

Approved for Release

TAB	Name	Nationality	Duty	Interviewed
A1	Wendel, Kevin MG	US	CG, CSTC-A	x
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	US	(b)(3), (b)(6)	Evacuated
A2		US		x
A3		US		x
A4		US		x
A5		US		x
A6		US		x
A7		US		x
A8		US		x
A9		US		x
A10		US		x
A11		US		x
	Greene, Harold MG	US	DCG, CSTC-A	Deceased
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	US	(b)(3), (b)(6)	Evacuated
		US		Evacuated
B1		US		x
B2		US		x
B3		US		x
B4		US		x
		US		Evacuated
B5		US		x
B6		US		x
B7		US		x
B8		US		x
B9	US	x		
B10	US	x		
	US	Evacuated		
B11	(b)(6)	AFG	(b)(6)	x
	Bartscher, Michael BG	DEU	Deputy Advisor, MOD	Evacuated
C1	(b)(6)	DEU	(b)(6)	x
C2	(b)(6)	DEU	(b)(6)	x

C3		DEU		x
C4	(b)(6)	DEU	(b)(6)	x
C5		DEU		x
D1	Bathurst, BJ MG	GBR	Director, MOD MAG	x
	(b)(6)	GBR	(b)(6)	Evacuated
D2		GBR		x
D3		GBR		x
D4		GBR		x
D5		GBR		x
D6		GBR		x
D7		GBR		x
D8		GBR		x
E1	(b)(3), (b)(6)	US	(b)(3), (b)(6)	x
E2		US		x
E3		US		x
E4		US		x
E5		US		x
E6		US		x
E7		US		x
E8		US		x
E9		US		x
E10		US		x
E11		US		x
E12		US		x
E13		US		x
E14		US		x
E15		US		x
F1	Russell, Bruce BG	GBR	Chief Mentor, ANAOA	x
F2	(b)(6)	GBR	(b)(6)	x
F3	(b)(3), (b)(6)	US	(b)(3), (b)(6)	x
F4		US		x
F5		US		x

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F6	(b)(3), (b)(6)	US	(b)(3), (b)(6)	X
F7	(b)(6)	AFG	(b)(6)	X
F8		AFG		X
F9		AFG		X
F10		DNK		X
F11		DNK		X
F12		DNK		X
F13		DNK		X
F14		DNK		X
F15		DNK		X
F16		DNK		X
F17		DNK		X
F18		DNK		X
F19		DNK		X
F20		DNK		X
F21		AUS		X
F22		AUS		X
F23	CRO	X		
	Shah, Jalandar MG	AFG	Commander, MFNDU	
	Sahki, Miyan-Yar BG	AFG	Commander, NMAA	
	Sharifi BG	AFG	Commandant, ANAOA	
	(b)(6)	AFG	(b)(6)	
		AFG		
		AFG		
F24		AFG		X
Statements From Those Not On-Site				
G1	(b)(6)	GBR	(b)(6)	X
G2		GBR		X
G3		GBR		X
G4		GBR		X
G5		GBR		X

G6	(b)(6)	GBR	(b)(6)	X
G7		NZ		X
G8		GBR		X
		GBR		X
G9		GBR		X

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MG Kevin Wendel

Camp ISAF 22 Aug 2014 at 1930

I interviewed MG Kevin Wendel in his office the evening of 22 August 2014. Up front I told him I did not need details about the planning that went into the event, as I had sufficient information from multiple other interviews at that point. Additionally I was aware that he had very little to do with the planning, aside from being in attendance. Planning was done by MG Greene and his staff engineers. His Personal Security Detachment (PSD) did a great deal of advance coordination as is documented in the statements of his team. For the purposes of this interview I wanted to know his thoughts, having had several weeks to reflect on the events of the day.

We discussed how events of this type should be handled in the future. He acknowledged that, in the future, we would rely more on Afghans to provide security. In addition he acknowledged that when multiple teams come together, as they did on 5 Aug, one element had to be overall in charge of both planning and security. We discussed who that might have been on 5 Aug, also wondering how much more should the Afghans have been involved in the advance planning. He both discussed actions on contact and agreed the individual security teams did exactly what they were supposed to do under the circumstances.

We discussed his thoughts on the training of Personal Security Teams and Guardian Angel personnel. He agreed with the need for an in-country training and certification program and the need to address a common communications platform. We discussed the complexities of operating in a NATO environment and how this would impact determining the common platform. We talked about planning responsibilities for complex, multi-organizational venues like the one held on 5 Aug. He agreed we needed to have a centralized organizational construct, with an approval protocol for events with multiple senior personnel.

We discussed the possibility of purchasing concealable body armor for use by senior leaders in key leader engagements. He thought it would be wise to explore this for all advisory personnel, especially those who work in a ministerial environment. He thought we should continue to look at other out of the box solutions for protecting advisory personnel. He agreed that, as we go into Resolute Support, we should expect the operational environment to change...and that we should be prepared to change as well. He emphasized the need to be vigilant, analyze trends, and closely monitor atmospherics.

Overall MG Wendel was shaken, surprised, and devastated by the outcome of what was intended to be a positive event to facilitate progress. He praised the individual heroics of PSD members and supports measures to increase protection, specifically for advisory teams, and reduce risk.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
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ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION HQ ISAF, Kabul, Afghanistan	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140808	3. TIME 1800	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS undefinedundefined (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS DCOS SA/ CSTC-A			
9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH: On 05 AUG the entire team was out on mission minus (b)(3), (b)(6) who was in the Control Room and (b)(3), (b)(6) who was resting for his Mid shift duties. This event was the biggest mission to date. We did extensive coordination with the event POC and a very detailed recon/ site survey 3 days prior to the event. We had an advance team on ground hours prior to the event to coordinate any final changes and ensure security was tight. The event consisted of touring several different site locations at the ANAOC . The guest list consisted of several high ranking Generals from several different nations (to include Afghan). Prior to the movement to the next site my advance team would go to that area and secure it. They linked up with the Danish Security Team or had K-9 sweep the area. Security for this event was very tight to include snipers in towers and on roof tops. We were at the second to last venue which consisted of touring a pump house/underground bunker. At the end of the tour of the bunker everyone was waiting for the group to exit and began to huddle in a group. They used this opportunity to give one last briefing before moving to the last venue. This stop was completely an impromptu stop and was not on the schedule. Once the briefing was about to be turned over to questions I let the motorcade (b)(3), (b)(6) know we were about to be moving. Seconds after I notified them of the possible movement automatic fire commenced from the building to my rear. I could see the rounds hitting the ground to my left/ front. I took immediate cover and drew my side arm to return fire but the crowd was too large and the shooter could not be identified. I began to check myself for wounds. As I moved to (b)(6) I noticed that the MG Greene who was standing shoulder to shoulder with (b)(6) (b)(6) was shot and lying helplessly on the ground. Three Generals aides who were standing immediately to my left were also taken down. I could see that the British aide received a gunshot wound out of my peripheral vision to the left. He was screaming for help and attempting to apply self-aid. I looked up the street to my right to see where my team was and I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) (who was my Shift leader for that mission) running in my direction with the trucks behind him so he could move them into position for an evacuation. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the Limo driver and (b)(3), (b)(6) was the chase driver. When I got to (b)(6) he was trying to provide aid to MG Greene. I yelled for a medic and simultaneously grabbed a medic bag from a British Soldier who was heading my way. When (b)(6) looked up and saw me I could tell in his eyes we needed to evacuate MG Greene as well. I quickly grabbed (b)(6) and threw him into the passenger seat of the limo. I grabbed MG Greene with members of his team and laid him across the back seat of our limo. I used the vehicle as cover and ran alongside the truck as we reversed out of the engagement area. (b)(3), (b)(6) stayed at the location and continued to provide assistance to the wounded. Once we reached a location to do a j-turn I yelled to MG Greene's team start to call up the nine line and give them the grid of the primary HLZ. I jumped in the backseat of the limo to assess and treat MG Greene. It was (b)(3), (b)(6) (driving), (b)(6) (front passenger seat), MG Greene (lying across the rear seat) and myself (kneeling over the MG Greene in the rear seat). I immediately checked him for a pulse. There were no vitals and he was unresponsive. I kept talking to the General to let him know he was going to be ok and we were getting him to safety. I did not know if he could hear me but I wanted him to know in case he could. I started to look for bullet wounds but none could be located at this time. As soon as we reached the primary HLZ we got out the litter and prepped for medevac. I could not locate (b)(6) gear so I threw my vest w/ plates on him for his protection. (b)(3), (b)(6) grabbed the M249's out of the rear of the trucks and began to secure the			
10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

site. We quickly assessed MG Greene for additional wounds. When we rolled him over to check his back we noticed two gunshot wounds. One was to the middle of his back and the other was to the center lower portion of his head. Once the wounds were bandaged I started CPR (Chest Compressions). The team set up 360 security and prepared smoke for the birds. I instructed them that we do not know who the enemy is at this time and to challenge anyone and everyone who tries to enter our location. They used all four trucks as protection and closed in the gaps for security. I notified our control room that we were receiving small arms fire and MG Greene and many others were shot. (b)(3), (b)(6) (the interpreter) made it to our location. They positioned their additional trucks as an outer security element. We continued to look for vitals but had negative results. After a while I looked up at (b)(3), (b)(6) and we knew there was nothing more we could do...he was gone. (b)(6) was very shook up so I continued chest compressions to keep hope for him and the team. When the birds finally came they started to land at the other HLZ (secondary HLZ). We popped several cans of smoke with negative results. I made the decision we had to go to the birds. We took a local pickup truck to the other HLZ. I put (b)(6) in the back seat and the team carried MG Greene to the bed of the pickup. We transported him to the HLZ. He was later Medevac'd (b)(6) and I escorted the body to BAF).

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AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION HQ ISAF	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140812	3. TIME 1704	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS DCOS SA/ CSTC-A			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On August 5th at approximately 1200 I was sitting in the chase vehicle with (b)(3), (b)(6) was in the limo vehicle in front of us. We were at the sight of the ANA officer camp near Camp Quarga for a meet and four of the facility. Our team was at event five which was the final event of the day. We staged our trucks all in one spot along with the other PSD teams who were on site approximately 35 meters from the event. about 20 minutes went by and they were at their final brief when there was small arms fire that was coming from the site and at that moment MG's Wendel's limo driver (b)(3), (b)(6) and Myself sprang into action. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I got the trucks turned around to get to the boss in the quickest time possible (b)(3), (b)(6) got the limo to them within seconds of the attack. (b)(3), (b)(6) ran towards the site where the boss was. While the limo went to the aid of MG Wendel, MG Greene, and (b)(3), (b)(6) I proceeded to get my aid bag into an easily assessable spot to preform aid to the downed MG Greene. As soon as we got the boss and the downed MG, we proceeded to get to our pre designated HLZ if we had causality's at the site. We moved swiftly to the site which was approximately a quarter of a mile from the scene. Upon reaching the site we quickly set up a three sixty security with our trucks and MG Greene's PSD's trucks. When we stopped the trucks I proceeded to grab out the aid bag with litter. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I opened up the litter and brought it to the limo vehicle (b)(3), (b)(6) was driving where MG Greene was inside of. (b)(3), (b)(6) and Myself grabbed the General out of the vehicle and put him on the litter and assessed his injuries which we learned that he has a shot to the back of the head and one shot to his back. (b)(3), (b)(6) and the team of MG Greene's PSO (b)(3), (b)(6) began doing chest compressions and dressing up his wounds. We continued to pull three sixty security while we were waiting for the helicopters to get MG Greene to the hospital. About thirty minutes after we circled the trucks our advance team which consisted of (b)(3), (b)(6) who were at MOI waiting for us to leave our current event and go to the next event. When they arrived we placed them into the spots in your security which was weaker than others. We began to hear the helicopters flying in so we began to get MG Greene's litter prepared. MG Greene's team, (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself proceeded to carry him to the area of the HLZ where we did a three sixty security around his body while we waited. The helicopters we called for ended up going to the wrong HLZ so (b)(3), (b)(6) sent me with (b)(3), (b)(6) as my driver to go the other HLZ and get us a helicopter to go to where our HLZ is to get the downed general to a medical facility. When we reached our location (b)(3), (b)(6) were already at the site and informed me that all of the Helicopters were full and there wouldn't be another one for another 20 minutes. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I went back to the HLZ we were at when we reached the site we saw they had taken MG Greene to the HLZ we were just at. When we had reached the site I saw that they had moved MG Greene to get medical treatment from the British medics on scene. Fifteen minutes after we reached there MG Greene, MG Wendel, (b)(3), (b)(6) all got onto the helicopter and flew away. We proceeded as a group to Camp Quarga to make sure we all were accounted for all our gear was secure and we were okay. We then planned our drive back to Camp ISAF HQ.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT _____ DATED 20140812

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

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AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Kabul HQ ISAF	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140813	3. TIME 1847	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS DCOS SA/ CSTC-A			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
On 5 August 2014, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(6) the interpreter and me were part of the advance team 1, advance team 2 was (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6). We were at MOI for MG Wendel next destination, (b)(3), (b)(6) where at the gates at MOI talking to the guards. I was parked about 100 meters from them. (b)(3), (b)(6) got the call that MG Greene was down he and told me to drive back to ANA compound. (b)(3), (b)(6) hope in the truck and told me that MG Greene was down and that the other team was taking small arms fire. After (b)(3), (b)(6) made the call to head back to ANA compound and we took off to the ANA compound. When we made it to the ANA compound we try twice to get in to base where the rest of the team was. But the gate guard at the ANA compound won't let us in on the first to time and on the third time our interpreter (b)(6) hope out of our truck and start talking to the gate guards and final let us in to ANA compound after a few minutes. We pulled up to the HLZ where the rest of the team was, and help provide 360 security on the HLZ. We saw the Blackhawks flying over us but they didn't see the smoke that was been throwing out. After a few minutes (b)(3), (b)(6) and I where told to go to the other HLZ where the Blackhawks where landing to try to get one over to the other HLZ where the rest of the team was with MG Greene. While (b)(3), (b)(6) was talking to the other soldier about trying to get a Blackhawk to the other HLZ a British solder came up to the truck and ask me to move my truck because they were about to go pick up the other wounded. I move the truck then (b)(6) and me went back to the first HLZ but the team had load up the wounded and MG Greene and move to the HLZ that we were just at. MG Greene was load on a Blackhawk. We then went in to the compound that was near the HLZ where the Blackhawks where landing to find out where MG Greene and the other wounded was been taking. (b)(3), (b)(6) gather the team and made sure we were ok to drive back to ISAF and the team was reform and head back to ISAF.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

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WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION HQ ISAF	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140813	3. TIME 2003	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS DCOS SA/ CSTC-A			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

At approximately 1200 I received a phone call from (b)(3), (b)(6), while I was advancing MOI, Stating MG Greene is "down". I then called (b)(3), (b)(6) to see if he knew more information and he did not so I informed him with the information that I knew. I called (b)(3), (b)(6) and he informed me that MG Greene had been shot in the head and (b)(3), (b)(6) had been shot in the stomach. I relayed the information to (b)(3), (b)(6) and told him the advance was going back to ANAOA. As we arrived I called (b)(3), (b)(6) and told him that we made it and we were trying to get through the ECP. As we were going through the ECP (b)(3), (b)(6) had called me and asked for my location, I told him we were going through the ECP. He told me his location was at the HLZ and to come to him. When we got to the HLZ my two trucks pulled security. 4 Blackhawks flew over our HLZ and landed at a different HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6) told me to go to the HLZ that the Blackhawks were at and tell we have a casualty at the other HLZ when I got to the HLZ I spoke with the person in charge and told him the situation and he said all the Blackhawks were full and they had more in route. The convoy with MG Green came to the HLZ that I was at. I called (b)(3), (b)(6) and gave him the grid of the new HLZ and pulled security until the Blackhawk with MG Greene had left.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 2003 DATED 20140813

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION ISAF HQ KABUL, AFGHANISTAN	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140813	3. TIME 1500	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS PSD-B DCOS SA/CSTC-A MAG			
9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH: ON 5TH AUGUST 2014, (b)(3), (b)(6) WERE PART OF ADVANCE TEAM 1 AND (b)(3), (b)(6) WERE ADVANCE TEAM 2. WE WERE BIEFFED ON MISSION TO CAMP QARGHA AT 0600 AND SP AT 0700. IT TOOK US ABOUT 30 MINUTES TO ARRIVE TO CAMP QARGHA ON ANA SIDE. WE MET WITH DENISH FORCES AT THE ECP. WE DROVE UP TO THE HLZ AREA, WHERE THEY HAD A GROUP OF SECURITY FORCES THEIR AND CHAIRS FOR THE DEMOSTRATION OF SLIDES. THEN WE DROVE UP TO ANOTHER AREA WHERE THEY HAD THE WATER TANKERS AND ALSO THEY HAD A RANGE ON THE HILL THAT WAS HOT AT THE MOMENT. AFTER OBSERVING THESE AREAS WE WENT BACK TO THE HLZ AREA AND WAITED FOR MG WENDEL TO ARRIVE. ONCE MG WENDEL ARRIVED, ADVANCE TEAM 1 WENT TO THE WATER TANK LOCATION BY THE RANGE. (b)(3), (b)(6) STEPED OUT OF THE VEHICLE TO TALK TO DANISH FORCES. I STEPED OUT OF THE VEHICLE TOO BECAUSE I THOUGHT HE MAY NEEDED MY INTERPERTAION SKILLS. THE AREA WAS FULL OF ANA SOLDIERS. I WALKED AROUND WITH (b)(6). I DIDN'T SEE ANYTHING UNUSUALL AMONG ANA SOLDIERS, THEY ALL LOOKED NORMAL TO ME. I WENT BACK TO THE VEHICLE. WE WAITED FOR MG WENDEL TO ARRIVE AT WATER TANK AREA. ONCE HE AND OTHER GENERALS ARRIVED, WE AS ADVANCE TEAM 1 AND 2 LEFT THE ANA COMPOUND AND HEADED TOWARDS MG WENDEL'S NEXT DESTENATION, WHICH WAS MOI. WE ARRIVED BY MOI AND ME STEPED OUT, TO TALK TO GAURDS AT MOI ECP. WHILE I WAS INTERODUCING MYSELF AND (b)(3), (b)(6) RECIVED A CALL ABOUT MG "GREENE DOWN", (b)(3), (b)(6) TOLD ME THAT WE HAVE TO HEAD BACK ASAP TO CAMP QARGHA RIGHT NOW. WE GOT IN THE VEHICLE AND HEADED TOWARDS CAMP QARGHA. (b)(3), (b)(6) TOLD ME MG GREENE IS DOWN AND OUR TEAM NEEDS HELP. ONCE WE ARRIVED ON CAMP QARGHA, THE 2ND ECP OF ANA WOULDN'T ALLOW US TO ENTER THE AREA. I STEPED OUT OF VEHICLE AND TOLD THEM OUR TEAM IS IN THEIR CAMP AND THEY NEED OUR HELP. THEY SAID THEY ARE IN A LOCK DOWN CAN'T ALLOW ANYONE TO ENTER THEIR ECP. AT THE MOMENT AN ANA GENERAL WAS COMING OUT OF THE SAME ECP WITH 3 FORD TAN VEHICLES, I STOPED HIM AND INTERDUCED THE TEAM TO HIM AND ASKED IF HE CAN TELL HIS SOLDIERS TO ALLOW US TO ENTER THE AREA. HE KINDLY TURNED AROUND AND TOLD HIS SOLDIERS TO LET US ENTER THE ECP. THEN WE DROVE UP TO HLZ, WHERE EVERYONE WAS SECURING THE AREA. I STEPED OUT AND SEEN MG GREENE LYING DOWN, BLOOD COMING FROM HIS EARS AND NOSE. I ASKED (b)(3), (b)(6) IF HE NEEDED ANY HELP, HE ASKED IF I CAN FIND SOME SMOKE FOR HELICOPTER TO SEE US. I FOUND FEW BUT WE WERE CALLED TO MOVE TO ANOTHER HLZ WHERE THE DANISH FORCES WERE PROVIDING MEDICAL TREATMENT. AFTER FEW MINUTES HELICOPTER ARRIVED FOR MG GREENE, AND WE LEFT CAMP QARGHA WITH 4 VECHLES TO ISAF.			
10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)		PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

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STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE

OF

PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION ISAF HQ KABUL, AFGHANISTAN	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140813	3. TIME 1336	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6) undefinedundefined	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS PSD-B DCOS SA/CSTC-A MAG			
9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH: (b)(3), (b)(6) OUR INTERPRETER (b)(3), (b)(6) (ADVANCE 1) (b)(3), (b)(6) AND I (ADVANCE 2) WERE APPOINTED AS THE ADVANCE TEAMS FOR THE MISSION. ON 4 AUGUST 2014 THE DAY PRIOR OF THE ATTACK, WE CONDUCTED A ROUTE RECON TO AND FROM THE ANA COMPOUND WHERE I NEVER ENTERED NOR SAW THE ACTUAL VENUES THAT WERE ABOUT TO TAKE PLACE THE FOLLOWING DAY. ON 5 AUGUST 2014 THE TEAM WAS GIVEN THE MISSION BRIEF AT 0600 BY (b)(3), (b)(6) WHO WAS SHIFT LEADER FOR THE MISSION. AS THE ADVANCE TEAM, WE WERE TOLD TO SP AT 0700 WHERE IT TOOK US ABOUT 30 MINUTES TO GET TO THE ANA COMPOUND. UPON ARRIVAL WE MADE IMMEDIATE CONTACT WITH THE DANISH TEAM WHERE THEY THEN LED US AND INFORMED (b)(3), (b)(6) TO EACH OF THE VENUES. AS THE ADVANCE DRIVER I PRIMARILY STAYED IN THE VEHICLE THE MAJORITY OF OUR TIME THERE BUT WAS STILL STAYED VIGILANT. AT VENUE 2 WHICH WAS KNOWN AS THE WATER TANK, I WAS TOLD TO FOLLOW THE DANISH AND PARK THE VEHICLE ON THE SIDE OF THE ROAD ALONG WITH THEIR VEHICLES WHILE WE ALL WAITED FOR MG WENDEL, MG GREENE AND THE OTHERS TO MOVE TO THEIR NEXT LOCATION WHICH WAS VENUE 2. AS WE WAITED, I OBSERVED ANA CADETS CONDUCT SOME SORT OF PT TEST BUT NEVER SAW ANY OF THEM PAY ATTENTION NOR COME UP TO TALK TO THE DANISH TEAM OR MYSELF. MG WENDEL, MG GREENE AND THE OTHERS WERE MAKING THEIR VEHICLE MOVEMENT TO VENUE 2. THOUGH I CANNOT RECALL TO HOW LONG BEFORE THAT WERE WE WAITING FOR THEIR ARRIVAL TO OUR VENUE. AS THEIR MOVEMENT CAME ABOUT THE DANISH TEAM HAD TOLD ME TO STAY AT MY EXACT LOCATION WHILE THEY MOVED TO ANOTHER LOCATION. I THEN GOT INTO MY VEHICLE AND RECIEVED A TEXT FROM (b)(3), (b)(6) INFORMING THE ADVANCE TEAM THAT THE MOTORCADE WAS TO NO LATER LEAVE THE ANA COMPOUND AT 1215 TO MOI. I THEN LOOKED AT MY WATCH WERE IT WAS ABOUT 1140ISH AND CALLED (b)(3), (b)(6) TO PICK HIM UP FROM VENUE 3. AS SOON AS I GOT TO THE VENUE I IMMEDIATELY SAW (b)(3), (b)(6). I PULLED THE VEHICLE UP TO THEM AND (b)(3), (b)(6) HOPED IN AS WELL AS (b)(3), (b)(6) IN THE OTHER VEHICLE. WE WERE LEAVING THE COMPOUND ON OUR WAY TO MOI. ABOUT 5 MINUTES IN, (b)(3), (b)(6) CALLED (b)(3), (b)(6) TO NOTIFY HIM THAT WE HAVE LEFT THE COMPOUND AND THAT WE WERE ON OUR WAY TO MOI. IT TOOK US ABOUT 25-30 MINUTES TO GET TO MOI. AS SOON AS WE GET THERE, WE IMMEDIATELY SET UP OUR PROPER POSITIONS. AS I WAS IN THE PROCESS OF POSITIONING MY VEHICLE, (b)(3), (b)(6) TELLS ME TO MAKE A U-TURN AND AS MY VEHICLE WAS ALREADY CANTED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD AND THE TRAFFIC WAS CLEAR, ANOTHER VEHICLE FROM BEHIND TRIED TO PASS ME AND ENDED UP GETTING HIT ON THE FRONT PASSANGER SIDE. AS WE WERE TRYING TO SETTLE THE INCIDENT, I IMMEDIATELY SAW (b)(3), (b)(6) RUN TO THEIR VEHICLE WITH (b)(3), (b)(6) AS THE DRIVER SAYING "WE HAVE TO GO, WE HAVE TO GO!" (b)(3), (b)(6) GETS IN THE VEHICLE AND INFORMS ME THAT MG GREENE GOT SHOT. BOTH OF THE ADVON TEAMS HAULED THEIR WAY BACK TO THE ANA COMPOUND TO ASSIST ON THE SITUATION. WHILE ON OUR WAY BACK TO THE			
10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ISAF HQ KABUL, AF DATED 20140813

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

COMPOUND WE WERE HAVING TROUBLE WITH COMMUNICATION. (b)(3), (b)(6) GAVE (b)(3), (b)(6) A QUICK UPDATE THAT MG WENDEL AND MG GREENE AND THE TEAMS WERE LOCATED AT THE HLZ. IT TOOK US ABOUT 20 MINUTES TO GET BACK TO THE ANA COMPOUND. AS WE GOT THROUGH THE MAIN GATE, WE WERE HAVING TROUBLE ENTERING WHERE THE AFGHAN GUARDS WERE POINTING THEIR WEAPONS AT US. (b)(3), (b)(6) GETS OUT OF THE FIRST VEHICLE AND TRIED TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE GUARDS LETTING THEM KNOW WHAT WE WERE THERE FOR. THERE WERE 2 VEHICLES, TAN IN COLOR AHEAD OF US (AFGHAN GENERALS). (b)(3), (b)(6) ORDERED ME TO FOLLOW THEM. ALL 4 OF US THEN MAKE OUR WAY TO ANOTHER GATE TO WHERE THEY THEN TELL US TO GO BACK TO THE MAIN GATE (THE FIRST GATE WE WERE AT). SO WE GO BACK TO THE MAIN GATE AND THE GUARDS THEN TALKED TO THE AFGHAN GENERALS AND ALLOWED THEM TO GO THROUGH. AS FOR US, WE WAITED THERE FOR ABOUT 3-4 MINUTES AS ONE OF THE GUARDS WALKED TO OUR VEHICLE AND QUICKLY TALKED TO (b)(3), (b)(6) AND FINALLY LET US THROUGH. WE FINALLY MADE OUR WAY TO THE HLZ WHERE WE IMMEDIATELY SEE BLACK AND WHITE SUBURBANS AND OUR TEAM AS WELL AS MG GREENE'S PSD TEAM SET UP A 360 SECURITY AND THE CASUALTY (MG GREENE) LAYING ON THE GROUND WITH (b)(3), (b)(6) AND PART OF MG GREENE'S TEAM RIGHT NEXT TO HIM TRYING TO REVIVE HIM. I PULL UP TO COMPLETE THE CIRCLE FOR THE SECURITY AND WE ALL HOP OUT TO ASSIST WITH THE 360. WHILE WE WERE PULLING SECURITY, WE SEE 2 MEDICAL HELICOPTERS IN THE AIR KNOWING THAT ONE OF THEM WERE COMING FOR OUR CASUALTY BUT YET THEY NEVER WERE ABLE TO SPOT OUR SIGNALLED LOCATION THEREFORE WERE NEVER ABLE TO LAND AT THE HLZ WE WERE AT. MG WENDEL AND EVERYONE ELSE WERE GETTING FRUSTRATED TO WHY THEY WERE NOT ABLE TO SPOT OUR LOCATION. (b)(3), (b)(6) THEN HOPPED IN ONE OF THE VEHICLES AND HAULED THEIR WAY TO THE OTHER HLZ TO NOTIFY THE BIRDS ABOUT OUR LOCATION. YET THERE WAS STILL NO SIGN OF ANY BIRDS COMING OUR WAY TO PICK UP OUR CASUALTY. AFTER POPPING ABOUT ANOTHER 2 DIFFERENT COLORED SMOKES AND STILL NO BIRD, (b)(3), (b)(6) AND I HOPPED INTO ONE OF THE VEHICLES AND HAULED OUR WAY TO THE OTHER HLZ WHERE (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) WERE AT TO ALSO NOTIFY THAT WE NEED A BIRD TO GO TO THE OTHER HLZ. AS SOON AS WE GOT THERE, I STAYED IN THE VEHICLE AND (b)(3), (b)(6) HOPPED OUT AND WENT STRAIGHT TO THE HLZ. I STAYED IN THE VEHICLE MOST OF THE TIME. WE WERE TOLD TO STANDBY UNTIL MG WENDEL AND (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) WERE ON THE FLIGHT WITH MG GREENE TO BAGRAM. AS SOON AS THAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED, THE REST OF THE TEAM AND I DROVE BACK TO ISAF.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT

SAF HQ KABUL, AF

DATED

20140813

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION HQ ISAF	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140812	3. TIME 1535	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6) undefinedundefined	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS DCOS SA/ CSTC-A			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On August 5, 2014 I was currently working advance. While working advance we went to the ANAOA compound around two hours early to make sure the area was secure. We met up with two Danish guys, and two Australian Sharp Shooters that were securing the venues before we arrived at them. When we arrived they showed us each venue they were told we were going. They notified us that all of the venues that were going to have a K-9 unit go through prior to the meetings. There were a total of five venues. When our convoy arrived at venue one, both advances proceeded to the next venue, during venue two and three both advance teams helped provide security, it was located at a water tower and near a range. I was on a roof of a building providing security. While everybody was occupied at venue three we SP'd to MOI because we had another mission that day. When we arrived to MOI we received a call stating MG Green had been injured. Both advances proceeded back to the ANAOA compound to assist with our mission. When we arrived the compound was secure, we met with two tan trucks that had Afghan Generals inside them. Our interpreter got out of the truck to let them know that we were with Major General Wendell. After about 15 minutes they let us in and we drove straight to the HLZ. When we arrived I jumped out of my truck and parked them where we had good cover for 360 security. I made sure everybody had a secure position then got with my (b)(3), (b)(6) to see what I could assist with; he stated MEDEVAC was en route. I began looking through the trucks to get smoke for the HLZ. I saw Blackhawks and they seemed to be coming for us, so I assisted to help pick up our casualty to help transport him into the helicopter. None of the four Blackhawks ever stopped at our HLZ. We then put our casualty in a white Toyota truck, and transported him to another location (Camp Qargha). When we arrived other coalitions had already had a secure position on their HLZ. After approximately 20 minutes our casualty was picked up. We went back to Camp Qargha to see if we could find (b)(3), (b)(6). The medical center told us that all the casualties that had been to their facility had been transferred to Bagram Airforce Base. I checked to see if all of my guys were okay and we had accountability of our sensitive items. We had a short convoy brief and then shortly returned to ISAF.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION ISAF Headquarters	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140812	3. TIME 1730	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS DCOS SA/CSTC-A			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
PSD B team was assigned with providing security and ground transportation to MG Wendel to the ANA Officer Compound on 5 August 2014. I was appointed as the Shift Leader for that mission. As a Shift Leader I was in charge of coordinating all the details of the mission. Tending to that responsibility (b)(3), (b)(6) and I conducted a reconnaissance and site survey of the area on Saturday 2 of August of 2014. We were informed that day that the meeting for the 5 of August will consist of a tour of 6 venues, all over the complex in which they planned to show the Boss and other dignitaries the advances that the ANA academy was achieving in the training of future Afghan National Army Officers.
On the 4 of August of 2014, the day prior to the meeting, we also conducted an additional route recon. I established communication with the persons of contacts I have for that venue, (b)(3), (b)(6) And they all informed me that there were no changes planned for the event.
On August 5 of 2014, the day of the event, I conducted the mission brief at 0600 in order to give time for my advance team to get to the venue, establish contact with the POCs and brief me if there were any last minute changes to the schedule or the tour. Upon arrival to the ANA complex (b)(3), (b)(6) called me and informed me that the first venue, which was a rendezvous point near some tents was changed to the primary Helicopter Landing Zone of the complex. He also informed me that the second venue visit was eliminated, that the Boss was not planned to dismount on the third venue, and that a firing range visit was added to the fourth venue since the range was adjacent to it.
We started the movement to the ANA complex at approximately 0915. We arrived at the first venue in ANA at approximately 1000. From there and after the introductory brief we headed in a convoy containing all the dignitaries to what was briefed to us as the fourth venue on the reconnaissance, which consisted of the water tank and firing range. My advance team had already cleared the area before we arrived. We stood there for around 30 to 45 minutes. After there, we moved again in a big convoy to venue 5. My advance team left to MOI. The Boss and MG. Greene had a meeting at MOI on schedule for that same day at 1300 and we previously decided to stage the advance team at MOI after venue 4 to ease the safe transportation of the Generals to there.
The day of the reconnaissance we were briefed that venue 5 was going to consist of a walk outside the wire to a bunker in which the dignitaries will enter and be briefed inside. Apparently they made a last minute change and did a brief inside the wire in an open area with the building on the left side and a wall on the right side. At approximately 1200 when we were at the site near of what was briefed to us as the venue 5. I was near the chase truck of our motorcade; being that was the truck I was commanding that day. I heard a noise that resembled a small set of explosions like fire crackers, followed by small arms fire. After hearing that I ran to the area in

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ISAF headquarters DATED 20140812

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

which the meeting was being held and I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) (Mg. Wendel's PSO). He told me Mg. Greene was down and that they needed the trucks in there. I went back to instruct the drivers of my motorcade to bring the trucks. They (b)(3), (b)(6) were already turning the trucks towards me and heading towards my direction, same direction in which the meeting was being held and all the casualties were. I instructed a soldier from the German PSD team and a white truck driver to move their truck, so my truck could pass and assist in the moving of both Generals. The white truck moved and the Limo truck passed thru. The Limo driver (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) staged in front of the area in which the shooting happened. (b)(3), (b)(6) and a group of soldiers brought MG Greene to the back seat of the truck. I took Mg. Wendel's and (b)(3), (b)(6) IOTVs from the back seat to make room and helped put Mg. Greene in the truck. I help clearing the path so the truck could back up and leave and took care and possession of Mg. Wendel's and (b)(3), (b)(6) IOTV.

While (b)(6) (Mg. Wendel's linguist) and I were heading up the hill looking for our truck to leave, (b)(3), (b)(6) approach us and told us he was wounded in the stomach. I saw his arm bleeding and I try to establish communication with my driver (Chase truck driver (b)(3), (b)(6)) in order to take (b)(3), (b)(6) to a medical facility. I tried in many occasions to contact him, all were unsuccessful; my driver later informed me he followed the Limo carrying Mg. Greene and Mg. Wendel when they left the area, believing I was in the Limo also. While I was still trying to communicate with my driver, the same afghan national that was present during our reconnaissance on Saturday offered us (b)(3), (b)(6) and me) to take us to the medical facility in Qargha in his pickup truck. I accepted his help and (b)(3), (b)(6) got in the back seat of the truck while (b)(6) and me mounted the bed of the pickup with Mg. Wendel's and (b)(3), (b)(6) IOTVs. We arrived to the medical facility in Qargha and (b)(3), (b)(6) went walking inside to get treated, I left him and (b)(6) in there since it was a safe and secured place, and went back to the incident area to see if there were any other casualties that needed movement on the pickup truck. When we arrived back to the scene we found out that all the casualties were already being moved. The Danish Security Team (b)(6) asked the driver of the pickup, the afghan national, if he could be his translator and try to get an ID of the downed shooter. I asked him (Danish Lt.) and he told me that they shoot the shooter down. After 5 or 10 minutes on site I was finally able to communicate with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) inform them what happened, and to be informed what they knew. (b)(3), (b)(6) informed me that they were on HLZ I (Primary Helicopter Landing Zone) which was the first venue we stop when we arrived to the complex. I told the afghan national to take me to that HLZ. (b)(3), (b)(6) informed me that he and (b)(3), (b)(6) my advance team left MOI and were on his way back to ANA complex. We went to the HLZ, and upon arrival I noticed the 360 security my team and Mg. Greene's PSD teams had put in the area, using the trucks to surround and protect the stretcher in which Mg. Greene was. Once I dismounted, (b)(3), (b)(6) ask me if there was any other casualty left; I informed him about (b)(3), (b)(6) situation and he told me to bring him to the HLZ so he can be put in the same helicopter they called to get Mg. Greene once it arrives.

I went to the Qargha medical facility to pick up (b)(3), (b)(6) but he was not there. When I asked for his whereabouts no one could tell me anything until I talked to (b)(3), (b)(6) who told me he was being moved either on helicopter or to a hospital near the New Kabul Compound (NKC). I left the area with (b)(6) and went to the HLZ to inform (b)(3), (b)(6) about (b)(3), (b)(6) status. I arrived to the HLZ and both PSD teams were still putting 360 security waiting for the helicopter for Mg. Greene. I informed (b)(3), (b)(6) about (b)(3), (b)(6) movement to another medical facility and incorporated myself to the 360 security formation and waited for the helicopter.

Approximately 5 minutes after that, I saw 3 or 4 helicopters approaching the complex, but none of them head towards our direction. They were heading to the other HLZ. Members of the team threw smoke grenades to attract the attention of the helicopters with no success. After this they decided to move the General (MG Greene) to the other HLZ, the one in which the helicopters were actually landing. They did so, and after all the responsive casualties were moved, a helicopter took Mg. Greene to be transported to Bagram Air Field. That helicopter was boarded also by Mg. Wendel and his PSO (b)(3), (b)(6)

After that (b)(3), (b)(6) call (b)(3), (b)(6) and informed him that (b)(3), (b)(6) was not registered in any medical facility in NKC; (b)(6) (b)(6) informed me that and he (b)(3), (b)(6) and me went to the Qargha medical facility and ask the medics if they knew where exactly (b)(3), (b)(6) was taken. A British female medic told us that all the injured were being medevac to the Bagram Air Field medical facility, and that she remembered someone with (b)(3), (b)(6) description and injuries being sent there. We passed that information to (b)(3), (b)(6) who upon further investigation confirmed us he was in Bagram. After that confirmation, the whole PSD B team with the exception of (b)(3), (b)(6), who was in the helicopter heading to BAF, moved to ISAF headquarters.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ISAF headquarters DATED 20140812

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION HQ ISAF	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140812	3. TIME 1330	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(6) undefinedundefined	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS DCOS SA/ CSTC-A			
9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH: On August 5, 2014 we were conducting a mission at the ANA Officer compound. We had multiple venues that we were visiting on the compound. My job was the limo driver. As the limo driver it is my responsibility to drive General Wendel to each of his meetings quickly, efficiently, and safely. As we drove to each venue I made sure that each time I parked I was in a spot where I could react if something were to happen and get the truck to General Wendel. I also made sure that each place I parked that I had eyes on the venue and the meeting. When we arrived to our last venue I dropped General Wendel, (b)(3), (b)(6) at (b)(3), (b)(6) off and parked the truck. (b)(3), (b)(6) informed me that this would be our last venue then we would be leaving for MOI. As they went to the meeting I was in my truck going over the routes and making sure I had them down so there would be no discrepancies. As I was going over the routes I heard two loud bangs which I thought were explosions. I looked over at the venue I saw people running. Training instantly kicked in I began to turn the truck so I could get down to the venue. On my way down to the venue I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) at the beginning of the road down to the venue. I drove to straight by (b)(3), (b)(6) and down to the venue. As I drove down the road I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) knelt down behind a barrier. I drove straight to him parked the truck grabbed my MP5 and jumped out of the truck. (b)(3), (b)(6) yelled out that General Greene was down. (b)(3), (b)(6) told (b)(3), (b)(6) and I that we were going to put General Greene in my truck. I immediately jumped back into my truck while (b)(3), (b)(6) cleared the backseat (b)(3), (b)(6) put General Wendel in the front passenger side of the truck and also he helped carry General Greene over to the truck. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I helped pull General Greene's body into the back of my truck, where I saw that General Greene had been shot in the back of the head. (b)(3), (b)(6) then shut the door and ran by the truck as I reversed out of the road that led to the venue. (b)(3), (b)(6) then jumped in the backseat with General Greene. I then signaled General Greene PSD team who were in their trucks to lead us to the HLZ and our chase driven by (b)(3), (b)(6) followed us straight to the HLZ. On our way to the HLZ General Wendel and (b)(3), (b)(6) were talking to General Greene to try to get General Greene to respond to them. When we arrived to the HLZ we set up are four trucks in a square to act as barriers. I jumped out of the truck and began to help (b)(3), (b)(6) set the stretcher up so we could put General Greene on it. As we did that General Greene's PSD team pulled security and were calling up a 9 line medevac. Once (b)(3), (b)(6) and I set up the stretcher we helped pull General Greene's body onto the stretcher. Then (b)(3), (b)(6) and I fell into the 360 security and (b)(3), (b)(6) told us to keep people away and challenge anybody who tried to come to us. As I pulled security I made contact with (b)(3), (b)(6) who was at MOI with the rest of the advanced and informed him that General Greene was down. I also made contact with (b)(3), (b)(6) who stayed at the venue and I kept him updated where we were and also (b)(3), (b)(6) updated me periodically where he was and what he was doing. While I pulled security we kept ANA soldiers away from our location who were training near the LZ. (b)(3), (b)(6) and part of General Greene's PSD performed first aid on General Greene. I also saw (b)(3), (b)(6) making contact with (b)(3), (b)(6) who was back at the ops room so (b)(3), (b)(6) could call in the birds and keep those at the ops room updated. After a while of pulling security we saw the first Blackhawks come in but they didn't come to our LZ they went to the secondary one to pick the other wounded. We all tried to signal the Blackhawks to us with smoke and waving our arms. Then our advanced team arrived and began to pull 360 security with us. I ran over to (b)(3), (b)(6) and told him the situation and to keep eyes on a group of buildings that were approximately 150 meters from our location. Then (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived with a truck. We decided to put General Greene's body in the back of that truck and take him to			
10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT		PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

and take him to the secondary LZ I helped carry General Greene's body into the back of the truck and General Wendel (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) jumped in the truck with (b)(3), (b)(6) in the back and drove to the secondary LZ. We then got into our trucks and drove over to the secondary to help pull security till the Blackhawks came and picked up General Greene. Once the Blackhawk picked up General Greene, General Wendel and (b)(3), (b)(6) got on the bird also. (b)(3), (b)(6) then instructed us to drive up to Camp Qargh (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) got us all water and made sure we were good to drive back to ISAF. Once they knew we were good we drove back to ISAF.

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION HQ ISAF	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140813	3. TIME 1430	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6) undefinedundefined	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS DCOS SA/ CSTC-A			
9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH: It was on Aug. 5, 2014, our team with some other Coalition Forces traveled to British-run military training academy Camp Qargha Kabul, Afghanistan. The Camp is a huge place and it runs by the British Military. We had several stops and briefings by the US military personnel, the British and the Afghans, after we approached the last site which was a underground type of area and they had another briefing about the location which was suppose to be the last one, everyone was calm and listening the person who was explaining the plan to the gatherings. There was an empty room across from us and we had no clue that someone was there and hiding himself with a machine gun. Therefore, everyone was listening to the American civilian guy and all of the sudden firing started from that room, everyone threw his/her selves on the ground trying to find some corner to protect and save themselves from the bullets, I threw my self on the ground and stayed there until the firing stooped which took about 2-5 minutes, after the firing stopped and I looked around, I saw about 10-15 people injured on the ground, Gen Greene and some others injures were very sever. We carried Gen Greene's body to the vehicle and they took him to the clinic, after a while they send him to the flight line waiting for choppers to take him to BAF which took more than an hour to show up. We stayed there for about an hour and came back to ISAF.			
10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT		PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT HQ ISAF DATED 20140813

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Approved for Release

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WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION ISAF HQ	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140807	3. TIME 1600	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 3RD PLT, C CO, 2-508 PIR, 2ND BCT, 82ND ABN			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
On 5 AUG 14 myself and my team (b)(3), (b)(6) had a mission to take MG Greene and his staff out to a series of ANA projects/ facilities in vicinity of the Afghan National Officer Academy located right near Camp Qargha. At approximately 1150 our final site visit was wrapping up. There was a civilian presenting a project on a easel board to MG Wendell, MG Greene, as well as a British and German General. The four General officers were standing next to each other and off to their right was a group of 25-30 people in horseshoe like formation. I was standing in the back of, but amongst, the crowd of people along with (b)(3), (b)(6) and various other PSD teams. (b)(3), (b)(6), who came from BAF, also had his PSD on site. There were roughly 20-25 PSD related security on site. The Danish PSD group was providing outer security and had two snipers over-watching our position. The meeting was wrapping up and all of the sudden I heard a burst of fire and then noticed rounds firing all around us. I immediately hit the ground and, along with two to three others, began low crawling to the nearest cover I had as rounds continued to fly overhead, everyone around me was trying to get to cover as close as possible. (b)(3), (b)(6) was off to my left and was more exposed by nature of where he was standing when the rounds went off. The shooting continued for roughly seven to ten seconds. Once it stopped, I heard screaming from all over. I looked over the small concrete plant holder I took cover behind and saw bodies everywhere covered in blood. I immediately called for (b)(3), (b)(6) and was asking if he saw the General. He got on the radio and said that the General was down and that we had a MASCAL. I then got on the radio and called to (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) to get the vehicles to our position. Within a minute there were four vehicles immediately next to me as I was looking for where the shooter was because I assumed he was still alive and now amongst the group. When the vehicles moved up I moved around them and met (b)(3), (b)(6) who is MG Wendell's Personal Security Officer, and (b)(3), (b)(6) carrying MG Greene's body. (b)(3), (b)(6) MG Wendell and his PSD backed up fifteen to twenty meters to our rear where (b)(3), (b)(6) were located with the vehicles ready to go. Myself and (b)(3), (b)(6) jumped in our respective vehicles and sped off to an HLZ site where we continued to give medical attention to MG Greene. (b)(3), (b)(6) was working immediate security of the area, (b)(3), (b)(6) was working the medical evaluation and I was working the radio talking to the TOC. Eventually we had to drive back to the HLZ located at Camp Qargha where MG Greene was picked up from. Once MG Greene's helicopter took off I started to consolidate and reorganize with my team, the other American personnel as well as the QRF that showed up on site. We left from Camp Qargha and went back to ISAF.
Roshan Phone #: (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1600 DATED 20140807

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1500 DATED 20140807

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7th day of August, 2014 at ISAF HQ

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION ISAF HQ	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140807	3. TIME 1425	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 3RD PLT, C CO, 2-508 PIR, 2ND BCT, 82ND ABN			
9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH: Myself along with "Black Team" were doing a site visit with MG Greene on 5AUG2014. We were visiting the ANA Officer Academy located beside Camp Qargha. At 1145, we were at the third project location with MG Greene. Also MG Wendel, the British general, German general, and various staff members along with their own PSD teams. All of the principals were standing in a horseshoe formation around the easel board that was being presented off of. The Danish security element had the outskirts of the group secured along with the building, rooftop and road. Myself and (b)(3), (b)(6) were within the group along with some British, German, and American PSD personnel. At 1150, the presentation started to wrap up and opened to any questions. MG Greene stepped in front of MG Wendell and began to speak. As soon as this happened, the initial burst of rounds began to fire into the group. Knowing it was very close, I immediately hit the ground along with everyone else as I witnessed the rounds impacting all around us. It stopped for a second and then a second cyclic burst came in again. Having a better idea of it coming from the building but not an exact location, I turned to return fire but was surrounded by friendly elements. I knew the building had friendly elements so I couldn't take a clear shot without risking injuring more friendly. I immediately got up accompanied by what I knew was about 6-8 rounds of returning fire and rushed my way to MG Greene. As soon as I got to him, I called up on the radio to (b)(3), (b)(6) "General down". I looked up and saw bodies littered about the ground screaming with some unresponsive. Immediately I called up again on the radio and shouted out, "We have a MASCAL" MG Greene showed no signs of being responsive and vitals were extremely low. MG Greene had a concave to the front of his skull with bleeding out of the ears and mouth. I looked for and found no gunshot to the head. (b)(3), (b)(6) then joined me along with MG Wendell. I located a gun shot entry wound to the right side of MG Greene's neck. I began to apply pressure to the wound. At this time, I had no idea if the shooter was killed or if he would be accompanied by more attackers. I knew we had to get both Generals out of there and could not stay to apply treatment. (b)(3), (b)(6) along with (b)(3), (b)(6) got the vehicles ready and MG Wendell's vehicle came to us. I got MG Greene to the truck and we put him in the backseat. (b)(3), (b)(6) accompanied him in the truck. I ran with the truck as it backed up until it could turn around. I hopped into my vehicle with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) driving and we took lead as everyone followed us to the first HLZ site we planned to set up. When we got there, I got MG Greene out of the vehicle with assistance from MG Wendell's PSD team. At this time, (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself concluded he was KIA. I continued my assessment and apply the necessary treatment. I bandaged and wrapped the neck wound and located a gun shot entry wound to the middle of his back. I cleaned the site and applied a chest seal. During this time (b)(3), (b)(6) was working the radios calling up 9-Lines and talking with the TOC. (b)(3), (b)(6) was working our site security and setting up the vehicles in a box like formation around the casualty and myself (b)(3), (b)(6) then asked me if I got hit and to check myself because I began to limp around on one foot. It was when I started to notice a sharp pain in my foot and ankle as the adrenaline began to wear off. I told him I was not shot and had no idea when or how the injury occurred. I still remained with MG Greene continuing to do whatever I could to try to stabilize him with some help from (b)(3), (b)(6). The helicopters took forever to get to our location but ended up landing at another LZ. As soon as we saw them, I threw violet colored smoke next to the pickup site. After they flew past us, I threw two more smoke one after another to signal them to our location. A small pick-up vehicle drove up to our location with a civilian and a member of MG Wendell's PSD team along with two British MRAPs. They told us the helicopters were landing at another LZ to pick up the other casualties.			
10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT		PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1425 DATED 20140807

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

We decided to move MG Greene to their location. We put him in the bed of the pick-up and I hopped in the back with MG Greene's body. I grabbed the side of the bed and laid over the casualty holding him and myself in place so he wouldn't slide out. The driver then drove fast along a dirt route to the second LZ. As soon as we rolled up, I began yelling at the British and Australian soldiers at the LZ for help to get MG Greene out and over to the LZ. Six soldiers ran over and helped me get the casualty over to the LZ. I handed him over to the medics there on the ground and gave them my notes and assessment on the casualty including injuries and treatment given. This is when I stepped back and let the medics do their job. I remained there in the area with him until a bird arrived to take MG Greene. MG Wendel and (b)(3), (b)(6) accompanied the casualty on the bird. I stayed back and linked up with our company MRAP vehicles. We drove over to Camp Qargha and reconsolidated with (b)(3), (b)(6) the rest of the QRF element and principals.

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7th day of August, 2014 at ISAF HQ

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION ISAF HQ	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140807	3. TIME 1845	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6) undefinedundefined	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 3RD PLT, C CO, 2-508 PIR, 2ND BCT, 82ND ABN			

9. (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
At approximately 1150 I was in my truck about 25 meters away from a presentation site where (b)(3), (b)(6) were providing security for our principal, MG Greene. Around that time while my truck door was open I heard a loud burst of rounds coming from the vicinity where (b)(3), (b)(6) were. Once I heard these rounds I began to listen for any communication coming from (b)(3), (b)(6) for instruction for the evacuation of MG Greene. As per our SOP I turned my truck around to be able to get MG Greene in to my vehicle and exit the scene. I pulled my truck up to the closest point I could and heard over the radio "MASCAL, MASCAL, MASCAL!" I also heard that MG Greene had been hit. Once this happened I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) running up towards my truck and he jumped in. He let me know that MG Greene had been placed in to one of MG Wendell's vehicles and that our move was to the HLZ where we had originally visited earlier in the day. We led the convoy to this position with the the vehicle carrying MG Greene directly behind us. When we arrived at the HLZ we set up a box shaped perimeter to secure our principal and prepare for the MEDIVAC helicopters. (b)(3), (b)(6) went right back to administering medical aid to MG Greene (b)(3), (b)(6) kept communication over the radio, and (b)(3), (b)(6) and I set up security. I was at the hood of my truck and pulled security to the direction I saw as the most likely avenue of approach. As other vehicles and personnel would come near the vicinity, one of the members of MG Wendell's PSD and I approached, challenged and directed them away. As the MEDIVAC helicopters neared, (b)(3), (b)(6) and I ran to MG Greene in order to get him on the helicopter once it landed. After the helicopter passed over us three times (b)(3), (b)(6) instructed us to move MG Greene to a pickup truck which was part of the perimeter. We carried the the litter on to the pickup truck, (b)(3), (b)(6) jumped on, and MG Greene was taken to the HLZ next to Camp Qargha. We followed slightly behind after (b)(3), (b)(6) instructed us on our next movement. We then consolidated at Camp Qargha, met up with the rest of the convoy and conducted a movement back to ISAF with our QRF as support.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1750 DATED 20140807

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7th day of August, 2014 at ISAF HQ

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION ISAF HQ	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140807	3. TIME 1750	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6) undefinedundefined	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 3RD PLT, C CO, 2-508 PIR, 2ND BCT, 82ND ABN			
9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH: I was standing outside of my truck approximately 25-30 meters away from the presentation site at 1145 hours. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) were down at the presentation site with our MG Greene and the staff we brought with us. At around 1150 I heard a short burst of what I thought to be 7.62mm rounds coming from the site where (b)(3), (b)(6) were. I immediately went back to my truck to secure my ACH. I jumped in the driver's seat of my truck in order to turn the trucks around and stage them to evacuate the immediate area as per our SOP. At that time I heard over the radio "MASCAL, MASCAL, MASCAL!" I then jumped out of my truck to secure the medical bag and placed it in the passenger seat. After this I posted up on the hood of my truck in order to pull security for the evacuation. Shortly after (b)(3), (b)(6) reached the vehicle and jumped in to the passenger seat. We then followed the lead truck which consisted of (b)(3), (b)(6) to our original site we had visited earlier that day. Once we reached the location we set up our own HLZ to prepare for the helicopter which was called up by (b)(3), (b)(6) We positioned our trucks in a box formation to secure the area and protect the principal. (b)(3), (b)(6) continued to give medical aid to the principal as (b)(3), (b)(6) kept in communication with the TOC and our QRF. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I pulled security on the main avenue of approach. Once General Wendell's PSD all arrived we placed them in tactical positions to better secure our position. We scanned the immediate area for any threats as well as kept all other oncoming vehicles and personnel away from the site. When the MEDEVAC helicopters were nearing, (b)(3), (b)(6) and I ran to the principal and coordinated our plan to carry him on to the helicopter. After the helicopter passed us over three times, (b)(3), (b)(6) and I carried the principal on to a pickup truck to be driven to the HLZ in the vicinity of Camp Qargha. Once the vehicle with MG Greene's body was taken to Camp Qargha, (b)(3), (b)(6) coordinated for our vehicles to link up with QRF, checked for SI, and instructed our next movement to Camp Qargha. Once we arrived on Camp Qargha, I found our interpreter and brought him to our position.			
10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT		PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1750 DATED 20140807

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1750 DATED 20140807

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7th day of August, 2014 at ISAF HQ

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION ISAF HQ	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140813	3. TIME 2100	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6) undefinedundefined	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS DCG, CSTC-A			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
I am a (b)(6) and had been working for MG Greene. We arrived at Camp Qargha around 0930 on the 5th of August 2014. We went to three total briefs. The General officers were receiving briefs at each different location. I was there with my group the whole time. My group consisted of: MG Greene, (b)(3), (b)(6) as well as MG Greene's PSD team. I was there in case my team needed linguist support. Also, each group of people that were briefing the General officers had their own interpreter. The incident itself happened at the third location. This was just before noon. Everyone was paying attention to the brief, then all of the sudden we heard shots fired. Everyone hit the ground when the shots were fired and I only heard MG Greene but did not see him. I heard people screaming to include (b)(3), (b)(6). When the shooting stopped, there were soldiers trying to evacuate wounded people to include (b)(3), (b)(6). I went to and stayed with the two U.S. soldiers who were helping (b)(3), (b)(6) in order to help them. I helped them carry her to the vehicle she was evacuated in. I did not know who the two U.S. soldiers were because I had never met them before. There were British medics helping as well. When we (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) into the vehicle the medics told me that since I was not hurt I could not come with them. They took her immediately to the Qargha medical facility. There was no room in the vehicle because the medics and wounded soldiers took up all the space. As we were taking (b)(3), (b)(6) to the vehicle, I briefly saw (b)(3), (b)(6) with a rifle at the scene so I assumed he was okay. I then started to look around for people I knew from my team (the PSD for DCG as well as DCG/ CSTC-A staff). At that time (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) saw me and he came up to me and told me to come with him as they were going to go back to coalition base at Qargha. I went with (b)(3), (b)(6) to the coalition base. Once we got to the medical facility I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) there and he had minor wounds that were being treated so I stayed with him. The nurse was there and asked me to help bandage him to make sure he was okay until he was to be evacuated. The medic gave me his uniform and boots and (b)(3), (b)(6) asked me to take them back to ISAF with me. While I was inside the medical facility, MG Bathurst saw me and said that if I did not have a ride back to ISAF that he would take me. Shortly after, I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) (MG Greene's PSO) as well as (b)(3), (b)(6) outside the medical facility. I met up with them and they said I would go back to ISAF with them in their vehicle. Eventually we went back to ISAF and everyone met up at the DCG office.
NIPR Phone: (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 2100 DATED 20140813

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 13th day of August, 2014 at ISAF HQ

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Marshall Fahim National Defense University (Kabul)	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140805	3. TIME 1145	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6) undefinedundefined	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (b)(6) CSTC-A/CJ ENGINEER Camp ISAF, APO AE 09356			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 5 August 2014, I executed a key leader engagement plan to Marshall Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU) outside of Kabul Afghanistan. This engagement was largely planned by Unified Training and Advisory Group (UTAG), led by (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) British and (b)(3), (b)(6) (US), with support from CSTC-A CJ/Engineers (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6). The day prior, (b)(3), (b)(6) joined (b)(3), (b)(6) and executed a planned water Shura with key members of UTAG and the various PSDs to talk through the overall sequence of events. CSTC-A/CJ Engineers had several focus points for the engagement: 1) to observe training and to receive a UTAG overview brief; 2) to resolve and develop a long term water distribution plan for MFNDU; 3) to develop a common understanding of USACE infrastructure issues and turnover plans; 4) to discuss future facility Engineer capacity. With these focus points in mind, on 4 August I briefed MG Greene, DCG CSTC-A, MG Wendel, CDR CSTC-A, MG Bathurst, MOD MAG, and BG Bartscher on the timeline and focus points during the KLE. Previous to this discussion, (b)(3), (b)(6) was concerned that MG Greene's schedule and leave timeline was too constrained for both the visit to MFNDU and MOD, and he asked that I engage MG Greene about not making the MFNDU site visit on 5 August. I did state during the meeting with MG Greene that I could handle the KLE while he focuses on the other meetings and leave. MG Greene simply stated (b)(3), (b)(6) will not miss out on this. The Afghans must work with us to figure out the water problem; after all, they know where the aquifer locations better than we do".

On 5 August, we arrived to the Helipad/Observation Point at roughly 0950. We were running late due to Kabul traffic. Our first session started around 1000 with a briefing from UTAG (b)(3), (b)(6). He provided an overview of the schedule for the day, then BG Russell, CDR ANAOA (British), briefed about the training the Afghans receive. USACE then followed with a brief on MFNDU construction timelines and beneficial occupancy dates. We then drove by the training area (lack of time) and we moved to point 3, where we discussed how the MFNDU water system was designed and how the system will require enough throughput to sustain 10,000 Cadets/support personnel in the future. Towards the end of the discussion, (b)(6) (CPMD) and MG Shah got into a heated debate over proper water conservation. (b)(6) felt the COM ANAOA was wasting water and not placing enough restrictions in place. At that point, it was decided by (b)(3), (b)(6) and BG Russell (British) (I think) to have the discussion on facility engineers/budget somewhere near point four by the tank (This was unplanned). Before we departed (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) said that the visit out to the buried water tanker would be for primary officers only because it was in a limited capacity location (Main Staff and General Officers only).

Upon arrival of the motorcade (probably 20-25 vehicles), the vehicles were line up about 100m uphill of the destination point (across from a T62 that the Afghans was trying to start). The last point was near the front/main gate of MFNDU, which was closed with a truck mounted machine gun in front. I was traveling with MG Greene and MG Wendel's PSD to the last site. We got out of the vehicle and started walking down towards the guard house. I stopped MG Greene and BG Russell for a few moments until security/PSD was with us. I recall looking at the guard building and noticing two Danish Soldiers on the roof, an Afghan w/machine gun pointed towards the gate (in a sandbag bunker on the roof, in front of the building two Afghan Soldiers, neither had any noticeable weapons on them and I noticed a vehicle mounted machine gun outside of the front gate). Continued (b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

I recall asking (b)(3), (b)(6) has the area been cleared. His response was, "Sir, we have it under control." Noticing PSD to my left and right and on the roof, we proceeded down the hill, past the guard building, and proceeded through a small 3' entryway that led us outside the compound wall but still inside the compound fence. The selected group walked for about 100m to a building that contained the in ground 2,500 gallon water tank. (b)(3), (b)(6) UTAG gave a brief on its overall performance. (b)(3), (b)(6) asked if we were giving the FE brief in the building. It was jam-packed in there, and my response was that we would find (b)(3), (b)(6) outside and have the final brief. As we returned, (b)(3), (b)(6) was standing with the easel and Facility Engineer poster adjacent to the guard building and near the closed front gate. Again, I noticed PSD and a Coalition Soldiers up on the Guard Building roof next to the Afghan machine-gun position. As all the General Officers came out, they formed a horseshoe configuration around (b)(3), (b)(6) This briefing started at 1145hrs, and I recall telling (b)(3), (b)(6) that he had 15 minutes to complete the brief. As I looked around everyone was talking, laughing and reminiscing with the Afghan Generals and senior level officers from CPMD. I recall (b)(3), (b)(6) finishing his presentation at 1159hrs. He said, "Gentlemen, that concludes my brief." I thought the Afghan General, MG Shah, was moving forward to shake (b)(3), (b)(6) hand or to say something when the machine gun fire commenced at or about 1200hrs.

At the commencement of firing it was almost like a unrealistic and surreal moment in time. I noticed two hits near my feet and I dove to the ground with my head planted in the rocks. I started low crawling to the concrete barrier about 15 feet to my front, and I recall looking to my left and seeing MG Greene on the ground with blood coming out of his head from the first volley of rounds. I screamed for a medic and that we needed a MEDEVAC, and the second volley of rounds came in. I repeated this several times after the shooting had commenced. As I was low crawling, I looked back and witnessed a Soldier firing into the Guard Building window. That was when I realized the firing was coming from the mid section of the building and not the machine gun position on the roof. I recall a Soldier having a torn sleeve and an arm injury while he was firing at the building. At this point I ran into (b)(3), (b)(6) who was in battle gear and told him MG Greene needed assistance. We didn't know if the shooter was still active or not. We both low crawled to MG Greene, and I commenced CPR, cleared his airway (his mouth was full of blood), checked his pulse in his arm twice and on his neck, put my hand over his heart and listened, checked his finger capillary refill time. There was nothing, no pulse, no movement. We then started to move MG Greene out of the danger area (again we didn't know if the shooter was reloading or where he was located). As mentioned initially, I thought the machine gun on the roof was firing at us. I recall seeing numerous bullet strikes on the ground to my left and right as I was low crawling towards MG Greene. I recall what I thought was (b)(3), (b)(6) (PSD) for MG Wendel moving MG Wendel to my front to the Suburban.

(b)(3), (b)(6) myself and (I think (b)(3), (b)(6), USACE) (b)(3), (b)(6) extracted MG Greene from his position about 15M away to the Suburban that was backing down the hill to extract MG Wendel. As we were lifting MG Greene, I noticed a severe entry wound to the side of his head, an exit wound behind the head, and what felt like an abrasion on the back of the neck. MG Greene was losing an enormous amount of blood. I placed my hand on the back of his head (to reduce the blood flow) and we moved him quickly to the middle of the Suburban for evacuation. I recall that MG Wendel was just being loaded, and we loaded MG Greene in the back with (b)(3), (b)(6) I opened the door and told MG Wendel, that MG Greene had a severe front and back head injury with no pulse. I shut the door and the Suburban departed. I tried to make a quick phone call at that point to (b)(3), (b)(6) and had no luck. I think the jammers were jamming my cell phone.

I moved to assist, load and evacuate (b)(3), (b)(6) BG Sahki, then (b)(3), (b)(6), and (b)(3), (b)(6) who had one of the more severe injuries. At that point, all vehicles were full and we ((b)(3), (b)(6) and me) ended up carrying the liter up the road. (b)(3), (b)(6) waved down an Afghan Toyota Pickup, and we loaded (b)(3), (b)(6) onto the back of the Toyota (I noticed the incident area was cleared and the last vehicle was being loaded with (b)(3), (b)(6) Camp Qargha (b)(3), (b)(6), who was injured). I loaded the Back of the Toyota with (b)(3), (b)(6) (who was with (b)(3), (b)(6) the entire time), (b)(3), (b)(6) myself and (b)(3), (b)(6) in the passenger seat of the Toyota. We moved quickly to the front gate of British Camp Qargha. We passed the first check point without having the vehicle inspected and I made (b)(3), (b)(6) dismount because I did not know the source of the vehicle, and I was worried that it could be a VBIED (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) dismounted and searched the vehicle before it entered Camp Qargha. It wasn't until later that I realized that (b)(3), (b)(6) had been shot as well.

Once we were inside Qargha, I tried the land line at the British TOC to call (b)(3), (b)(6) with no luck. Then I tried my cell phone and made contact and started to relay the count. I felt like the British TOC was still trying to get their head around the totality of the incident. I asked if the MEDEVAC was inbound; I recall that being around 1225/30hrs. Once I arrived to the aid station, I started to execute a personnel inventory just to make sure everyone was accounted for. I immediately went to find MG Greene and he was not in Camp Qargha aid station, so I assumed the PSD took him directly to the LZ site on MFNDU. At this point I heard MEDEVACs inbound. My initial count was 5 CAT A, 1 CAT B, and 5 CAT C. 10 minutes later I called and had a better report that changed the CAT C number to 10, for a total 16. I did not know the status of MG Greene, so I called (b)(3), (b)(6) again and (b)(3), (b)(6) relayed that they were still at the LZ. I relayed to (b)(3), (b)(6) MG Greene's status: no movement, no pulse, severe head trauma (b)(3), (b)(6)-----

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

I went back to the British TOC and asked if the MEDEVAC had picked up MG Greene, and they stated no and that they thought the Suburban was moving to another LZ for pick up. I relayed this back to (b)(3), (b)(6) and then he said that they were in fact en route to another LZ near Camp Qargha. Approximately 10 minutes later, someone said the MEDEVAC had picked up MG Greene for evacuation (at this point we was 1 hour +). I remained at the Camp Qargha aid station until everyone was evacuated, then I linked up with the USACE personnel, MG Wendel, MG Greene's PSD, and a Guardian Angel who arrived on-site. We did a sensitive items check and had two additional weapons that we did not know who the weapons belonged to. Weapon number: 1161926/1107228. We did a convoy break and headed back to Camp ISAF. I witnessed several acts of valor during the actual event and during the evacuation process that deserves recognition. (b)(3), (b)(6) quick reaction to secure MG Wendel (b)(3), (b)(6) he moved as soon as possible during and after the firing to recover MG Greene along with (b)(3), (b)(6). I witnessed a Soldier, later identified as (b)(3), (b)(6) firing with his M4 back into the building; I witnessed (b)(3), (b)(6) assisting in helping several critical life threatening injuries move out of the danger area. I witnessed (b)(3), (b)(6) provide comfort to (b)(3), (b)(6) with serious injury from the point of injury to Camp Qargha and then BAF Hospital, Lastly, I witnessed (b)(3), (b)(6) who was wounded provide aid and evacuate several wounded to Camp Qargha. I believe the quick action of many ((b)(3), (b)(6) and others) ultimately saved the lives of several others who wounds required immediate professional medical attention. I felt the Qargha aid station staff did a superb job caring for all Coalition and Afghan personnel. To the best of my knowledge (fog and friction of war), this is how I recall this very unfortunate ending to what started out as a very successful engagement with the MFNDU leadership about infrastructure solutions. Provided is attached sketch not to scale. End of Mission and statement (b)(3), (b)(6) 080614//-----

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

1. Purpose: To record my personal observations, as I remember them on 14 August, of the insider attack at the Marshal Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU) on 5 August 2014.

2. Chronology. This report will be provided in mostly chronological order and will include those items that I feel may be relevant to any investigation of the events on that day.

3. Planning.

a. I first learned of the event upon returning from TDY on or about 29 July 2014. I understood that an engineer working meeting was to take place on August 4th to address MFNDU water issues that would help to prepare for an even bigger meeting with several generals on August 5th. I was definitely concerned as I had heard there would be a part when the CPMD advisors would provide a presentation concerning the tashkil and the budget that supports MFNDU.

b. I understood that (b)(3), (b)(6) and the UTAG organization had organized the event and were driving the need for the discussion. I was surprised that so many generals were invited. When I found out that BG Jackson, MG Bathurst, and MG Greene were invited, I suggested that MG Amiri also be invited. I was told that he was already on the potential invitee list.

c. On Sunday August 3rd, I invited MG Amiri to the meeting on the 5th. I also told MG Amiri that (b)(3), (b)(6) and possibly even (b)(6) should attend the working meeting on the 4th and if possible the 5th as well. MG Amiri confirmed with me that he would have (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(6) at MFNDU on the 4th and they all would come on the 5th.

d. On the morning of August 5th, I had heard that MG Greene and MG Wendell would be 30 minutes late. I called MG Amiri to tell him that the meeting was going to start 30 minutes late. I spoke to his chief of staff – (b)(3), (b)(6) – who said that MG Amiri could not come. He was called to a budget meeting being led by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff and was therefore unable to attend the meeting at MFNDU.

4. Attendees on the Day of the Meeting.

a. On the day of the meeting, I was struck by how many generals were there. They included MG Greene and MG Wendell; MG Bathurst and BG Bartscher; and a Brigadier from UTAG. They all seemed to have their personal security teams (PST's) with them. From the ANA, the 2 star commander of MFNDU was there along with 2 or 3 of his one star deputies. I had thought BG Jackson and MG Amiri would be there as well, but neither were able to attend.

b. We had many attendees from CSTC-A CJ Engineer: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6), and our translator (b)(3), (b)(6) had also been told to attend, but he had a family engagement and was unable to come. We had invited two CPMD colonels to attend – (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(6) – who were both there.

c. From USACE, I remember (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and several others.

5. Immediately Prior to the Attack.

a. For the 3rd stop of the day, we drove down towards the main entry control point. We parked up on a slight hill and walked downhill approximately 100 meters to the entry control point. There must have been at least 20 vehicles that were parked up on the hill. From there, we were told that there was limited space at the actual site - where the 3" line goes into a buried water trailer. This water trailer was in an enclosed building that was on the outside of the large T-wall barrier protecting the interior of MFNDU. To get there required going through a small doorway and walking down a narrow path on the outside of the T-walls. The building with the buried trailer was partly underground and relatively cool.

b. I was with (b)(3), (b)(6) when we walked down towards the entry control point. He was going to be briefing, so he had carried a briefing board with him with an enlarged slide on the board. He said that he had gone to the buried tanker yesterday (Aug 4th) and had bumped his head due to the small opening to get in. Because he had seen it and had no desire to squeeze through the opening, he stayed near the entry control point waiting for us to return.

c. We went to the buried tanker and received a briefing from (b)(3), (b)(6). At the end of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) briefing, he asked if (b)(3), (b)(6) was there to brief the last part. We told him that (b)(3), (b)(6) was up at the entry control point waiting for those in the small building to return to that area. So, we all walked back up to the entry control point area.

d. Once there, we created a semi-circle around (b)(3), (b)(6). He had his board set up, I believe on an easel in front of a concrete planter. As (b)(3), (b)(6) and I are a team, I positioned myself approximately 3-4 meters south of (b)(3), (b)(6) at the bottom end of the semi-circle— close enough that I could step in if there were any questions that I needed to answer. There were concrete planters to the east of us – approximately 0.7 meters high and 3 to 5 meters long. There were several of these lining the road just behind Erik (to his east). There was one next to me. I also remember a post – probably a light post that I was leaning against. (b)(3), (b)(6) was next to me near the post. I remember (b)(3), (b)(6) straight across from me (to the north) at the other end – the top - of the semi-circle. The rest of the crowd was around (b)(3), (b)(6) approximately 3-8 meters away from him in a semi-circle shape. The generals were typically closer to the front. The rest of the crowd was around the generals and around the board making up rest of the semi-circle.

e. At site #2, which was the site of a well and water tanks, I specifically remember looking at the security around the group and being comfortable with the perimeter. I do not remember doing such a scan at (b)(3), (b)(6) briefing site. I do remember looking up at the Security guards up on the guard shack. Just to the north of where (b)(3), (b)(6) was briefing, approximately 15 meters away, was a two story guard shack. On top were several guards. I remember one very large, muscular guard, looking out over my head (to the south) with binoculars towards the outside of the camp.

6. The Attack

a. Right after (b)(3), (b)(6) finished briefing, the attack started. I believe (b)(3), (b)(6) last words were – “this concludes my briefing, are there any questions?” I remember what sounded like firecrackers going off

right in the middle of the semi-circle. I saw dust flying up on the ground about 2 meters in front of (b)(3), (b)(6). It sounded just like an observer controller had walked up to the crowd and thrown firecrackers down to simulate an attack. I quickly realized that someone must be shooting at us and jumped down on the west side of the concrete planter. I had no idea from where the shots were coming. I was just trying to get as low as possible with cover around me. As I got down, others were right next to me. I was next to a parked ANA pickup truck and contemplated briefly whether it was safer under the truck or against the planter. I noticed someone had already crawled under the truck. (b)(3), (b)(6) was on the ground right next to me. (b)(3), (b)(6) was just to our north also on the ground.

b. Someone said something like “this sucks.” I think (b)(3), (b)(6) mentioned that he was afraid something like this could happen. I asked if everyone was alright and Erik said rather calmly that he was hit. “What?” I think both (b)(3), (b)(6) and I asked at the same time. “I’m hit,” (b)(3), (b)(6) said. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I crawled a couple of meters to him. (b)(3), (b)(6) said he was hit in the leg, so (b)(3), (b)(6) checked out his wounds. (b)(3), (b)(6) also said that his eye was bleeding. I checked his eye and saw that there was minor bleeding around his eye, but it didn’t look too bad. (b)(3), (b)(6) kept his eye shut and said he thought his legs would be ok, but he didn’t want to have a glass eye. (b)(3), (b)(6) checked (b)(3), (b)(6) entire body for wounds and found 3 holes in (b)(3), (b)(6) thighs – two on one leg and one on the other, none of which showed arterial bleeding which was a relief. Because there was no arterial bleeding, we did not put on any tourniquets.

c. The firing seemed to go very quickly. I heard a long burst – much longer than the 3 to 5 round bursts that we aim for. That was the time when I jumped down behind the concrete planter. I thought I heard screaming and people yelling to get down. Then I heard another long burst. Both went by very fast. Because they sounded like popping firecrackers, I assumed it was an AK47, but I am not certain of that. Shortly thereafter I heard more firing. That is when (b)(3), (b)(6) and I were talking. A very short time later, I thought I heard someone yell... “shooter’s down” or something to that effect. I also saw (b)(3), (b)(6) behind the planters to my north.

7. Evacuating the Wounded to Qargha


a. With (b)(3), (b)(6) injuries, I knew we needed some bandages for first aid. My IFAK was up with my gear in our truck. I yelled for a medic but didn’t see anyone who fit that description. Because I had heard someone yell “shooter down” and had not heard any firing, I looked over the planter and saw many people on the ground with others around them beginning to apply first aid. There seemed to be some horrible injuries with much blood around. I remember seeing (b)(3), (b)(6) going from casualty to casualty. I realized I wasn’t going to get any help from a medic for (b)(3), (b)(6) wounds and went looking for a medical kit. After not having any luck, I returned to (b)(3), (b)(6) and told him that I was going to get a vehicle to evacuate (b)(3), (b)(6) and the others. (b)(3), (b)(6) remained with (b)(3), (b)(6) and continued to treat him. I went up the hill and saw 3 people sitting, parked in a white SUV. I hit their hood, pointed, and told them to get their truck down to the kill zone (KZ) and begin evacuating people. I directed other trucks to get down there and then followed the trucks to help load people inside them.

b. People were loading injured people as fast as we could get vehicles down there. I remember helping to get (b)(3), (b)(6) in a vehicle. I remember helping to move several others (perhaps 4) and just lending

~~Certified~~

To area where all vehicles were parked (~100m from Kill Zone)

North



~~Certified~~

a hand where I could. (b)(6) the British aid, was in a very bad way as he was being loaded into one vehicle. The NTV vehicles were not well suited for casualties.

c. After everyone was loaded and gone, I checked the kill zone site for any weapons, radios, or other sensitive items and did not see any. I saw medical gear strewn all over the place. I then went back up the hill. Most of the vehicles were already gone, having been used to evacuate the wounded or follow them to Qargha. I saw (b)(6) next to his vehicle. I went to him and asked if he was ok and where (b)(6) was. He was fine but didn't know about (b)(6). I looked back towards the KZ and saw (b)(6) being helped up the hill. I was very surprised, as I had thought I had surveyed the area and didn't see anyone. It looked like he had been shot just above the right knee. I helped him get into an ANA pickup truck. From there the ANA truck took off, and I did not see (b)(6) (b)(6) after that until later that week.

d. (b)(6) ended up going to the National Military Hospital where he was treated. His wound was a shrapnel wound where metal pieces had gone deep into his thigh just above the knee. I know this because we visited him at the hospital on 8/8/2014.

e. After getting (b)(6) in a truck, I went further up the hill towards our truck (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was up at the truck waiting for me with (b)(6) and I believe (b)(3), (b)(6). We donned our armor, got in the truck, and drove roughly two miles to Qargha where we were allowed right in. Once at Qargha, we went to the medical center. We were told to stay outside, but I went inside anyway.

8. Helping at the Qargha Medical Clinic.

a. At the Qargha medical clinic, we went inside and found (b)(3), (b)(6). His leg wounds had been wrapped and his right eye was covered with a bandage. He was talking with us and seemed to be managing the pain ok. There were roughly 8 others in the rear area of the clinic where they were stable and waiting for evacuation to a hospital. These 8 included BG Bartcher, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) eventually (b)(6) the Translator, and a few others.

b. An ANA Brigadier General was in the hospital, in the front area being treated for multiple gun wounds. They asked for an interpreter and we offered up (b)(6) started to help, but began to feel worse and worse. We brought him water but that did not seem to help. We did not know it at the time, but (b)(6) had gone back into the guard shack when the shooting had started. When in the shack, he realized that the shooting was louder and he jumped out a window with another coalition soldier. They landed on each other, and (b)(6) injured his back. So, back at the Qargha clinic, he was witnessing several severely injured people, I presume his adrenaline was starting to recede, and he was going into shock. The medical personnel noticed this, treated him, and moved him back to the waiting room with the other stable soldiers who were waiting for evacuation. Eventually, (b)(6) would be evacuated with several others to Bagram.

c. The front part of the hospital was filled with several severely injured people who had numerous medical people around them caring for them. I remember [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) and the ANA Brigadier General. I believe there were others, and there was a flurry of activity as the medical personnel attempted to make them stable and prepare them for evacuation.

d. I wondered what took the helicopters so long to arrive. After we had been there awhile, I heard that it would be another 20 minutes before the first birds arrived. I relayed that message to the people in the back. They were all relatively stable and did not seem to be in pain, so the 20 minute message seemed ok to all of them.

e. Once the birds seemed to be inbound, we all helped the wounded to get ready for evacuation. We helped them to get into vehicles that took them to the LZ. Once all casualties were gone from the hospital, we re-organized ourselves and prepared to move from Qargha back to ISAF.

END OF STATEMENT

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION HQ ISAF	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140816	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS CSTCT-A CJ-ENG			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
On 5 Aug 2014 MG Greene, MG wendel, MG Bathhurst, another Scot BG, a German BG and various MFNDU GOs were in attendance for project briefs in morning at location one (see attached maps). Significant amount of security details were on hand. We arrived at the HLZ area (where brief 1 was to be held) around 0930 and up on the ridge line behind the LZ was a unit of ANA soldiers doing live fire exercise. As done on many previous visits to ANDU where we believed we were in a secured complex, we removed our IOTV and ACH and stored them in our trucks. This was true for all non-security detail personnel, including the GOs. The ANA do not wear body armor on their own base. A Danish coalition security detail appeared to be in charge as they were giving us instructions to move our vehicles as well as when to move to the next site for briefing. After giving that instruction, however, they left us without notifying us and we had to find the next briefing location on our own in one vehicle. The first brief ended approx. 1040 and the VIP group moved to location 2 for the water systems briefing I was to deliver. For the second brief, we had setup on a high ground just above the 3.0ML round blue water tank. Behind us was a small arms range and they were conducting live fire there as well. So all morning we were listening to live fire discharges. I presented the brief to the VIP party and MG Greene asked some questions about when the CPMD wells were to be installed and ready. He commented that we need a commitment from the CPMD to finish those wells before we award phase II. The brief started approximately 1050 and it went on for at least 45 minutes before (b)(3), (b)(6) summarized and made the group move on at approximately 1140. The VIP group then snaked its way to the ECP area at location 3. I did not see the generals get dropped off but they were already making their way to the pumphouse just outside the perimeter wall. (b)(6) from UTAG had mentioned in briefing 2 that he was concerned with security from the outside intruders coming onto the MFNDU property. We parked our vehicles at the top of the hill and I walked down to the small building that we had to duck under to access the outer walk towards the pumphouse. By the time I got to the pumphouse, the generals were all lined up inside and (b)(6) had started his briefing. We spent approximately 15-20 minutes in the pumphouse after which everyone started to make their way back to location 4 for the final brief. Location 4 was an impromptu location as (b)(3), (b)(6) was supposed to brief at location 2 but due to the extended amount of time spent on the water brief, the group decided to move to location 3, review the pumphouse, then come out to location 4, quick brief then lunch. While the generals were reviewing the pumphouse operations, (b)(3), (b)(6) had set up his briefing poster on a tripod and waited for the VIP group. At approximately 1240, (b)(3), (b)(6) started his brief and held discussions for about another 20-25 minutes. While (b)(3), (b)(6) was briefing I recalled scanning my field of vision for potential danger. My concern was there were several buildings approximately 1/2 kilometers away across the street that was high enough to have a direct line of sight to the group gathered. I looked back on the building behind me and saw what appeared to be 3-4 coalition security forces perched on the building's rooftop and were also scanning the outer perimeter. Probably like many others, we assumed the building right behind us was secured, especially with so many GOs in the audience.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

The brief was coming to a close with a 1 or 2 questions and answers and then there was lull when all of a sudden loud slamming noise rang out followed immediately by shouting and screams. I ran towards and dove behind one of the 2' high planters and took cover while more shots were fired. On the other side of the planters were parked uparmored vehicles and there were people already taking cover under them. After a few minutes, the shooting stopped and I waited there for approximately 5 minutes but did not hear an "all clear" signal. While taking cover, I looked beyond the uparmored vehicle next to me and saw NTVs were pulling up. As I looked back towards the site, I noticed two men dragging a lifeless body to load up into a NTV. I realized later and that the body was that of MG Greene. I decided to look up when I saw one person shouldering (b)(3), (b)(6) away from the middle of the action area. I ran to shouldered her other side and got her to the west side of the building. We paused to take cover and waited there for a litter vehicle when I recalled hearing someone said "be careful, we think the shooter is inside this building". While waiting at the building, I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) escorting (b)(3), (b)(6) being carried to a litter truck. Shortly thereafter, a truck appeared and we moved (b)(3), (b)(6) to the truck and loaded her.

Once all the wounded were evacuated out of the area, the remainder of the CJ-ENG members moved up to our vehicles. As we got to our trucks, I saw what appeared to be a coalition security personnel just watching as ANA troops were amassing and blocking the intersection with their vehicles. By that time, I've gotten enough intel to understand that the shooter could very well be a member of the ANA. Since I did not know the intention of the amassing ANA troop and since they were impeding with our vehicular movement, I directed the ANA personnel to evacuate the site and back off of the area. They did not appear to be arm but it was hard to remember whether they were or not. After a few shouts to back off, the ANA got the hint and cleared out of the area. There was at least one ANA soldier who as all the others had cleared out, stood at the middle of the intersection, not wanting to move and continued looking down the road. I had a round chambered in the M4 and safety off but was very concerned if he did not move and the situation might escalate. However, he did and we quickly mounted our vehicles and proceeded to the Camp Qargha clinic where all the casualties were taken to receive immediate treatment. I drove in a truck by myself following the lead truck. By the time we got to Camp Qargha, all the casualties were being treated except for MG Greene whose body was taken directly to the LZ for MEDEVAC. QRF teams were pulling out of Qargha and FP posture was heightened.

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE

OF

PAGES

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Camp ISAF, Kabul AFG	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140813	3. TIME 22:33	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS CSTC-A CJ-ENG			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
On the afternoon of 5 Aug 14 at MFNDU I was in the crowd when a gunman opened fire on us. We were at MFNDU in to to conduct a KLE w/ MG Shah and to discuss water issues at the site. We left Camp ISAF in our own movement at approximately 0830hrs. I was the CC in the first truck w/ (b)(3), (b)(6) driving and (b)(6) as a passenger along with our interpreter (b)(6). The second truck was driven by (b)(3), (b)(6) and TC'ed by (b)(3), (b)(6). We arrived at MFNDU around 0900hrs. We found the first tour stop (near the two LZ's to the north of the site) and parked to wait the arrival of the key leaders. MG Wendel and MG Greene arrived together at approximately 1000hrs which was past the scheduled start time of 0930hrs. A British (b)(6) and a BG briefed the welcome. USACE (b)(3), (b)(6) then briefed an overview of the site and construction. Once the overview was complete we loaded back into vehicles and proceeded to the second site near the "blue" water tank. We were there for quite some time working on next steps for the water project. From the tower we loaded up again in the cars and drove to the 3rd site a the buried water truck. The key leaders proceeded down to the truck and I waited at the top near the gate with probably 10 to 15 other people because space was tight down by the buried tanker. Upon the key leader's return (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed his board about the Afghan's budget and the preparation of their facility engineers on site. At the end of his presentation he asked for questions. About the time someone spoke up I heard a burst of gunfire and saw impacts in the dirt ahead and to my left. The impacts seemed to be moving away. The gunfire seemed loud and close but at the time I couldn't determine where it was coming from. I moved to my right and dove for cover behind some concrete planters. I heard screaming and continued gunfire. I was next to (b)(3), (b)(6) and we both tried to determine where the shots were coming from. (b)(3), (b)(6) proceeded to call for his vehicles to approach and I crawled between the planters and saw three wounded ahead of me. Furthest from me was (b)(6), next to him was (b)(3), (b)(6) and closest to me was (b)(3), (b)(6). I remember that there was still shooting but I don't remember if it was return fire or the gunman. I crawled to (b)(3), (b)(6) and got there about the same time as someone else. I applied a tourniquet to his leg and proceeded to help the other person apply pressure to his shoulder. (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived at this point with a CLS bag and we called for a stretcher. We got (b)(3), (b)(6) onto a tarp style stretcher and loaded him into the back of an SUV. I believe (b)(3), (b)(6) was in the same vehicle. I returned to the site with (b)(3), (b)(6) and we started to give aid to (b)(3), (b)(6). He was bleeding badly and we called for another stretcher. We had to reposition him to treat the wound in his back and finally got him on to the stretcher. The litter team had myself (b)(3), (b)(6) and one other I don't remember. We began to climb the hill towards the vehicles but couldn't find one with any room in it, or at least one where someone was willing to get out and make room. We saw (b)(3), (b)(6) who was wounded, and shouted to him to get a vehicle. He flagged down a passing truck and we loaded (b)(3), (b)(6) into the back along with (b)(3), (b)(6) so they could continue care. I then proceeded back to the site to ensure there was no one left. I found (b)(3), (b)(6) at that point along with two interpreters (b)(6) and my interpreter (b)(6). After ensuring no one else needed transport we loaded into our two vehicles and proceeded to Qargha. Once inside the coalition compound we headed to the Role 1 medical clinic to assist in whatever way we could.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp ISAF DATED 2014 0813

9. STATEMENT (Continued)



AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

CSTC-A CJ-ENG
CAMP ISAF

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
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ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION ISAF HQ, Kabul, Afghanistan	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140816	3. TIME 0830	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS CSTC-A, CJ-ENG			
9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH: On 05 August 2014 at MFNDU (b)(3), (b)(6) (CPMD Advisor) had just completed his briefing on CPMD budget and asked the group if there was any questions. (b)(3), (b)(6) (UTAG) asked a question which (b)(3), (b)(6) was answering while I was taking a final picture of the group watching the brief before we left the area for the key leaders to depart for their KLE. I started hearing rounds being fired, because the sound was so close I assumed was from the force pro on the roof and going away from us. I do not remember the number of rounds or how they were fired, just that it seemed consistent and not just a few shots. Immediately I turned towards the sound to face more towards the building and (b)(3), (b)(6) briefing board was to my right hand side. It was then that I realized the rounds were coming towards us when I saw the dirt kick up at my feet and people started to run to take cover behind the planters which were now to my rear. I ran to the side of the building to take cover because it seemed like everyone else was going towards the small area behind the planters. I stayed towards the middle of the side of the building in case anyone else was running behind me and to make sure I wasn't hit/injured. I saw several people in the briefing area on the ground and most people running towards the planters or behind the vehicles next to the planters to get vehicles to move people. From where I could see a group carry out MG Greene across the briefing area by the far wall, at that point I did not see anyone else since the building was blocking my view and everyone else was running to get vehicles or taking cover behind the planters. I could not see who was firing back towards the building. As soon as I saw people move in to help I moved towards the edge of the building to ask the British officer what he needed for help. At that point someone ran past me and dropped a CLS bag, which I took out to the British Soldier, but they were already treating him. I then moved to the Soldier next to him with the bag; (b)(3), (b)(6) was on the ground with (b)(3), (b)(6) at his head talking to him and (b)(3), (b)(6) and a few others rendering aid. We loaded him on a tarp like stretcher and moved him to a vehicle. I then went back to the area and saw (b)(3), (b)(6) on the ground being treated. They were applying a bandage to his lower back, so I looked elsewhere for injuries. He was on his stomach, so I couldn't see any of the other shots they later found at the hospital. Then I ran and got a litter out of a white SUV, which we put him on to bring him to a white pickup truck which took him to the hospital. I left the scene in the back of the truck with (b)(3), (b)(6). I am unaware of what happened there after we departed. I was with (b)(3), (b)(6) the remainder of the time at Qargha, for the flight to BAF, and until he went into the ER at BAF. Sketch of the scene as I remember it to the best of my knowledge is attached. I have placed all the individuals that I can remember where they were standing at any given point during the brief. There were additional people present that day; however, I do not remember specifically where they during this particular briefing. I also do not remember the names of the Afghan officers other than the two Colonels from CPMD.			
10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT		PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT HQ ISAF DATED 20140816

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____


(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES



Events of 5 Aug 2014

Eyewitness Statement

Before (b)(3), (b)(6) starts briefing to participants, because I drank too much water, I asked him if I may find a rest room, "sound's good" (b)(3), (b)(6) said. Then I walked to west side of that position and asked two ANA soldiers for rest room, then the ANA soldier showed me a building to the east side of that location. Finally I found the rest room, I used it, then I went back where (b)(3), (b)(6) and the rest of people were standing.

When I reached that location, (b)(3), (b)(6) already started briefing to the participants. I stopped where my teammate (another linguist) was standing. After a few minutes I walked to a T wall in order to stand in the shade for a moment. After (b)(3), (b)(6) was done with the briefing, I walked back towards (b)(3), (b)(6) in order to assist the other interpreter while the participants asked him questions. I was standing beside (b)(3), (b)(6), suddenly I heard the horrible noise of shooting. For a few seconds, I guessed it's just firecrackers because I didn't see anyone run away from the area. When I saw a bullet impact very close to me on the ground, I thought the bad guys were shooting on us from behind a concrete wall. I couldn't locate the source of the shooting sound but I preferred to escape by running towards that building which seemed to me to be the closest. So I went inside the hallway of that building but the noise of shooting seem to me much closer or louder than outside. I then preferred to go into a room on the left side because the door of that room was open. When I got in to that room, an American civilian and two ANA soldiers who had PT uniforms on were already in there hiding. One of the ANA soldiers asked us to stay in that room but the room had an open window to the back side of the building. I thought to myself that the shooters might be more than three to four guys. I told myself if they come to our room from back windows, we can be an easy target. I told the civilian American, I am not going to stay in this room and it is your decision if you want to stay or leave. I asked the ANA soldier if I can jump out of that window. "Go ahead" said the ANA soldier. When I jumped out of that window, I felt somebody pushed me from the back. I fell down and I felt some bad pain in my lower back. When I was out of the window, the shooting had stopped. But however, I decided to continue running towards the vehicles about 100 meters away. No one was at vehicles, I then walked back toward to the buildings and after 20m I found (b)(3), (b)(6). The 3 of us walked back to the vehicles and got inside. We then drove to camp Qarga. (b)(3), (b)(6) drove the vehicle.

At the Qarga medical treatment facility, I felt weak and dizzy. The medical personnel gave me an IV and medicine. I became unconscious and woke up at the hospital in BAF. I was in BAF for 24 hours before being released and flew back to ISAF with (b)(3), (b)(6).

Linguist, CSTC-A CJ-ENG

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Telephonic interview at KAIA on 21 Aug 14 at 1200

When we went inside the hallway, restroom was at the right side. There was nobody in the restroom when he used it.

He saw a couple of ANA soldiers that had their PT uniform on.

He asked them where the bathroom was, and they showed him the bathroom.

There was another room in the hallway.

Doesn't know if it was the same bathroom where the shooter was.

Went in the building that he used the bathroom (during the shooting). Gunfire was louder in the building.

He went inside the hallway of the big building.

It was the door that was closest to the street, closer to (b)(3), (b)(6)

The door faced the street when he entered.

Bathroom that he used was on the right side of the hallway.

He went back to the briefing after bathroom use.

There were soldiers in the barracks.

He went in the door at the left side, because it was opened, there was another ANA soldier in PT uniform with civilian American.

He went in the same door (entrance door) as he used before to use the bathroom.

Inside the hallway then went to the first door at the left. It was a bedroom, there were two beds.

Same room where he climbed out the window.

He was facing the vehicles? Stairs were on the left, ran uphill towards the vehicles.

Soldier asked him to stay in the room. Fire was louder in the building, asked ANA if he could jump out of the window.

American person was a civilian. Translated ANA speech to American person, and asked if he wanted to stay in the room. He told him that he was going to jump out of the window.

Fire stopped when he jumped out the window. Didn't hear any more fire, went towards the vehicles.

Nobody there from his team, walked back towards the area, and saw (b)(6) from the ANA with (b)(6) (b)(6). He stopped by (b)(6), then saw (b)(3), (b)(6) and went back to vehicle.

Drove towards coalition forces base.

Medics were asking for interpreter and said he could interpret. ANA General got injured from his lower knee, doesn't remember the ANA General's name. Medics took him (b)(6) over to another room and gave him an IV.

While he was being transported he could only hear the noises of the helicopter. Doesn't remember who was in the helicopter with him. He stayed at BAF for 24 hours.

He still has problems with his back. Medic told him to go to civilian doctor, and is taking pain relievers. They're not working very well.

He was in the crew with (b)(3), (b)(6), he thought it was a firecracker, he didn't know where the fire was coming from so he went inside the building.

Didn't see any injured individuals in the building.

Approved for Release

Statement of (b)(6), MOD MAG HQ ISAF, Kabul, 20140807 1450

Q. Please list all of your team members who were present at Camp Qargha on 5 August 2014.

A. BG Bartscher, (b)(6), 3 NCOs, CPT.

Q. Please describe your job, responsibilities, and level of experience.

A. I'm the (b)(6) to the MOD G7 Training. I'm at the strategic level. I had accompanied BG Bartscher, the Deputy Advisor to the MOD, to the area before. (b)(6) is the MFNDU Commander's Advisor. (b)(6) is his deputy.

Q. Please describe your team's security planning for this event.

A. The CPT was there for security. The CPT tries to coordinate with the British CPT, but there was no further coordination. I saw Danish security. I knew one week in advance about the trip. I don't know about the Afghans.

Q. Please describe any coordination with other organizational Personnel Security Detachments (PSDs) that your team conducted.

Q. Please describe your internal and external communication equipment.

A. I don't have knowledge of the communications. Coordination was in-person.

Q. Please describe any rehearsals your team conducted.

A. I received a course in Stavanger and I read materials here. You can't prevent this type of event.

Q. Please provide a list of any of your team member who may have photos or videos.

A. I have photos and I will share them.

Q. Please describe your team's plan for MEDEVAC.

Q. Please describe the events and your actions from your arrival at Camp Qargha through your departure.

A. We went to see the central water tank pumps where there were guards. We walked between the Hesco barriers and the fence and we were out there for about 20 to 30 minutes at the first place. We were at the second place for about an hour. Nobody was wearing armor and there was not a lot of security coordination. We saw one or two Afghan training companies. I saw the Danish on a roof but I didn't see other security. In the background of the second stop, there was a live-firing range. We were concerned about danger coming from the street outside the gate. We grouped for about 10-15 minutes while (b)(3), (b)(6) was briefing about infrastructure for future growth. We were at

the second place for nearly an hour. Nothing was out of the ordinary, but I wondered why one of the road gates were opened. I heard a long burst and it sounded like someone shot a full magazine. I was shouting to the guys on the roof and I secured the area toward the guards at the water pumps. I saw MG Greene on the ground. I had spent 6 years as a medical NCO and I knew he was deceased. I heard crying and I saw running – it was chaotic. I didn't know BG Bartscher was wounded. I knew Camp Qargha and decided to take them to the Role 1 MTF. BG Bartscher went to the right side of the vehicle. The heavily wounded went to the ICU – there were 5 or 6. I thought the Brits knew of the event since [REDACTED] (b)(6) was from the area (he is British). I hadn't had a good feeling about being at the live fire range by the water storage tank at the second stop. Another platoon was dry firing. One Afghan seemed to be missing from the briefing. There was no tension during MG Greene's discussion at the second stop. The Afghans didn't provide any assistance. The CPTs took care of their own. I didn't hear any firing after the burst.

Approved for Release

Statement of [REDACTED] (b)(6), MP Company Germany, Kabul, 20140807 1320

Q. Please list all of your team members who were present at Camp Qargha on 5 August 2014.

A. BG Bartscher, [REDACTED] (b)(6)

Q. Please describe your job, responsibilities, and level of experience.

A. I am the leader of the CPT for BG Bartscher. I have [REDACTED] (b)(6) of experience. This is my third time in Afghanistan and I've deployed to Kosovo. I joined the Army in

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

Q. Please describe your team's security planning for this event.

A. We learned of the event 3 or 4 days prior. About 2 days prior, we did a recon. We had received information from the front office about the event. We drove to the main gate.

Q. Please describe any coordination with other organizational Personnel Security Detachments (PSDs) that your team conducted.

A. I spoke to the British CPT. There are no comms between us and the American PSD. I know the American PSD, but there's only a small office and there's no opportunity to coordinate. We internally discussed threats because this was an HVT. We considered rocket attacks. It was threat condition orange for VBIED. Other teams were behind us by 15 minutes for back-up. We discussed intel threats. I didn't know how big the party was. There were 8 VIPs. We coordinated with the British guards for the drive out but not for actions on site.

Q. Please describe your internal and external communication equipment.

A. We have VHF radios. In the vehicles, we have ICN for MCC and MOVECON. We called on arrival and departure. We have the same radios but cannot communicate with the British because they're on different frequencies.

Q. Please describe any rehearsals your team conducted.

A. There is no training here, it was all done in Germany. About one and a half hours before departure, we go over routes, times, and SOPs.

Q. Please provide a list of any of your team member who may have photos or videos.

A. Only driving out. We have a Go-Pro on [REDACTED] (b)(6) vehicle.

Q. Please describe your team's plan for MEDEVAC.

A. We have no plan for MEDEVAC. We have a Bravo medic (like a combat lifesaver) who has a medic bag. In the car, the medic treated the general for a GSW. Prior to meeting, I didn't know about the MTF, but (b)(6) knew of the MTF on Camp Qargha. We took the US civilian with us to the MTF. There was no aerial MEDEVAC available. We called the NSE for MEDEVAC. BG Bartscher was wounded on the upper leg.

Q. Please describe the events and your actions from your arrival at Camp Qargha through your departure.

A. At 0845 we drove to the location with BG Bartscher. There was a discussion between the Afghan and the US general at the second site. MG Greene was telling them that they need to build the programs. We were focused on the street. There were guards on the building, on the roof with coalition forces next to the building. The shooting started and someone pushed me down. I thought the guards were shooting. I took BG Bartscher and (b)(6) down to the covered area. The vehicles came down, I called them and ran to them. (b)(6) saw smoke on the street outside of the camp and thought the shooting was from outside. The shooting started about 5-10 minutes after the briefing at the indoor storage tank. I didn't notice anything unusual about the Afghans. I saw many Danish guards. I didn't clear the building because the Danish guards were already there. I didn't look in the building. I only saw the Afghan general. I didn't see any Afghan Soldiers and no Afghan Soldiers helped. I had previously had some visual cues training.

Approved for Release 2013/08/08

Statement of (b)(6) Kabul, 20140807 1419

Q. Please list all of your team members who were present at Camp Qargha on 5 August 2014.

A. (b)(6) OF6
Bartscher.

Q. Please describe your job, responsibilities, and level of experience.

A. I am the Deputy Team Leader and medic. I am responsible for evacuation. I stay near the vehicles. I joined (b)(6) I became a member of the CPT. This is my second tour in Afghanistan. I'm trained as a CPT leader and as a medic.

Q. Please describe your team's security planning for this event.

A. At first I tried to get information from other CPTs, but only coordinated with the British regarding timelines. There was no coordination with the others and there was no info on routes, medical, etc. We did a threat assessment and were warned of VBIEDs. There was only one route in and out. We considered Green on Blue and we talked about actions on the objective. We were notified of the event about a week prior by the front office.

Q. Please describe any coordination with other organizational Personnel Security Detachments (PSDs) that your team conducted.

A. We drove to the camp to see the route and the gate, but we didn't have any contact with the Afghans. We drove on route Orange to recon routes for evacuation.

Q. Please describe your internal and external communication equipment.

A. We use ICN and German radios. There are problems with the ICN in communicating. The British have ICN but they have their own frequencies and we can't lock onto their frequency so we can only communicate internally.

Q. Please describe any rehearsals your team conducted.

A. We trained in Germany, including Green on Blue. We talked about G on B history and discussed guns and suicide vests. We had a training scenario where the Governor's men attacked us.

Q. Please provide a list of any of your team member who may have photos or videos.

A. We have none of the incident, only of the drive out.

Q. Please describe your team's plan for MEDEVAC.

A. I didn't know of the MTF – we had planned to evac to the HQ. We tried to coordinate with the British but there was no coordination. We didn't know anything.

Q. Please describe the events and your actions from your arrival at Camp Qargha through your departure.

A. The range was active all day – we heard shooting all day. I saw a Dan with a big scope that I had seen in a previous meeting. I don't know if they cleared the building. We saw the Danish on the site when we arrived. I didn't see Afghan Soldiers walking around the building. We saw action – someone was running we saw someone fall. I thought the danger was from the street. I had an M28 rifle, so I set it up and searched for a target on the roofs of houses beyond the gate. After I had scanned for a while, [redacted] (b)(6) called a Green on Blue. The right lane towards the building was closed. I ran down towards the building to locate BG Bartscher and [redacted] (b)(6) and evacuated them. The second car stopped for an American. The Afghans seemed paralyzed. An American had asked me if I knew what had happened. There had been a lot of Afghans with guns during the second meeting. I saw 2 Afghans with M16s. The Danes had a ring of 100M but allowed the Afghans in.

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Statement of [redacted] (b)(6) MP Station, Kabul,
20140807 1530

Q. Please list all of your team members who were present at Camp Qargha on 5 August 2014.

A. Bartscher, [redacted] (b)(6)

Q. Please describe your job, responsibilities, and level of experience.

A. Normally I'm a driver for a vehicle. Usually, there are 6 in the CPT, but one was in Germany and another was out. I drove the VIP on this day. I am an [redacted] (b)(6) Germany. I joined the Army [redacted] (b)(6) and I have been doing CPT since last year. I have been in Afghanistan since June 27.

Q. Please describe your team's security planning for this event.

A. Not so much. Two days prior we did a route recon from the HQ to the camp gate.

Q. Please describe any coordination with other organizational Personnel Security Detachments (PSDs) that your team conducted.

A. The team leader spoke with the British team. We would have spoken with the US team but the US don't coordinate.

Q. Please describe your internal and external communication equipment.

A. We have no external communication.

Q. Please describe any rehearsals your team conducted.

A. We didn't conduct any. We didn't know what the camp looked like.

Q. Please provide a list of any of your team member who may have photos or videos.

A. Just video of the route out.

Q. Please describe your team's plan for MEDEVAC.

A. Nothing – no plan.

Q. Please describe the events and your actions from your arrival at Camp Qargha through your departure.

A. When I parked the car, I saw the Danish on top of the building. There was a sandbag position on the roof. I saw Afghans near the tank taking pictures. We were in the car for about 20 minutes with the engine running and the door closed – we were ready to take off. I thought I heard shots and I saw the Danes drop to the roof, so I just drove towards the building. I saw people on the ground and saw a lot of blood. I saw a

Statement of [REDACTED] (b)(6) MP Station, Kabul,
20140807 1530

bloody African American. I called the team leader and he said he was with the General. I drove around the street and the general and team leader got into my car and we left, driving backwards until we turned around and waited for the other vehicle. [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6) vehicle took the lead, followed by the British, then went to the hospital. It seemed like a normal day prior to this. Afghan guards were on the first point. I don't know if Afghans went down the road. I had wondered why everyone took off their IBA.

Approved for Release

Statement of (b)(6) Kabul, 20140807 1605

Q. Please list all of your team members who were present at Camp Qargha on 5 August 2014.

A. Bartscher, (b)(6)

Q. Please describe your job, responsibilities, and level of experience.

A. I am the driver of the evacuation vehicle and I've been on the CPT since 2012. I trained to be a driver in 2009 and have been an MP since I joined the military.

Q. Please describe your team's security planning for this event.

A. We conducted a recon of the route 3 or 4 days prior. We had internal briefings about threats, threats enroute, and Green on Blue. We assumed the Afghan Army would check their people for such an important event. We were concerned about IDF and street threats.

Q. Please describe any coordination with other organizational Personnel Security Detachments (PSDs) that your team conducted.

A. We talked to the British about convoying up together and had good cooperation. We had no discussions with the Americans.

Q. Please describe your internal and external communication equipment.

A. We only have internal communications.

Q. Please describe any rehearsals your team conducted.

A. We only conducted training in Germany. We did insider threat training in Germany along with our other classes.

Q. Please provide a list of any of your team member who may have photos or videos.

A. There was a video camera on the vehicle from HQ to Point 1 then to Point 2 in the camp.

Q. Please describe your team's plan for MEDEVAC.

A. Our SOP is to go to the nearest building or drive away to safety. I didn't know the MTF was on the camp. (b)(6) directed me to the British Camp because he knew there was an MTF there.

Q. Please describe the events and your actions from your arrival at Camp Qargha through your departure.

A. I parked the vehicle and recognized a tank, crane and vehicle drove by and parked at the building. It drove slowly. It was a green pick-up, probably ANP. I don't know if it was there when the group was passed the building. One Afghan went to the roof – I'm not sure about weapons. I saw smoke – black smoke. I saw no reaction from the guard force. I was in the car – in the seat. The right-side door was opened because my partner was smoking. Because the door was open, we could hear shooting. We saw people dropping. I called the team leader and the first vehicle drove down. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) got the sniper rifle and scanned by propping it on the hood of the car. He couldn't see any threat, so he tossed the rifle in the back of the vehicle and walked next to the car while I drove it slowly. When I got to the bottom, I had to back up. The British vehicle was at the bottom. A Brit asked if we could take a casualty. We couldn't see anyone from the German team. I saw [redacted] (b)(6) coming to his vehicle and saw BG Brathurst run to the other vehicle. We saw an American and he got in the back right. The first vehicle got behind him and drove backwards up the hill, turned around and went to the hospital.

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Personal Interview with Maj Gen Benjamin J. Bathurst

Conducted in his office from 1950-2125 hours, 8 August 2014, at Camp ISAF

Maj Gen Bathurst (GBR) is the Deputy Advisor, Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD). On 5 Aug 2014 he attended an NTM-A sponsored meeting at the Marshal Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU). The event was hosted by a subordinate unit of NTM-A, the Unified Training Advisory Group (UTAG) but was also supported by both the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). The purpose of the event was to highlight the problem of insufficient water supply for the MFNDU site and concerns over Afghan plans to appropriately budget for operations and maintenance. From his perspective, it was a significant concern of the MOD due to its direct impact on the training of many thousands of leaders that are necessary to professionalize the Afghan Army. It would also highlight similar issues that would arise across a range of other bases.

MG Greene, Deputy Commander of CSTC-A, attended the meeting to try and determine whether or not to award a contract for Phase II (the Command and Staff College). Given the current facilities under construction did not have adequate water supply, he questioned whether or not he should compound the problem by adding more demand to the system. The Construction Property Management Directorate (CPMD) of the MOD is responsible for solving the water supply problem and whilst there was a plan, it had yet to be executed. Despite repeated efforts at multiple levels to resolve the problem, including a recent "Water Shura" hosted by the CSTC-A CJENG (b)(3), (b)(6) it was determined a meeting at a higher level was required to force CPMD to honour their obligations.

MG Ameree, Director of CPMD, was invited but unable to attend and (b)(6) a very able ANA officer, represented CPMD at this meeting. At the second Stand on the visit, MG Greene challenged CPMD to provide a solution, which (b)(6) assured him they would. It was relayed later, through the interpreter for Brigadier Bruce Russell that MG Jalandar Shah, Commander of the MFNDU, had a heated discussion in Dari with (b)(6). In this conversation he called (b)(6) a liar and challenged him to be honest and tell MG Greene that CPMD was unable to execute their portion of the project. This exchange, which was discussed with MG Greene, highlighted exactly the problem that was faced, namely repeated assurances of action but without it being followed through. Maj Gen Bathurst believed, in theory, CPMD should be able to complete the water supply upgrades but in reality, given their failure to execute to date, there was still doubt whether they would get this accomplished. For this reason at Stop 2, MG Greene laid down exactly what was to happen: either CPMD repaired the two water pipes and drilled the two wells, or MG Greene would not sign the \$70M Phase II contract.

All those who participated had a common interest in seeing the MFNDU grow and prosper but the fact that it had been constructed in three separate phases (with Phase II stalled owing to contractor liquidation and having to be re-procured after Phase III) meant there were a lot of people responsible for various parts, hence the need for an all-informed meeting to take a holistic approach.

Maj Gen Bathurst has a Close Protection team formed of 6 Royal Military Policemen all of whom have to pass a long and stringent course at the Close Protection Unit in UK; the standard of his Close Protection team is exactly the same as that of the British Ambassador as they are all found from the same Close Protection Unit. Normally, every visit is reconnoitered in advance but they did not do so on this occasion as MFNDU is one of their most frequent destinations on account of the Afghan National Army Officers' Academy (ANAOA) being a UK lead and Maj Gen Bathurst is the UK National Contingent Commander. They were not only familiar with the whole of the MFNDU campus but also familiar with FOB Qargha having had to divert in there a month previously when routes back to HQ ISAF went red.

He was aware that both the PSDs of MGs Wendel and Greene did a reconnaissance in advance of the event. He was made aware subsequently by BG Jackson that BG Bartscher's German PSD only conducted reconnaissance up to the front gate but he did comment that his UK Close Protection team and BG Bartscher's PSD were well known to each other, conducting many moves together, owing to the close overlap between Deputy Advisor MoD and General Staff responsibilities. Maj Gen Bathurst found all of the PSDs to be extremely professional throughout the day, despite not having done extensive coordination beforehand, since they focus on their individual principal with the outer ring provided by the UTAG Danish Security Force Protection team (with elements of Australian force protection) who clearly had their orders and were fully familiar with every aspect.

The [REDACTED] (b)(6) provided an opening presentation at the initial meeting place. In Maj Gen Bathurst's opinion, the event appeared to be very well coordinated from the beginning was very visible on the site and at each Stand, scanning their arcs and forming a visible presence between likely threats and the ANA-ISAF group. All other Personal Security Detachments (PSD) provided augmentation to the Danish team and by their nature, PSDs focus on their individual principal rather than being tasked with wider force protection duties. In the opening remarks by [REDACTED] (b)(6) he did identify the Danish Security Team as the security lead. He also made a comment regarding force that the final stop, to visit the underground water tank would be somewhat restricted in numbers with caution needing to be taken regarding footing and overhead obstructions.

[REDACTED] (b)(6) invited the Chief Mentor at ANAOA, Brigadier Bruce Russell to give the ground brief at the first Stop on the HLZ. Brig Russell pointed out the three Phases of construction. He also made a particular point of drawing the audience's attention to the PGSS/Aerostat, saying that at the base of the tether was FOB Camp Qargha where the UTAG and ANAOA mentors and force protection was resident. Although he did not mention there was a Role 1 hospital located inside FOB Qargha, the location of the ISAF force elements would lead anyone to conclude that this was the safe area if in any doubt.

At the start, when Maj Gen Bathurst took in the surroundings, he recalls noticing that although there were a number of Afghans present, none were armed. He found this interesting, wondering why they did not have personal weapons or armed security but from previous visits he was aware that the MFNDU has a very low weapon carrying population with none of the students or instructors being armed. He also added that at Stop 2, in vicinity of the active firing range, he was not concerned as the range personnel appeared to be at the 25M point, rather than at the 300M point and therefore were

very far away. He also noticed that there force protection between the range and the ANA-ISAF group. Whilst the presentation by [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was going on, Maj Gen Bathurst observed the UTAG Danish Force Protection guarding the front and the back of the group; he also had one of his Close Protection team right by him and noticed that BG Bartscher had the same. The remaining Close Protection/PSD teams were in and around their vehicles in the normal posture.

At Stop 3, while moving to the underground water tank he noted armed Afghans in the vicinity of the Garrison Support Unit (GSU) Security area. He did not find this odd since the GSU is overall responsible for security for the MFNDU and had seen them before, most recently when LTG Anderson addressed the ANA Strategic Leadership Programme. On that occasion, there was an even larger group of ANA-ISAF personnel and armed GSU were providing the security along the road outside the lecture theatre where LTG Anderson addressed the course. He had also seen the GSU guarding the MFNDU entrance and was aware from previous briefings that they manned the towers on the hills surrounding the site. Again he noted a very visible security presence by the Danish Security Team, to include several Australian Sharpshooters positioned on the roof of the MP Barracks and one member of the team scanning the area with binoculars. He felt that there was effective overwatch of the most likely threat area.

As the team moved outside the wall and along a path which ultimately led to the underground water tank, again he noted the presence of the Danish Security Team. During the briefing at the final scheduled Stop inside the shelter covering the water tank, Maj Gen Bathurst heard [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) UTAG Infrastructure Officer, ask for [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) CSTC-A CPMD Budget Advisor, several times. Maj Gen Bathurst assumed the plan was for [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) to do his presentation inside the tank but was unsure why he had not arrived, thinking perhaps he was unable to move the large board that he had been carrying. The brief inside the underground water tank took about 15-20 minutes, at which time the group made their way back to a small open area behind the MP Barracks. As it turned out later, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was supposed to present a budget overview briefing at Stop 2 but that had been postponed due to time constraints. Maj Gen Bathurst was unaware of the plans to make an unscheduled stop back by the MP Barracks but had no particular cause for concern at the time.

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) provided the group with a budget overview highlighting the requirements to address a multitude of concerns pertaining to adequate water supply, and operations and maintenance of MFNDU overall. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) is a tall, very polished individual, who held everyone's attention throughout the brief. As [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) completed his brief, Maj Gen Bathurst leaned over to [redacted] (b)(6) and reminded him to allow MGs Greene and Wendell an opportunity to make some closing remarks. Maj Gen Bathurst was standing immediately behind MGs Greene and Wendel and subsequently suggested to MG Wendel that given the number of Afghan officers present, it would be an opportunity to remind them that any attempt to extort money from the contractors (a problem from earlier in the year) must be stamped down on.

It was about that time the shooting began.

At first, Maj Gen Bathurst was fairly sure the firing was coming from straight ahead, having been under fire before and knowing what the 'crack' and 'thump' of bullets sounds like from head on; however, he did not observe the shooter himself. Instinctively, he went straight back rather than to the left or right owing to rounds falling either side of him. On going straight back, he came up against the stone wall, then noticing a sliding metal gate with enough room for him to get behind; he remembers thinking the gate offered cover from view but probably not from fire and that there was a large gap at the bottom. He noted the firing came in at least three bursts (possibly four) each of 5-7 rounds and whilst the first rounds were directly in his directed, he noted that the later bursts where at more of an angle.

The immediate member of his Close Protection team, (b)(6) had moved back to his normal position over by Maj Gen Bathurst's side just before the firing began, having previously moved across the group to have a word with the Aide, (b)(6) was in the process of raising his rifle when he was hit twice, once in the arm and the other on his holstered pistol. Maj Gen Bathurst told (b)(6) to get in behind the metal gate to assess his wound. Behind the gate was also Brig Russell's Afghan interpreter who was considerably agitated, having seen another GSU member the other side of the gate. Being very certain of where the rounds had come from, Maj Gen Bathurst did not believe that this other GSU member was a threat (he can be seen in the photograph as the gate sentry). However, the Afghan interpreter was desperate to get out from behind the gate and cross over to the dead ground by the entrance to the water tank which he did.

There was the sound of rounds being returned and after the firing had stopped, Maj Gen Bathurst's attention was instinctively drawn to his Aide, (b)(6) who was lying on the centre ground but moving and crying out loudly. (b)(6) was following the normal procedure by trying to remain in place until the other Close Protection team members arrived, having given the Contact report already over his Personal Role Radio. (b)(6) was telling Maj Gen Bathurst to remain in place but Maj Gen Bathurst was saying to (b)(6) that they had to get to (b)(6). At that point, (b)(6) and (b)(6) of Maj Gen Bathurst's Close Protection team arrived quickly on the ground with an orange stretcher and started attending to (b)(6), applying first aid to stop the bleeding.

Maj Gen Bathurst noted that the PSDs of both MGs Greene and Wendel were very quickly on site and began to move their people into vehicles for evacuation. He also noted Brig Russell attending to BG Sakhi and (b)(6) (GBR) applying first aid to (b)(3), (b)(6) a member of the USACE PSD. At that point, (b)(6) (as the leader of the UK Close Protection team and responsible for incident management) told (b)(6) to move both Maj Gen Bathurst and (b)(6) to the lead UK Close Protection vehicle to take him straight to the Role 1 Medical Facility at Qargha. Upon arrival, he immediately ran into (b)(6) (b)(6) who thought he was role playing a MASCAL drill, having finished just such a drill that morning as the Role 1 staff were in the middle of the RiP/ToA and fortunately, manned above the normal level. He explained that it was certainly not a drill and that (b)(6) did indeed have a gunshot wound but that at least five additional CAT A casualties were en route and that they should prepare accordingly, including sending additional medics to the scene of the shooting.

Casualties began to stream into the Role 1 hospital shortly thereafter and although he cannot be absolutely sure of the order, BG Bartscher came with a PSD member, (b)(6), Brig Russell with BG Sakhi, then (b)(3), (b)(6) came limping in unaided and (b)(3), (b)(6) carried in. There were also others but not all were well known to him. He also noted (b)(3), (b)(6) was there trying to find MGs Greene and Wendel. He was told by two individuals that their PSD team had taken them by vehicle for evacuation, but at the time they had not arrived at the FOB Qargha Medical Facility.

Maj Gen Bathurst then departed the Medical Center to speak with (b)(6) (the FOB Qargha Force Protection Company Commander for ANAOA who he knew personally) to ensure that he fully understood the situation. They discussed the need to send the Quick Reaction Force to the scene and Brig Russell offered to return with them to ensure that everything was under control. There was also a discussion about the need to ensure there was adequate manning to assist the medical staffs who were quickly becoming overwhelmed, not least by the non-injured wanting to ensure that their injured were being cared for. He therefore tasked his UK Close Protection team to assist in the Medical Center and was told later that the German PSD had been particularly effective in helping the medics with their own enhanced medical skills.

Outside the Role 1 hospital, Maj Gen Bathurst was again joined by Brig Russell who had returned from the scene and informed that the Danish Security Team had secured the site and that the shooter was confirmed dead. He was assured by (b)(6) who had remained in the Operations Room that the incident had been reported upwards and that helicopters were inbound shortly. There was a discussion on the whereabouts of MG Wendel and Greene's PSD and (b)(6) said that they had looked for them using the PGSS/Aerostat but had not seen them. After that, Maj Gen Bathurst observed a number of PSD teams and individuals who had been separated as most teams had split to attend to their own, and other casualties. They were trying to find and account for other members of their units and there were a number of discussions on who had been treated and who was where and people connected back up together. In particular, there were a number of interpreters who were visibly shocked and needed to be matched up with their teams again. Casualties were being moved to the HLZ at this time.

After the helicopters had come and gone, Maj Gen Bathurst had discussions with Brigadier Russell and (b)(6). It was agreed that it was important that they should go and see the Commander of MFNDU, MG Jalandar Shah, and (b)(6) was asked to telephone ahead. On arrival at the Commander's headquarters, he was met by MG Jalandar Shah but also MG Farahi (GSG2), MG Payenda (IG) and an officer from GS Legal who had arrived to start the investigation. The Aghans were expressing remorse at the incident and were clearly shaken by the event but seemed relieved by the reassurances given by Maj Gen Bathurst that whilst lessons must be learned, ISAF would not walk away from MFNDU. The Afghan leadership made a particular point of the fact Brigadier Russell had looked after BG Sakhi and it was very much appreciated that the latter had been treated the same as the ISAF casualties. Following these meetings, Maj Gen Bathurst returned to Camp ISAF, arriving back by 1500.

In retrospect, he hypothetically asked...should we have been wearing body armor...should the buildings have been checked and if so, how many along the route taken through the day. He also wondered how the event had been reported, noting that actions on the ground had been well executed by the PSDs and the medical response, both immediate and in the Role 1 hospital, was very professional. His final comment was a constant reminder that after 14 years of looking after the Afghans, now they really have to look after us.

-----NOTHING FOLLOWS-----

Transcribed from my personal notes and submitted for approval to MajGen Bathurst on 13 Aug 2014.

DONALD E. (Ed) JACKSON, JR.
Brigadier General, US Army

Approved for Release

Pages 1 through 3 redacted for the following reasons:

Tab B, Exhibit D2 - (b)(1)1.4b - DEFER TO NATO

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION HQ ISAF	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140808	3. TIME 1146	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME (b)(6)	6. SSN N/A	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS HQ ISAF / BRITISH ARMY			

9. I, (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1. What is your duty description.

(b)(6)

2. What was the purpose of the event you attended at MFNDU and what was your role?

To provide close protection to MG Bathurst whilst attending the MFNDU Project Board Visit.

3. Who was the host of the event, and who was overall responsible for command and control?

National Training Mission Afghanistan

4. Who was responsible for planning, coordinating, and executing force protection measures in support of this event?

NMTA with various CPT for the individual dignitaries. My specific task was to provide CP to MG Bathurst.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(6) TAKEN AT HQ ISAF DATED 8/8/14

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

5. Did you have a PSD/CPT assigned to you? Did you have a Guardian Angel(s), if so how many? Were they trained? What instructions did you give to them? MG Bathurst had a 6 man CPT assigned. All the CPT are trained to conduct CP Operations, and received task specific pre deployment training prior to deployment.

6. Were the efforts of your PSD/CPT/Guardian Angel(s) coordinated with others, or synchronized as part of an overall force protection plan?

The CP Team's mission is the protection of MG Bathurst only with other considerations being secondary to that mission.

7. Did you receive a security brief upon arrival at the site that day? If so, how effective was the security plan briefing? Did it cover medical evacuation and the location of the nearest medical treatment facility?

We received no security brief from the NMIA FP, however My team had performed numerous reces on QARGMA and knew to extract to CAMP QARGMA for med and to lock down post incident.

8. Did you notice anything unusual with the atmospherics at MFNDU...any body language or other behavior that could be viewed as hostile?

I did not notice any atmospheric change at MFNDU that would cause an escalation of FP measures immediately prior to the incident or on the previous serials.

9. Please describe the events that took place from your initial arrival through the final stop where the incident occurred

1 Upon arrival at the GSD (Location of GoB) MG Bathurst (b)(6) and (b)(6) and (b)(6) (TERO) De-bussed and moved to the presentation locn. The VIP & PES vehicle remained

2. Approx 10 mins in, I heard bursts of SAF and could see personnel injured and others taking cover. The BG sent a radio message, informing us of the contact and that he had been hit.

3. Both PES and VIP vehicles moved to contact point, extracted VIL&BG, then administered first aid to ADC and extracted him to CAMP QARGMA.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(6) TAKEN AT HQ ISAF DATED 8/8/14

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

10. In your own words, please describe the actions that took place upon arrival at the final location (see attached).

See attached statement, dated 05 Aug 14.

(b)(6)

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AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

APD LC v1.01ES

Statement of [redacted] (b)(6)

Tuesday 05 August 2014

I am [redacted] (b)(6) RMP. I am currently employed as [redacted] (b)(6) of DMod MAG CP team currently tasked with the protection of Maj Gen Bathurst. I have held this position since [redacted] (b)(6)

On 05 Aug 14, I was on task along with my team at the Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA) / Afghan National Defence University where our Principle was attending a series of briefing stands relating to the infrastructure of the aforementioned institutions.

About 1145 hrs, that day, my team, along with the Principle, his interpreter and his Aide-De-Camp, [redacted] (b)(6) WG moved to the fourth serial on the days programme, a brief on a subterranean water tank at grid [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a. Due to the large numbers of personnel attending the briefing and the enclosed nature of the water tank we were instructed that only essential personnel were to attend. Maj Gen Bathurst, [redacted] (b)(6) and the Body Guard, [redacted] (b)(6) went to the area the briefing was to take place and our Personal Escort Section (PES) and VIP vehicle remained on the road approx. 75m North of where the briefing was taking place.

About 1155 hrs, I was in the PES vehicle, along with [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) when I heard bursts of small arms fire from the area where the briefing was taking place and saw people taking cover. I heard [redacted] (b)(6) shout 'CONTACT' and heard a PRR message from the BG stating the same and that he had been hit. [redacted] (b)(6) then exited the vehicle and ran toward the contact point using the vehicle as a screen as the vehicle drove to the contact point. The VIP vehicle, driven by [redacted] (b)(6) followed behind.

Upon arrival at the contact point I ran to the edge of a building which overlooked the contact point and saw a number of casualties on the ground including [redacted] (b)(6). I identified where the BG and Maj Gen Bathurst were and shouted at them to get into the VIP Vehicle. They ran to the vehicle and embussed and the vehicle extracted to Camp Qargha. I then ran to where [redacted] (b)(6) lay on the ground and was being tended to by [redacted] (b)(6) had sustained a gunshot wound to his lower left leg, his left elbow and his right hip. He was in pain and was asking for pain relief. [redacted] (b)(6) administered an morphine auto injector to [redacted] (b)(6) and I said we needed to get [redacted] (b)(6) into the PES vehicle to extract him from the scene and get him back to Role 1 Med at Camp Qargha. [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) an unknown US officer and I then lifted [redacted] (b)(6) into the rear of the PES vehicle and extracted him to Role 1 Med. Whilst driving to Role 1 Med, [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) and I attempted to carry out further first aid to [redacted] (b)(6).


Upon arrival at Role 1 Med, [redacted] (b)(6) and I, along with two med personnel carried [redacted] (b)(6) into the treatment area on a stretcher and handed over the MIST report to [redacted] (b)(6) staff.

[redacted] (b)(6)

Statement of (b)(6) taken at
HQ ISAF dated 08 Aug 14.

(b)(6)

taken at



25193799

Tuesday 05 August 2014

(b)(6)

I am (b)(6) and I am currently employed as the (b)(6) (b)(6) of the DMOD MAG CPT team tasked with the protection of Maj Gen Bathurst, a possession I have held since Jun 14.

I will go on to describe the following place. The subterranean water storage plant within QARGAH camp and the Afghan national officer training academy located at grid (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a. The location to be visited was about 10 – 20 meters from an entry control point and was overlooked by a U shaped two story building. From where w I was located in the Teams Silver Toyota Land cruiser I could see the eastern and northern edge of the U shaped building and was about 50 – 60 meters from the main congregation for the visit. We were slightly elevated and north to the building was a metaled road I could clearly see about a third of the group as they were in a court yard area that was obscured from my view.

I was in the vehicle with (b)(6) all team members of DMOD MAG CPT. Approximately 1130hrs I heard a burst of what I believed to be automatic weapons fire and saw rounds splashing in and around the group of visitors to the water treatment plant. I then said contact and (b)(6) debussed from the vehicle. I then drove the vehicle down the metaled road approximately 50- 60 meters to the contact point. I could clearly see three US personal taking cover next to a small wall situated on the southern edge of the road. I then drove next to them and stopped the vehicle where (b)(6) debussed from the vehicle and moved to the wall. I could see (b)(6) to Maj Gen Bathurst laying on the courtyard he appeared to have been shot. I was unaware of where he had been hit. I then looked to my front to try and identify the contact point where I saw (b)(6) (b)(6) leading Maj General Bathurst to the VIP vehicle that was situated to my rear. (b)(6) (b)(6) then told the VIP Vehicle to extract to Camp Qargha as (b)(6) had been wounded and to remove Maj Gen Bathurst to safety. (b)(6) then dressed forward with a medical kit and started to treat (b)(6) also dressed forward to assist. There were roughly 15-20 ISAF forces in the area and after initial treatment (b)(6) (b)(6) and an unknown American carried (b)(6) to the vehicle and dragged him into the back seat of the PES vehicle. (b)(6) then started to apply pressure to the wounds sustained due to the contact. (b)(6) was assisting from the front seat. (b)(6) held onto the off side running boards on the external of the vehicle and the interpreter was in the boot of the vehicle. I then reversed the vehicle and conducted a Y turn and drove the PES vehicle with all PAX to the British medical facility at Camp Qargha. Upon Arriving I then debussed with the rest of the team and assisted with extracting (b)(6) from the vehicle with other members of the team and a female medic who I cannot recall.

I then moved the vehicle to a parking area in order to let other teams to bring casualties to the Medical Facility.

Signed

(b)(6)

Approved for Release

5 Aug 14

I am (b)(6) currently deployed on OP HERRICK as part of the DMOD MAG CP Team. A position I have held since 22 Jun 14.

On Tue 5 Aug 14, I was tasked as VIP driver for Maj Gen Bathurst, DMOD MAG. During which I was tasked to an NTM(A) event at MFNDU, where a high profile visit was being conducted with members of other nations.

About 1100 hrs, that day, the congregation arrived at a water pumping plant within the MFNDU to be shown the building. I parked my vehicle at a T-Junction approximately 50 meters away from where the briefing was ongoing with the Personal Escort Section (PES) vehicle containing members of the CP Team were. I was not facing the briefing as I was just off the road in which the briefing was on, however I could see the meeting to my left. The meeting was taking place on the opposite side of cream single story building which had a large concreted area in which the all of the congregation were standing. On top of the building I saw several armed NATO soldiers. Down the far side of the concreted area was a high Hesco Bastion wall and down the other side was the road which had T-Walls down the centre of it, as if it was a check point. The road leading to the water pumping facility was at a steep decline therefore my vehicle was parked in an elevated location.

About 1130 hrs, that day, I heard two bursts of gunfire of approx 5 rounds each. Hearing this I looked at the meeting place and then heard another burst of gunfire of approx 5 rounds and could see ground splash around by now where members of the congregation laying down wounded. The PES vehicle drove down the road towards the concreted area. I followed behind the PES vehicle and stopped short of the building. It was at this point that I could see (b)(6) (b)(6) DMOD MAG, laying wounded in the centre of the concreted area as well as other wounded people.

I then heard (b)(6) state over PRR that Maj Gen Bathurst was uninjured however he had been hit.

I then looked to my left and witnessed a male wearing a dark green digital patterned ANA soldier's uniform and a red beret carrying a large machine gun running away from the cream building in the opposite direction of the road.

At this point, I saw (b)(6) and Maj Gen Bathurst running up the road on the opposite side of the T-Walls, towards my vehicle. I shouted for them to get in, to which they did and (b)(6) (b)(6) and I extracted Maj Gen Bathurst to Camp Qargha which is located within the same complex.

(b)(6)

DMoD MAG CPT

Statement of Witness

05 Aug 2014

I am [redacted] (b)(6) British Army, I have been employed as part of DMoD MAG Close Protection Team looking after Major General Bathurst B, Welsh Guards, since 22 Jun 14.

On 05 Aug 14, I was part of the CP team escorting MG Bathurst around Afghan National Defense University, along with [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) (Body Guard). MG Bathurst was part of a congregation of other Generals, Multi-nationality, along with their CP Teams. Around 0930 hrs we arrived at the location. We moved around various parts of the site before finally arriving at the location of the incident at around 1140hrs. I was part of the Personal Escort Section that was positioned on a T Junction approximately 75 metres from where the brief was taking place and had a clear view of the party. From our vehicle the congregation of Generals where at the bottom of a slight hill with a barrier half way down and a metal gate at the bottom, there were buildings on the right and a lone building on the left, the incident took place between the building on the left and the metal gate at the bottom of the hill, the building on the left was where the gunman fired from which I will later describe. Approximately 1155hrs, whilst sat in the vehicle I heard multiple bursts (3-4 five round bursts) of automatic gunfire from the direction of the group, I looked at their location and saw a lot of dust from the splash of the rounds impacting the crowd as a number of personnel hit the floor and dived for cover. I immediately dismounted from the vehicle and ran towards the incident site. As I got to the location I was not sure on the location of the gunman, so I took cover behind a vehicle, before removing the Medical Kit. Once it was confirmed the gunman had been killed I moved towards the crowd where I saw an unknown amount of individuals lay on the floor wounded. I immediately began to administer first aid to [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) to MG Bathurst, when I examined him I found he had a gunshot wound to his right elbow, left shin and right hip/pelvis, due to his pain I administered morphine at 1200 hrs, I then helped move [redacted] (b)(6) to one of our vehicles where we drove him to Camp Quarga Medical Centre. Around 1230 hrs, I was tasked to escort Brigadier Russell, Scottish Guards Regiment, British Army, back to the site of the incident. On arrival at the site the QRF had secured the area, we moved towards the site of the actual shooting and all personnel were gone all that remained where a number of medical items lay around the floor. Myself and Brigadier Russell were escorted by a Danish soldier into a "U" shape building on the left, approximately 5 metres from the shooting site, as we entered the building we turned right and immediately right again, we entered the third room on the left, which I believe was a toilet. There were a number of people in this room and I saw 1 male, wearing Afghan National Army clothing dead of gunshot wounds on the floor. There were a number of bullet holes in the window directly next to him. I didn't see his weapon as the room was quite small (1metre x 2 metres) and the amount of people in the room blocked my view. We then visited the ANAOA HQ, before making our way back to Camp Quarga. I had no further dealings with this incident.

[redacted] (b)(6)

AGC (RMP)

05 Aug 14

Statement of Witness.

I am [redacted (b)(6)] a member of DMoD MAG Close Protection Team (CPT) and have been since 22 June 14.

On Tue 5 Aug 14, about 1155 hrs, I was sat in the Personal Escort Section (PES) Vehicle which was placed at a T-Junction facing the congregation of VIP's including Maj Gen Bathurst (our VIP) that was receiving a brief about a water pump facility about 40 meters to our front but slightly left. Just before this area was an off white 1 story building that I can remember seeing numerous Afghan National Army soldiers entering and exiting whilst the brief was taking place. I was in the PES vehicle with [redacted (b)(6)] all fellow members of DMoD MAG CPT, when I heard a burst of automatic gunfire approximately 4-7 rounds, in the area of which the congregation were receiving their brief. This drew my attention straight away to the area and I heard another burst of automatic gunfire again about 4-7 rounds, this time I could also see bullet splash on the ground in the vicinity of the congregation. I did not see where the rounds were fired from. At the time the rounds were being fired, [redacted (b)(6)] drove the vehicle forward about 35 meters to the area that the rounds were landing so we could get our VIP (Maj Gen Bathurst) into the vehicle and into safety. Once at the incident point, I debussed from the right hand side of our vehicle and assessed the area around me to which I saw numerous casualties. I then saw [redacted (b)(6)] administering morphine to [redacted (b)(6)] who was layed on his back. There was a lot of confusion amongst the congregation as nobody seemed to know where the shots were fired from or who fired them. I then ran towards [redacted (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(6)] to assist but at this stage we decided to extract [redacted (b)(6)] to Role 1 Medical at Camp Qargha. [redacted (b)(6)] an American soldier and I then lifted [redacted (b)(6)] in to the rear seats of the PES vehicle. PES vehicle then extracted to Camp Qargha with myself administering further treatment to [redacted (b)(6)] on the rear seats. On arrival to the Role 1 Medical I then assisted with putting [redacted (b)(6)] on to a stretcher and getting him into treatment room.

[redacted (b)(6)]

DMoD MAG CPT
HQ ISAF



Investigation Reference No:

[Empty box for Investigation Reference No.]

SERVICE POLICE WITNESS STATEMENT

(CJ Act 1967, s9; MC Act 1980, ss5A (3a) and 5B; MC Rules 1981, r70)

Statement of: [Redacted] (b)(6)

Rank/Status: [Redacted] (b)(6)

Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18') Occupation: HM FORCES

This statement (consisting of 10 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Signature: [Redacted] (b)(6) Date: 7 Aug 14

I am the above named person whose full particulars appear overleaf.

I am currently a member of Deputy Ministry of Defence Military Advisory Group (DMD MAG) Close Protection Team, On the day of the incident 5 AUGUST 2014 I was in the role of Body Guard (BG) I have been deployed to Afghanistan in this role since [Redacted] (b)(6). The person I am employed to protect is Major General Bathurst Welsh Guards.

The place where the incident occurred was the Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANOA) which is located around two kilometres from the British camp QARGA in western Kabul, Afghanistan.

I was situated at the end of a dead-end road approximately 75 metres from a T-junction

Inv Ref No: _____

Continuation of statement of

(b)(6)

where a convoy of twenty vehicles were situated. Within this convoy the two vehicles containing the remainder of my Close Protection team. The VIP vehicle contained the driver, (b)(6). The second vehicle contained the team leader (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Throughout the incident they were situated in the vehicles. They wouldn't have been able to see me from where they were and I couldn't see them as there was a single-story building between us. This building was situated around 10 metres behind me. In front of me was a large entry point sliding metal security door. I don't know where it led to. To my left was a green, corrugated roof metal building with a small entrance 3x3 m and 1 story.

On my right was a concrete block central reservation with a white marker board lent against it which was where the briefing was taking place.

The Close Protection teams (There were 5 including ours, 1 German, 3 American) the bulk of most of the teams were out of sight with my team. Only the Body guard from each team and their VIP's

Signed:

(b)(6)

Signature witnessed by:

(b)(6)

Inv Ref No: _____

Continuation of statement of

(b)(6)

The congregation of around twenty people looked to be lending their brief that was being given by an American male who know ~~not~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) was giving the brief from the white marker board. (b)(3), (b)(6) was wearing a vomit-coloured suit.

I then saw General Bethurst stop towards Maj Gen's Wendell (US) and Green (US) and they were having a last conversation before moving. At this point I moved within two metres of Gen Bethurst and stood between him and the building behind me. I was there for about three seconds.

It was at this point I heard the sound of automatic gunfire coming from somewhere behind me.

I shouted at the General to get down and he started to make his own way to cover. I shouted at him to get behind the green building (b)(6) sliding door which was only three metres to our left (b)(6) point A) he got behind the cover I followed behind him, (b)(6) starting (b)(6) between him and the threat while he ran and pushing him behind the green building (b)(6) door

staying

It was at this point I felt a burning sensation in my right upper arm. I immediately took a knee. I turned to jam myself between

Signed

(b)(6)

Signature witnessed by:

(b)(6)

Inv Ref No: _____

Continuation of statement of

(b)(6)

As I had the person in my sights I heard gunshots I believe from my left, not sure how many. I believe the shooter fell down after these shots (the one in the window).

I believe the person who fired at the insurgent was a US SSGT Medic male. I can't remember his name. I can recall he is 25 years old.

I then turned to the general and continued to shelter him with my body for twenty seconds.

An interpreter who was in the alcove on the other side of the door began shouting for the General to come to him (across the killing zone) I told the General not to move. The General then caught sight of (b)(6) and tried to get out saying "we need to get the ADC!" (b)(6) I said "we need to stay exactly where we are, I don't know what's happened" (not exact quotes)

It was at this point over my personal Kabe Kadi (PRR) I informed (b)(6) that the General was fine but that (b)(6) and I had been hit.



Approximately twenty seconds later I saw (b)(6) on the corner of Building A who shouted that the vehicles were on their way.

Sign

(b)(6)

Signature witnessed by:

(b)(6)



PES - Personal Escort Section vehicle

(b)(6)

VIP - VIP vehicle

USG - U.S General

S - Sharpshooter

GB - Maj Gen Bathurst

(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

(b)(6)

SERVICE POLICE WITNESS STATEMENT

Section 1

Full Name: Service No:

Unit/Home Address or contact details:

Home Telephone No: Other Telephone No:

Mobile Phone No: Email Address:

Date and Place of Birth: M/F:

Maiden Name:

Height: Ethnic Code: (IC No):

- ETHNIC CODE - LEGEND (IC)**
- 0 - Not Known
 - 1 - White (skinned) European
 - 2 - Dark (skinned) European
 - 3 - African/Caribbean
 - 4 - Asian
 - 5 - Oriental
 - 6 - Arabian
 - 7 - Other

Statement recorded by:

Unit:

Place, Date and Time:

Section 2

Dates to be avoided of the witness named on this statement - (i.e. leave, course, etc)

Section 3

Witness Consent

- (i) (Victims only) The information recorded above will be disclosed to Victim Support so that they can offer help and support, unless you ask them not to. Tick this box to decline their services:
- (ii) The Service Justice System and Victim Personal Statement scheme (victims only) have been explained to me Yes No
- (iii) I have been given the Victim Personal Statement leaflet (victims only) Yes No
- (iv) I have been given the Victim and Witness Information leaflet Yes No
- (v) I consent to the statement being disclosed for the purposes of civil proceedings eg child care proceedings, CICA, SPVA etc Yes No
- (vi) I consent to the statement being disclosed for the purposes of Service administrative proceedings eg Board of Inquiry Yes No

Signature of Witness: Print Name:

Signature of parent/guardian/appropriate adult: Print Name:

Service Police Actions

- (i) Is this witness also the victim in this case? Yes No
- (ii) Is this a racist incident? Yes No
- (iii) Is this a racist incident? Yes No

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Bagram Airfield	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140809	3. TIME 1830	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
USACE-TAA-HQ, Bagram Airfield, APO/AE 09354

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 5 AUG 14, I attended the MFNDU Battlefield Circulation visit with the following USACE-TAA-HQ personnel: Vehicle (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (driver), (b)(3), (b)(6) (driver), (b)(3), (b)(6) (PAO), & (b)(3), (b)(6) (Contracting); Vehicle 2 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (driver), Myself (TC), (b)(3), (b)(6) (DPM), & (b)(3), (b)(6) (E&C Chief). Two TAA vehicles with additional personnel initially joined us enroute from Bagram to MFNDU for the visit, but returned to Bagram due to electrical troubles with one of the vehicles. Before they turned back, we stopped and cross-leveled people, leaving us with the eight listed above.

At MFNDU, we were joined by the following USACE-TAA personnel from the Kabul Area Office: (b)(3), (b)(6) (Area OIC), (b)(3), (b)(6) (North Kabul Resident Engineer), (b)(3), (b)(6) (Project Manager), (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6). We also met people from numerous other groups, primarily (b)(3), (b)(6) and MG Greene from CSTC-A.

At approximately 1200 hrs, (b)(3), (b)(6) of CSTC-A briefed a group of senior officers and civilians on water capacity expansion requirements for MFNDU. The group roughly stood in a semi-circle, facing the briefer. I stood near the edge of the semi-circle, to the briefer's left. (See attached site diagram).

From my rear I heard a "pop-pop-pop-pop-pop" that sounded like a string of firecrackers. I felt a sting in my finger and speckling on my leg and saw people falling and diving down. I realized we were being fired on and dropped to the ground. I low crawled a few feet to a low masonry wall to my right, with the shooter to my rear still firing on automatic. I realized I was on the wrong side of the wall for protection and still in the field of fire, but had no place else to go without exposing myself above the ground. I hugged the ground waiting for the shooting to stop. My finger was bleeding and ached, so I kept it clinched in a fist. Several people near me were hit and screaming.

When the firing stopped, I only heard screaming for help. People started to move so I low crawled to a red headed British officer about ten feet from me who had multiple wounds and was calling for help. I heard a few more pops so I low crawled to the other side of the road. (I know now that these pops must have been friendlies returning fire, but I thought it was still the shooter). Medics started to arrive and someone tossed me a first aid bag. I couldn't use my right hand very well because of my injured finger (I am right handed), so I tossed the bag to another soldier who was treating the red headed soldier and calling for bandages. I then heard (b)(3), (b)(6) from my PSD call my name. He waved for me to come toward him and said to enter a hardened building. I ran to him and asked where our people were. He said that (b)(3), (b)(6) was in our armored SUV up the hill from us, and he suggested I go there.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

I ran up the hill and climbed into our vehicle where (b)(3), (b)(6) had been securing our vehicles, gear, and rifles during the brief. He was not aware of the incident at the bottom of the hill. I told him there was a green-on-blue attack with numerous casualties, and the only person I had seen from TAA was (b)(3), (b)(6). We drove down the hill to gain accountability and assist. We saw (b)(3), (b)(6) walking and we told him to get in the vehicle. I began looking for (b)(3), (b)(6). A soldier then said they needed medevac vehicles, so we loaded the next casualty, (b)(3), (b)(6) in our vehicle. (b)(3), (b)(6) eye was bleeding and he was hit in the leg. (b)(3), (b)(6) sat in the back seat with him and tried to give him aid. We drove (b)(3), (b)(6) to FOB Qarga, following a trail of other medevac vehicles.

(b)(3), (b)(6) then helped (b)(3), (b)(6) to the Qarga aid station, where patients were being triaged. We assessed the situation and (b)(3), (b)(6) took charge to gain accountability of our people and weapons. (b)(3), (b)(6) told me some of our people were in the ward room of the aid station. I went to visit and found (b)(3), (b)(6) all of whom had been treated, along with (b)(3), (b)(6) and other casualties. I was told that (b)(3), (b)(6) was seriously injured and was being treated in the ER. (b)(3), (b)(6) gained accountability of all of our personnel, and help track the status of other casualties from CSTC-A. BG Jackson called my cell phone and I gave him an update. I then called TAA HQ to give an update.

After we accounted for everyone and confirmed that (b)(3), (b)(6) had been evacuated, we organized a convoy of all remaining USACE-TAA personnel and vehicles. (b)(3), (b)(6) who had been treated and released for leg injuries, stayed with us. We checked with (b)(3), (b)(6) from CSTC-A to see if their group need to join us, but they had sufficient security to travel on their own. Our TAA convoy stopped at NKC to drop off the group from the Kabuk Area Office. BG Jackson called again and (b)(3), (b)(6) and I provided an update. We then updated the TAA HQ, and continued back to Bagram.

We stopped at the Bagram hospital to check on (b)(3), (b)(6) the most seriously injured USACE member. While waiting for (b)(3), (b)(6) to return from surgery, I went to the outpatient clinic to get my finger looked at. It had stopped bleeding shortly after the incident, but still hurt and had limited movement. It looked like a large splinter was in it. Doctors cleaned it, and after X-rays, discovered a metal fragment in my finger. (b)(6) attempted to remove the fragment but couldn't reach it without risking damage. I also had a small welt on my right calf. On AUG 8, X-rays showed the welt was from a small metal fragment in my right calf. Since then, I have discovered two additional welts on my lower and upper right ham string likely caused by fragments, and a bruise on the side of my right knee.

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 9th day of AUGUST, 2014 at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(6)
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES


Site Diagram

Prepared by (b)(3), (b)(6)

1200 hrs, 5 AUG 14
MFNDU Incident

Briefer:

(b)(3), (b)(6)



SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

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PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.


DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION New Kabul Compound	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140809	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS USACE-TAA-HQ, Bagram Airfield, APO/AE 09354			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Please see the attached pages, numbered 1 through 3, entitled "Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)"

Please see the attached diagram entitled "(b)(3), (b)(6) Site Diagram"



10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

~~(b)(3), (b)(6)~~

~~(b)(3), (b)(6)~~

~~(b)(3), (b)(6)~~

~~(b)(3), (b)(6)~~

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)
NTM-A/UTAG
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 9th day of AUGUST, 2014 at New Kabul Compound, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6) EN
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

On the morning of 5AUG14, I traveled from NKC to MNFDU, departing at approximately 0740 and arriving at approximately 0815. My travel party consisted of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and Drive Team Members: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Once there we staged at the planned first stopping point along the planned travel route through the MFNDU at the completed helipads that overlook the site. The "Water Shura" or Battlefield Circulation (as the CONOP provided ahead of time titled it) was planned to start at 0900 but was delayed due to a travel delay for one of the VIP attendees (do not know which one).

While we were waiting, I spent the time with introductions and general discussions with several people including the Dutch Security personnel; (b)(6) BG (UK) Russell, the ANAOA Chief Mentor. Also, during that time, I observed the last minute briefing coordination and rehearsals. In the area visible from the helipads, I observed what appeared to me to be normal operations both in terms of the on-going construction, and normal business of the school. Additionally, I did note the presence of what appeared to be additional security by both Afghan and Coalition personnel to include what appeared to be additional security vehicles, and unarmed Afghan personnel.

This did not seem out of the ordinary to me given the attendees. The first briefing started at approximately 0930 and ended at approximately 1000 and everyone mounted their vehicles to travel thru Phase III so the senior leadership present could see the construction work there. As we traveled the route to the next briefing location, I noticed several unarmed Afghan Soldiers spaced out along the route up to the phase III construction area and I took those soldiers to be an honor guard or of a similar function. We arrived at the existing concrete water tank above the campus and climbed a short slope to the next briefing location on a flat area above the complete but not connected.

At this location, there were several briefers including (b)(3), (b)(6) from CSTC-A, and two Afghan gentlemen, whose names escape me. As I listened parts of the briefings as well as the subsequent discussions between the representatives from ANAOA, MFNDU, CPMD, and CSTC-A (mainly MG Green and (b)(3), (b)(6)), I periodically looked back toward the range behind us, but did not notice anything out of the ordinary. I did ask one my soldiers close to me, (b)(3), (b)(6), to periodically look back to check on the soldiers behind us to note and alert me if something started to happen at the range. The discussion became animated at points as MG Green emphasized the importance of receiving written assurance from CPMD that CPMD would provide adequate water for the overall MNFDU as each of the successive phases were completed. MG Green was requesting the written assurances prior to the re-awarding of Phase II of the project. From what I could follow of the conversation, it sounded like the CPMD was agreeing to this demand.

When the discussions were completed at this location, we remounted our vehicles and traveled to a parking area in Phase I near the existing buried tanker that serves as a water storage point for Phase I. I was one of the personnel that walked down to the tank, but did not enter the building that houses the tanker. As I walked down the road, I passed a one-story building on the left (same side of the road as the buried tanker) with several individuals on the roof. Most of the individuals that I noted appeared to

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

be NATO soldiers and there was a small tent and several antennas on the roof. From my perspective, I did not see anything unusual or notice any indications of hostile intent on anyone's part.

Down the hill from the one-story building, there was a smaller, shorter concrete structure approximately half-way between the building and the structure containing the tanker. At this time, the senior leadership entered the tanker structure, but there was not enough room for more than a few people. At the same time, the final briefing was being set up for (b)(3), (b)(6) the civilian CPMD advisor to discuss the future operations and maintenance costs for the totality of the MFNDU. When the senior leadership began to exit the tanker building, I moved from near the tanker building to near the uphill corner of the smaller concrete structure in order to listen to the last briefing.

As I recall, (b)(3), (b)(6) and a (b)(6) were standing to my left, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was standing at his briefing board close to a short landscaping wall. Several other individuals were standing closer to the briefing board, but do not remember the order of who was exactly where. There was security spread out in the area on top of the one-story structure, in the courtyard area between where I was standing and the road. Shortly into the briefing, I heard a short burst of automatic weapons fire, but it took a second to register what happened. I drew my pistol and got down, next to the small concrete structure to protect those in my immediate vicinity as I could not tell where the shots came from.

(b)(3), (b)(6) and the (b)(6) next to me both were hit. There was another individual there as well but I did not notice who that was. I also noticed that I was hit in the upper right arm and shoulder based on the rips to my uniform sleeve and the blood on the sleeve. I continued to pull close security even after others moved up to provide care to the wounded as I was not sure if the threat was completely over. I don't remember the exact order of the next several items. I noticed that one of the windows on the side of the one-story building facing the briefing area had several bullet holes in it, but could not tell if they were from in-bound or out-bound fire. I heard a lot of shouting and screaming of pain as well as hearing some soldiers getting ready to clear the building.

Among those rendering aid that I saw were (b)(6) from UTAG, (b)(3), (b)(6) from USACE TAA Contracting as well as several soldiers. A few seconds later, I heard one of the Danish soldiers calling through the shot through window that the room was cleared and he showed his face through the window. I also moved up to the corner of the smaller structure to look around the corner and asked the security on the roof where the shots had come from, but don't know if he heard me. Once I was satisfied that there was not a threat around the corner I backed down to the injured that were next to me and resumed pulling close security. One of my drive team soldiers came up from behind me, so I did not see who it was, to render further aid to the (b)(3), (b)(6)

At this point, I think the Soldier handed his M4 to (b)(3), (b)(6) (a U.S. Navy Veteran) to provide additional security to what I was doing. By this time there were many soldiers and civilians up and providing medical care. Shortly after this, I think (b)(3), (b)(6) grabbed me and escorted me up to one of our vehicles to be transported to the TMC at Camp Qargha for initial treatment. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

driver and we held up for a couple of minutes understanding that there was another patient coming, but never came, so he transported me to the TMC.

From there the personnel there, I assume mostly the clinic staff brought me in and sat me next to (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) where we the less seriously injured were triaged and given initial treatment, which appeared to be mainly stopping any bleeding, and bandaging the wounds. We waited for some time, while the more seriously injured were MEDEVACed. Once the more seriously were MEDEVACed, those of us less seriously injured were taken out to the Qargha Helipad. After waiting a while at the helipad for the next MEDEVAC helicopter, I understood that the British and Australian troops were told to take (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) a British Soldier and myself to North KAIA by ground, then that we would be flown to BAF, then back to the TMC, and finally we were transported to North KAIA by ground. Once there, we were taken right in for assessment and treatment.


----- Nothing Follows -----

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)

SITE DIAGRAM

Existing Road



(b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Bagram Airfield	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140811	3. TIME 1400	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
USACE-TAA-HQ, Bagram Airfield, APO/AE 09354

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Please see the attached pages, numbered 1 through 4, entitled "Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)"

Please see attached two Aerial Photographs of the site.

Approved for Release

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF <u>2</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Bagram Airfeild DATED 20140809

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

NOT USED

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 11th day of AUGUST, 2014 at Bagram Airfield Afghanistan

USACE-TAA-HQ
Bagram Airfield APO AE 09354
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6) *EW*
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(6)
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

Sworn Statement, (b)(3), (b)(6)

On 5 AUG 2014, we ((b)(3), (b)(6)) and I (B6 Uparmored vehicle#2) (b)(3), (b)(6) (B6 Uparmored vehicle#1) arrived approximately 0850 at the Afghan National Defense University (ANDU), also known as the Marshall Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU), located on the East side of the city of Kabul. Upon arrival at ANDU, our team made our first stop and staged on the Helipad located on the North side of ANDU. We downgraded our Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) into our vehicles other than our force protection team members. Upon our arrival at the Helipad, we all exited our two B6 Uparmored Landcuisers and assemble within the Helipad area along with all the other early arrivals. Also at that time, we met up with our unit's Kabul Area Office team (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) and soon afterwards began our briefing rehearsals for the new briefing time of 0930; rather than original start time of 0900. On the mountainous terrain just to the North of location, it appeared that an Afghan National Army (ANA) element was conducting some sort of live fire training exercise. You could distinctively see a rather large group of ANA Soldiers moving uphill and hear the sounds of live rounds being fired sporadically.

A few things I made mental note of while standing out on the Helipad was that there was a live fire exercise right above us, the fact that we were assembling and sitting in a very open area with anything between us, which I couldn't understand why here, and I really didn't know who was truly in-charge of all of the security personnel present at the brief or personnel coming to the brief. On top of being out in the open, there were 20-30 metal chairs placed in rows on the South side of the helipad, making it hard to maintain any dispersed distance between personnel. The 20 plus vehicles were parked along the west and east side of the helipad and other areas, but were not positioned to shield our personnel from the open exposure and exercise being conducted to our rear. At this point and time, I wasn't too happy about the way things were set up, with the exercises just to our rear, and hardly any joint collaboration and coordination between security members on the ground upon arrival. Since we weren't in the lead this time, and we only had a 5-10 minute briefing role in the meeting minus questioning and answering, I didn't make a scene with criticism to the leading agency. Therefore, our unit security teams weren't deliberately integrated into the British led security plan, but did provide security for our internal personnel.

The main party finally arrived by ground to our location at about 0935. The presentation was presented to the main party and ended at about 1010. At that time, everyone mounted back up in their respective vehicles to move to the next briefing site (ANDU Water Tower). My vehicle was the last vehicle in the movement over to the ANDU Water Tower. I counted 20-plus vehicles, many of them NTVs and few of them British Tactical vehicles, in the movement over. I think there were approximately 23, as I counted them moving out, and made a comment to (b)(3), (b)(6) about the number vehicles we had in the movement, but my number count could have been off a few vehicles.

(b)(3), (b)(6) our security team leader, and his three original passengers were in the vehicle#1 just to the front of us during movement over to the ANDU Water Tower. We decided as a drive team to wait until all the other vehicles moved out first so it wouldn't as be crowed and stuck in the middle. We all drove over as one huge convoy through the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE),

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sworn Statement, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Transatlantic Afghanistan District (TAA) ANDU State Corp (Contractor) project site to the ANDU Water Tower. Being the last vehicle in the movement, and by the time we reached the ANDU Water Tower, the majority of the vehicles had already encircled the Water Tower and parked their vehicles, and the passengers had begun moving up the hill to a small plateau just North of the Tower and East of a small building on the same plateau to conduct their second briefing. Since the plateau didn't offer the same terrain and space as the helipad did, not everyone went up on the hill to observe the second briefing. I stayed at the vehicle at this time, to include the other driver and Truck Commander (TC) of vehicle#1 within our unit movement group. However, about half of group went up onto this plateau to listen to the second presentation.

Nevertheless, at this point the group seemed to be a little scrambled with a lot of people on the plateau, so I felt that I was in a better position to see the group from where I was at the vehicles just below the plateau. There was nothing I saw at that time of the mission that posed a high level threat other than the large group again standing in the open conducting a briefing/discussion. When the group finished discussing their matters at the second location, we all loaded back up into our respective vehicle again and headed to our third location, which was the location/scene of the Green on Blue incident.

We arrived at third site around 11:35. When we (vehicle#1 and #2 of our unit) came down near to the third site, there was a group of afghan Mechanics working on an Old Russian tank. They were in the adjacent parking lot across from us as we parked along side the road just north of the third briefing location, a few vehicles short of the drop-arm gate entrance before the building with the shooter. I stayed again at my vehicle along with (b)(3), (b)(6) who stayed with their vehicle as well.

At the third site there were coalition force protection personnel in various locations, including on the roof top of the shooter's building. There was also what appeared to be a premade above ground security position on the roof top that the coalition forces were making use of. From my location, I had a pretty fare view all the way down the road just beyond the Shooter's building when the contours and parked vehicles made it difficult for seeing further at ground level.

About noon time, I heard a short burst of automatic gun fire and I saw a few people scattering to various locations around the site. Even at this time, I still did not realize or grasp what was truly going on because it was unexpected. Sometime shortly afterwards, (b)(3), (b)(6) took off from their vehicle and soon (b)(3), (b)(6) reached my location at the vehicle for cover. He confirmed with me that someone used a machinegun and opened up on them and people were injured. I asked (b)(3), (b)(6) the disposition of our people, but he didn't know immediately, so we drove our vehicle, as people were still in need of CASEVAC, toward the shooter's building/location. We ((b)(3), (b)(6) one of our original vehicle passengers, and I) proceeded to the contact site to retrieve casualties, where we met one of the Air Force Majors (didn't catch his name) waving us down for CASEVAC. I was the driver, so I stopped the vehicle, got out of the front driver's seat, and placed (b)(3), (b)(6) (DA Civilian casualty with multiple wounds to the face and body) into the back seat of our B6 Uparmored and took off at a high rate of speed to Qargha Aid Station and Casualty Collection Point (CCP), which I happened to be somewhat familiar with the vicinity, after being on Qargha many times before. During the time of

Sworn Statement, (b)(3), (b)(6)

CASEVAC, there were other CASEVAC vehicles moving amongst us to transport the wounded. Also during the CASEVAC to the Qargha Aid Station /CCP, one of our passengers, started wrapping (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) eye with a bandage as I continued to drive.

Upon our arrival at the Qargha Aid Station/CCP, I stopped and exited the vehicle, took (b)(3), (b)(6) out of the back seat and assisted him into the Aid Station, and passed him off to one of the Coalition medical personnel for triage and treatment. I then begin to assessment and account for our casualties and others that I knew (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) another wounded male who I really didn't know unfortunately, and (b)(3), (b)(6) who wasn't present at the CCP) to get a fully accountability status on as many casualties as I could and the record the extent of their injuries. I also started to account for all of the sensitive items and equipment that the wounded may have had with them or they may have left behind on the scene. I assessed and collected this information also in order to address or answer higher leadership's questions if they had any after the course of events.

I annotated during my assessment that (b)(3), (b)(6) sustained injury to his upper arm/shoulder and I pushed him to second treatment room, (b)(3), (b)(6) sustained a injury on his left lower leg, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) sustained a gunshot wound to the right lower leg (through and through injury), (b)(3), (b)(6) sustained a gunshot wound to his back and upper arm area, (b)(3), (b)(6) sustained gunshot wound to her leg, (b)(3), (b)(6) sustained shrapnel to his right hand, (b)(3), (b)(6) sustained gunshot wounds to his lower leg and back, and (b)(3), (b)(6) sustained wounds to his right eye, left upper leg and foot. There was an Afghan General Officer brought in to the front lobby of the Aid Station/CCP who was wounded, but I couldn't get full scope of his injuries by the time the coalition medical personnel began their triage on him.

Next, I briefly went back outside and quickly spoke to MG Greene's PSD team leader, (b)(3), (b)(6) and received word of the disposition of MG Greene and the extent of his injuries. He also briefed me that the MEDEVAC Helicopter flew around the helipad quite longer than expected, even after expending two different types of smoke grenades at the pickup site. Afterward, I went back inside the Aid station, briefly spoke to (b)(3), (b)(6) and continued with my assessment of casualties, which at the time I couldn't validate (b)(3), (b)(6) sensitive items and the total extent of his injuries, only heard through word of mouth that his injuries were critical. Also, in the mist of the ongoing treatment of casualties, I was called over from the main hallway to assist in the loading of a wounded Coalition Soldier into one of the Coalition's tactical vehicles for transport to the medevac helipad. While returning back to the Qargha Aid Station/CCP, (b)(3), (b)(6) (CSTC-A ENG) was assisting the medical personnel with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) in the treatment room and I continued to assist the medical teams wherever I could. I continued to stay in the main medical treatment room until all the wounded personnel were transport to the helipad, not counting the wounded in the second treatment room (your last priority and walking wounded).

Once just about everything on the ground at the Qargha Aid Station/CCP had settled down, I got with CSTC-A's team and tried to get everyone together so we could double check for equipment and personnel and to discuss our movement plan back and any other open topics that needed to be

Sworn Statement, (b)(3), (b)(6)

discussed. Once this was complete and we were up, except one extra 9mm Beretta and the whereabouts of (b)(3), (b)(6) PPE (Body Armor only). So we all said a quick prayer for the injured, reorganized our movement/load plan, and began moving back to New Kabul Compound for onward movement back to Bagram Air Field. The CSTC-A and MG Greene's PSD elements moved back to Camp ISAF on their own. ----- Nothing Follows ----- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)


(b)(3), (b)(6)

NOT USED

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)



(b)(3), (b)(6)

Where I was located

Incident site three

Aerial # 7

20140811

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AR 15-6 Investigation - Marshal Fahim National Defense University Incident - 05 AUG 14



1:10,000

Aerial #2

20140811

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION New Kabul Compound	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140809	3. TIME 1510	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (9)(q) (ε)(q)	6. SSN (9)(q) (ε)(q)	7. GRADE/STATUS (9)(q) (ε)(q)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS USACE-TAA-HQ, Bagram Airfield, APO/AE 09354			

9. I, (9)(q) (ε)(q), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:


Please see the attached pages, numbered 1 through 3, entitled "Sworn Statement of (9)(q) (ε)(q)"

Please see the attached diagram entitled "BFC CONOPS numbered 1 through 2"

Please see the attached diagram entitled (9)(q) (ε)(q) "Site Diagram Prior to SAF"

Please see the attached diagram entitled (9)(q) (ε)(q) "Site Diagram During Attack"

Please see attached two Aerial Photographs of the site.



10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (9)(q) (ε)(q)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (9)(q) (ε)(q) TAKEN AT New Kabul Compound DATED 20140809

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing else follows

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (9)(q) (ε)(q), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(9)(q) (ε)(q)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(9)(q) (ε)(q)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 9th day of AUGUST, 2014 at New Kabul Compound, Afghanistan

(9)(q) (ε)(q)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(9)(q) (ε)(q)

Officer

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(9)(q) (ε)(q)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

Sworn Statement of (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C)

On 05AUG14 I was serving as (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) for the USACE KAO-South PSD Husky on mounted and dismounted operations on movement from New Kabul Compound (NKC) to ANDU. Persons under my responsibility were (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C), Vic 1 (b)(7)(C) Vic 2 (b)(7)(C) I arrived about 0830, to the first site, RV HLZ. Prior to arrival I had received a mapped out schedule including grid coordinates and times of each location via (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) The scene at ANDU was very congested with personnel at each location. Upon arrival, (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) and I met with the Danish security element that was tasked with area over watch and security. They told me that they were responsible for providing outer security for the day's activities. At locations 1(RV HLZ),2(Blue Water Tanks) and 3(Contact site), Danish personnel were seen on close security and site over watch. Everything appeared very normal, besides the amount of coalition personnel. ANA soldiers were up on the mountain north of site 1 doing drills, throwing smoke grenades and it sounded like there was a range on the other side of the mountain. Usually on the opposite side they have crew serve, but I didn't see that. I generally run missions at ANDU about 1-2 times a week and this was all normal – very busy with training and ANA personnel everywhere. At site 1 (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) gave a presentation, PSD members were all on the perimeter.

At site 2 the blue water tanks, (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) and I provided vehicle security while (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) dismounted with our primary for ground security. Basically all the vehicles were staged around the water tanks and all the VIP personnel and security went up the hill to get another presentation. I could see (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) from my rear view mirror facing toward the ANA small arms range on the west end of ANDU. During this time I observed nothing remarkable. Several ANA soldiers walked past my vehicle while looking at the large group assembled on the hill though none were toting weapons. I also noticed there was a coalition member up on a plateau with binoculars, I assume providing overwatch.

Upon movement to site 3(contact site), 1030-1100 (closer to 11) hundreds of ANA soldiers were seen near the ANDU Phase 1 area of the compound which is very normal for this area of the base. This is probably the most soldiers I have ever seen on site, but generally seeing them wandering the campus in large groups was not uncommon. We staged the vehicles along the road just up from the site. Upon arrival at site 3 (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) and I dismounted to provide primary security for (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C). I instructed (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) to stay with the trucks. My two vehicles were parked on the main road approximately 150-200 Meters away from the contact site. (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) and I escorted our primary (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) to the underground well site where many of the higher ranking personnel were doing an inspection. We did not go inside. At this time I observed the Danish security detail and one Australian soldier who appeared to be a sniper (weapon with large scope) taking a position of over watch on the roof of the contact building.

At this time the VIP personnel returned from the underground well and gathered in a horseshoe around a civilian who was giving a presentation on budget sustainment costs. I was standing at the rear of the group on the near side of the contact building looking outward at the ANA ECP and Mosque. (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) was standing directly to my left side close enough to touch elbows. We were no more than 15 feet away from the building.

Without any warning towards the end of his presentation, small arms fire erupted from the building to my rear. It sounded as if a bomb or flash bang had exploded. The terrain rocky and there was a lot of rock fragment and dust right away. I was immediately hit in my right auxiliary and a second time in my right triceps and dropped to the prone positions. Bullets were being shot into the ground all around myself, (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) and the presentation area causing a massive amount of what seemed to be rock and bullet fragment. I immediately low crawled several feet to me left and returned fire. I didn't know how many rounds I fired, but I know that I shot. When I inspected my weapon back at NKC, there were 8

Sworn Statement of (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D)

rounds out of the magazine. There was a window that had frosted glass that looked like it had two rounds through it, and I fired through it. I cannot remember if I saw muzzle flash or not but I shot at bathroom window with my M4. While prone I saw a US Army personnel flat on his back with blood coming out of his mouth, he had appeared to be shot in the head and was not moving. I believed that this was MG Greene.

I then bounded to the HESCO barrier directly across from the window. I pulled 1 personnel in civilian attire that was curled in the fetal position still in the contact area and I grabbed him and threw him behind me, I believe male – I believe a local national. I took a firing position pointed toward the window. I attempted to establish comms with (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) but could only hear static over the radio. I did not fire any more rounds. At this time I heard "IM HIT" come from the shed to my rear. I bounded into the shed where there were several personnel seeking cover and a US Army CPT said he had been shot in the buttocks (male, brown hair). I exposed the wound and plugged the hole with my finger. I then applied a pressure dressing from my medical leg bag. I then left the shed and moved back to the contact area where I heard screaming and multiple calls for a medic.

At this time I saw (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) flat on his back. He was awake and bleeding excessively from several serious wounds on his arms and legs. I cut the straps on his plate carrier to get it out of the way. I then applied pressure to his arm that was still bleeding and packed gauze with as much pressure as I could, while a Danish medic applied aid to his other wounds. We then transferred (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) onto a litter and carried him toward the road to find an open vehicle. (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) was to my left while carrying the pole less litter.

While trying to find a CASEVAC vehicle that could accommodate (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) in his condition, I yelled at various uniformed personnel who were taking cover in large vehicles to "get out". We then loaded (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) into the vehicle and he was CASEVAC to Qargha. At this time (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) noticed that I had been shot and was bleeding from my armpit. I told him I was ok and returned to the contact area to assist with CASEVAC. I returned to the corner of the building, raised my rifle to the contact building and tried to establish comms. I am having a difficult time in remembering what other treatments I may have provided or anyone else that I came in contact with. When I returned to Qargha my medical leg bag was completely empty of gauze and tourniquets, but I don't recall where I rendered aid.

At this time I tried to re-establish comms with my Driver (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) and yelled for him to bring the vehicle and my aid bag. I was found by (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) at the contact site and asked him for a SITREP on our primary PAX and informed him that (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) had been hit and already CASEVAC to Qargha. (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) informed me that he brought our second vehicle to CASEVAC (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) who had light bleeding coming from his shoulder and (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) who had a tourniquet applied to his ankle below the knee. He gave me the keys to my VIC and left for the CCP at Qargha. I then ran from the contact site approx. 150Meters to our vehicle which was parked and locked on the main road.

I turned the VIC around and drive toward the contact site where I saw (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) standing in the road flagging me down. I stopped the truck and told (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) he would have to drive as I was shot and needed to establish comms with the CCP. I got into the TC seat, (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) the driver and (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) a passenger. I told (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) to drive as fast as possible to the CCP. It was uncertain if a CCP had been established outside Qargha or not.

We drove on the main road toward Qargha and came to an Australian up-armored vehicle providing a road block. I dismounted the vehicle and yelled at the soldier in the hatch for guidance on the location of the CCP. They had no idea what had happened and that there were real world casualties. I again mounted the vehicle and told (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) to drive to Qargha. We arrived at the Aid Station where

Sworn Statement of (b)(7)(q) (b)(7)(e) (b)(7)(q)

casualties were already be collected. At this time I asked (b)(7)(q) (b)(7)(e) (b)(7)(q) for accountability of sensitive items. I then tried to gain comms with NKC MOVCON Sky Dragon Xray and was unsuccessful. At this point (b)(7)(q) (b)(7)(e) (b)(7)(q) approached and asked for a SITREP on my people and equipment. He and a British medic saw that I was bleeding from my right side and escorted me into the aid station for treatment.

(b)(7)(q) (b)(7)(e) (b)(7)(q) found me inside the aid station and I told him I was being CASEVAC with (b)(7)(q) (b)(7)(e) (b)(7)(q) (b)(7)(q) (b)(7)(e) (b)(7)(q) to KAIA and that (b)(7)(q) (b)(7)(e) (b)(7)(q) is now in charge.

----- Nothing Follows -----

Approved for Release

@ 0845

SECRET

(g)(q) (e)(q)

Marshall Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU) 5 AUG 14 – BFC CONOPS

In attendance:

(g)(q)

- MG Ameree, COM CPMD
- MG Wendel, DCOS SA/CG CSTC-A
- MG Greene, DCG CSTC-A
- MG Bathurst, Dep Adv MOD
- BG Bartscher, CSTC-A MOD MAG Deputy Advisor
- BG Jackson, USFOR-A CMD GRP
- BG Russell, Chief Mentor ANAOA

BG Sharifi, COM ANAOA

(g)(q) (e)(q)

MFNDU Battlefield Circulation Program

0900 Introduction

Location: RV HLZ / Observation point (b)(1)1.4a

0910 MFNDU (Organisation, Site Orientation, and Construction Timeline)

Location: Observation point overlooking MFNDU site

Brief of MFNDU

- Phase I – National Military Academy Afghanistan (NMAA)
- Phase II – Leadership/cultural schools
- Phases IIIA&B – Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA)

0945 Observe ANAOA officer cadets range training

Location: Firing range adjacent to main water storage tank

1030 Water Infrastructure (Existing and Future)

Location: On-site well and main water storage tank

Existing water infrastructure

- City / CPMD augmented supply
- On-site well and storage capacity
- Main water storage tank – the Blue Tank
- Landscaping water trucks

Future water infrastructure

- Main water storage tank – the Blue Tank
- Additional water supply required
- COAs

1100 Operations & Maintenance Overview

Location: Buried Tanker – CPMD Augmented Water Supply

Water Usage

- Current - 250 l / person / day x 3,000 ppl = 750,000 l / day (200,000 gallons)
- Future - 250 l / person / day x 10,000 ppl = 2,500,000 l / day (650,000 gallons)
- Landscaping – provided via water trucks filled from Lake Qargha


Transition of infrastructure sustainment from USACE to MFNDU GSU / CPMD

Sustainment Concerns: CPMD coordination with GSU FEs, budget, training, and supplies

1130 KLE with COM MFNDU MG Jalandar Shah

Location: MG Jalandar Shah's offices

1230 Mission Complete




(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(D)

Prior to SAF

SITE DIAGRAM


Approved for Release



SITE DIAGRAM


(b)(3), (b)(6)

DURING ATTACK



(b)(3), (b)(6)





SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Bagram Airfield	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140809	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS USACE-TAA-HQ, Bagram Airfield, APO/AE 09354			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Please see the attached pages, numbered 1 through 2, entitled "Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)"

Please see the attached diagram entitled "(b)(3), (b)(6) Site Diagram"

Please see attached Aerial Photograph of the site.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF <u>2</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Nothing Entered!

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 9th day of AUGUST, 2014 at Bagram Airfield Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

Approximately 0845, we arrived at Afghan National Defense University. We went straight to the staging area. Everyone dismounted and they did a presentation at the staging area. Behind there was a live fire presentation with yellow smoke.

The second stop was the water tank. We arrived there no later than 11:00 or 11:30. The people talked there a while, and then we headed down the hill. We parked just before the bend in the road. (Map B Point 1). The (b)(6) vehicle was right behind ours.

I was in the vehicle with (b)(3), (b)(6) when the incident started. It was 11:59, by the clock in the vehicle. We first saw a number of people running down the street towards us and away from the area where the presentation was happening. At the same time, we saw people ducking on the roof.

When we exited the building, we heard multiple gunshots. I thought we were taking fire from outside the wire because we had seen people out there before the event. We went up the staircase on the side of the building. There were US civilians on the roof ducking who said that the shooter was down below.

We immediately went back down the stairs and around the building. (b)(3), (b)(6) saw us running from our vehicles and ran towards the fire fight. We came around the corner of the building and I saw (b)(6) and started providing aid.

I told (b)(3), (b)(6) to go get the CLS bag from the vehicle. I came back to (b)(6) and asked someone for gauze, because he was bleeding a lot. I started to provide him help. As we were providing aid to (b)(6) I could hear gunfire still going on. There were still shots going off from inside the window.

I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) near the rear corner of the building taking cover. Over by a low square wall-like structure, I saw the (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was rendering her aid.

A British soldier near me said that we need to clear the room that the shooter was in. I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) near me next to the low wall. I told (b)(3), (b)(6) to grab the COL and get him to the CSM's vehicle. The COL got up and ran towards (b)(3), (b)(6) who was standing near the corner of the building. Once they were safely clear of the building, the COL told (b)(3), (b)(6) to turn back and rejoin the fight.

The British soldier and I moved around the corner of the building and made a plan to clear the building. I talked briefly with the British soldier about our plan to clear the room. When (b)(3), (b)(6) came back, he met up with us by the corner of the building. I called (b)(3), (b)(6) over and we told (b)(3), (b)(6) the plan. We then went in to breach the room.

When we went in, we went right, then right again, and headed straight for the impact area. We entered the bathroom and saw the shot out window across from the door. The British soldier went first, then myself, (b)(3), (b)(6). We cleared two bathroom stalls on the left that were closed.

There were 5-6 Afghans crowded into the doorway at the end of the room that led to the narrow corridor. One of the Afghans had an M-16, but was holding it out in front of him by the muzzle. It appeared to me that they had taken it from the shooter. I didn't see any other weapons on the Afghan soldiers.

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

I looked around the corner through the doorway and saw a person who I presumed to be the shooter who was bleeding, but still breathing. I could not tell if he was still armed, but I entered the corridor to clear the corner and to make sure there were no weapons still on him. There were a whole bunch of magazines around him. His IBA was partially pulled off and there were wounds on his chest under where the IBA would have been.

I drug the body out to the doorway. (b)(3), (b)(6) then helped me pull the body out to the middle of the room while the British soldier pulled security on the door. I searched the body for weapons or wires, to ensure that he wasn't wired up with an improvised explosive device.

The Afghan took maybe 5 more breaths. HE stopped breathing. I checked his pulse, but did not detect a pulse. A second British soldier, who I believe was a medic, attempted to take his pulse and pronounced him KIA.

Once this was clear, the British Soldiers secured the room. (b)(3), (b)(6) had already left the room to find his people. I and (b)(3), (b)(6) left the room to look for the CSM. We left the building and went back to the courtyard to ensure everyone was clear. We stayed until everyone had left the courtyard.

We returned to our vehicle and CSM's vehicle was already gone. We tried to reach him on the Comms. We were informed by Husky element that the COL and CSM were at Qargha base. We headed for Qargha where all the vehicles were rallying under the larger carport in front of the TMC.

On the way to Qargha, I contacted the battle space owner – volunteer x-ray to make them aware of the situation. My first call to Volunteer X-Ray was at 12:09 by the time stamp on my phone call log. They were not at that time tracking what was going on. They asked me to call on a SIPR phone and provide information, but I did not have access to a SIPR line at Qargha. I provided them what information I could on the comms available.

The Battle space owner sent the QRF from NKC because we reported this to them. My contact with Volunteer Xray was (b)(3), (b)(6) who was the battle captain at that time. He said that they sent the QRF because we called to let them know the situation.

Before we departed for NKC, we called in the number of Vics and Pax at the starting point (SP). Volunteer X-ray asked us to come in and debrief with them on what was going on, which I did when we arrived at NKC.

----- Nothing Follows -----

1st site water tank

staging for brief

black USACE vehicle parked to see 2nd site at 11:59 people started running [redacted] I got out of the vehicle and heard shoots being fire we ran up a flight of stair that's out side and the people on the roof to said the shoots where coming from the first floor, we went down to the ground floor body's where screaming the first person that I ran into was [redacted] who could feel his leg and he was bleeding from his lower back

I told [redacted] to Grab [redacted] and take [redacted] him to the vehicle 2

Stairs

bathroom [redacted] Shooter [redacted] British or German soldier and [redacted] cleared the room

apply pressure to [redacted] who took a bullet to the lower back, I told [redacted] to bring the CLS bag from the truck still fire being fire he ran and brought back a CLS by then a medic came with a back and continue to work on him applying bandages on the open wound

entrance to Qarga

Qarga Project Offices
Kabul South Project Offices


truck staging after the event

espresso

(b)(6)

SITE DIAGRAM

(b)(3), (b)(6)



(b)(3), (b)(6) And I pulled the body out of the short room and into the bath room area. I searched the ANA insurgent for weapon or explosive. (b)(3), (b)(6) pulled security. the insurgent was cleared and took five to six breath and then he stopped breathing I looked for a pulse on his neck didn't get one the British medic came in and checked him and pronounce him KIA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
11/18/2014 - 193

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION New Kabul Compound	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140809	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS USACE-TAA-HQ, Bagram Airfield, APO/AE 09354			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Please see the attached pages, numbered 1 through 4, entitled "Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)"

Please see the attached diagram entitled (b)(3), (b)(6) "Site Diagram"

Please see attached two Aerial Photographs of the site.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), was on Camp Qargha when an attack occurred on 08/05/2014.

Our PSD arrived onsite at the Afghan National Defense University around 0830. The briefing was supposed to start at 0900, but when we got there we found out it had been pushed back to 0930. When we got to the helipads where the first presentation was going to take place, we were the second ones there. There was a set of black suburbans with civilian clothed security force that I recognized from other moves to ISAF headquarters.

After we arrived, we coordinated with the Danish soldiers who were in charge of security to ensure that we didn't need to do anything. Nothing was out of the ordinary at the site. I travel to ANDU at least 4 times a month, so everything seemed as it usually is there.

We departed the helipads and moved to the big water tank for the next presentation. When we got there, there was a group of Afghan soldiers on the range above our position working on their marksmanship. Another squad was waiting to go onto the range. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I were dismounted with the group at the presentation by the big water tank.

Right before we left the water tanks, I hear the UK officer who presented say that we were going to the next site and that we were going to look at a force protection issue, so "with that in mind we need only mission essential personnel. Everyone keep your head down."

We then moved to the other side of ANDU to site 3 around 1135 - 1140 with our principles to review a "Force Protection Issue" as I recall the narrator saying at the previous site. Moving to the incident site, as we drove through ANDU, we saw 3 or 4 platoons marching. Again, just normal activity at ANDU.

(b)(3), (b)(6) and I had been on foot for the majority of the morning providing PSD for (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) along with other USACE personnel. It was 10 minutes max before the shooting started. When PSD Team Husky arrived we rotated ground elements, as we often do, from site to site. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I stayed with the vehicles while (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) dismounted with their principals and made their way to the incident site. I sat in vic one staged upon the hilltop monitoring the radio. There were two British Military Personnel hanging out by the vehicle in front of mine dismounted. I noticed about 3 afghan soldiers walk by.

Moments later I observed the British military personnel duck, drop to the ground, seek cover, and take up their arms, but nothing came over the radio. I began to do my 5 and 25's and looking around in a 360. I looked to the side view mirror of my vehicle and witnessed (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) running towards the dismounted element with (b)(3), (b)(6) following.

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

I immediately grabbed my weapon telling (b)(3), (b)(6) to stay with the vehicles while I followed on foot after (b)(3), (b)(6). During my sprint down the hill I attempted to get communication with (b)(3), (b)(6) via MBITR but received nothing. As I ran down the hill I observed (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) run up the stairwell of the building on my left. They immediately set up to for security on the roof. I assumed we were taking small arms fire from the across the street, and they went onto the roof to set up a fighting position.

I continued on foot past the nook where the entry to the building was. I continued on to where I found wounded soldiers, civilians and Afghans lying prone on the ground seeking cover. At this time, I noticed a small cloud of black smoke (about 36" diameter) filtering into the sky about 20-25' in the air. I assumed a mortar round had hit. I immediately started assessing the situation. I found (b)(3), (b)(6) on the ground near the T-wall. I inquired as to his status, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was in an alert state and notified me that he had been shot in the arm and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) along with (b)(3), (b)(6) had been hit in the leg. Following his statement, he said "I'm fine, worry about her" pointing to a (b)(6) on the ground beside him.

The shooting had stopped by the time I got to (b)(3), (b)(6), but I did not know if the threat had been neutralized.

I knelt down beside the Chief and asked where she was hit. She told me in her right leg. I lifted the right side of her hip and observed blood everywhere. I then ask where her tourniquet was. She said "It's in my bottom left pocket." I pulled her tourniquet from her left bottom pants pocket and immediately placed it as high on her right leg as possible. Things had gone seemingly quiet at this point or my body dumped so much adrenaline I couldn't hear anything as I tightened her tourniquet. I began to hear the screams and chaos fade back in. All I heard were the screams for medic. I tried (b)(3), (b)(6) again on the radio. I heard nothing but static.

(b)(3), (b)(6) was facing me, near (b)(3), (b)(6) feet. He was sitting up and trying to assist. I told him to get to me to take cover. At this time I was still unaware that small arms fire came from inside the building. As previously stated, I assumed it had come from across the street and found (b)(3), (b)(6) position to be too exposed. He came over behind me and took my weapon, which I had laid on the ground next to me while I provided aide to the Chief (b)(3), (b)(6) was to my back and provided cover towards the building with my M4.

(b)(3), (b)(6) must have assessed the threat by this time because I heard him calling out my name. I turned towards his voice and heard him say (b)(3), (b)(6) I need you. The shooter is inside the building and we don't know if he is alive." I looked to my watch for the time to write 11:59 on the tourniquet and told (b)(3), (b)(6), who had grabbed my M4 and provided security while I rendered aid to the Navy Chief, to write it on her tourniquet. I then grabbed my M4 and

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

moved to where (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) were stacked on the edge of the building awaiting entry.

In my movement to (b)(3), (b)(6) I looked over my left shoulder and observed (b)(3), (b)(6) along with other soldiers moving (b)(3), (b)(6) on a litter up the hill towards a black suburban. (b)(3), (b)(6) appeared to have been shot several times. I spotted the pressure dressing on his shoulder and his leg as he reached out for me. I knew there was nothing I could do if there was still a threat inside the building. I arrived on the edge of the building. (b)(3), (b)(6) said again that the shooter is inside and we don't know if he is dead or alive. A Danish soldier who spoke English came over to join us. I recognized him from his tattoos and the helipad, but I don't know his name. I stacked on (b)(3), (b)(6) stacked on me and the Danish soldier stacked behind him.

We entered the building clearing the area along our way to the Latrine where the shooter was. We hooked right into a large open room. There was a gaggle of ANA in the room, but they were unarmed. I noticed how calm they were when we came in. We flowed into the hall just outside the bathroom. There was an ANA with an AK-47 slung on his back over his right shoulder standing near the door to the bathroom. He did not appear to be coming or going, and he did not appear to be standing guard. He was just standing there.

We entered the Latrine where I observed that the window had been shot full of holes right in front of the door and the walls were peppered from SAF. All over the wall and the stalls across from the window there were chips from where small arms fire had come in. There was an ANA soldier in the bathroom over by the wall next to the window. He was kind of just staring at the wall. He appeared to be in shock.

We cleared the bathroom stalls one by one making our way to the back. There were two stalls. I nudged open the first stall with the muzzle of my weapon, and (b)(3), (b)(6) cleared the second. We went back to the end of the latrine where there was a very small room. To the right of the entryway was the water heater, to the left was a narrow area where the shooter was.

(b)(3), (b)(6) was the first one in and then me. It was a very tight area, my shoulders would barely fit if I stood sideways. The shooter was lying awkwardly folded up in the back corner of the corridor. It looks like he had made it back into this space and then collapsed.

The shooter, who was dressed in Afghan Army uniform, had moved from the location of the window and barricaded himself in the back of the Latrine where the water heater was. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and I observed him to verify that the threat had been eliminated. The shooter was dead.

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)


Once I determined he was dead, I turned my focus on the Afghan soldiers who were coming into the bathroom. 5-6 Afghans came in the room. I provided security as ANA filtered into the room. Two other Danish soldiers came into the room as well. (b)(3), (b)(6) pulled the shooter from the back of his position and into the middle of the latrine.

The Danish soldier said, 'if he is breathing we have to provide him aid'. (b)(3), (b)(6) said he is not breathing, he is dead. I now noticed that there was a lot of blood on the floor of the latrine. (b)(3), (b)(6) was beginning to get a little overwhelmed, I told him to just breath.

I exited the building to collect our wounded in order to move them to the CCP. At that time, I received communications from (b)(3), (b)(6) on the radio notifying me that they had collected the members of PSD team Husky along with USACE personnel and were moving to the CCP. On the handheld I heard (b)(3), (b)(6) say that he had (b)(3), (b)(6) as I ran up the hill. I ran to where (b)(3), (b)(6) was parked with the (b)(3), (b)(6) and checked his status. I then ran towards our other vehicle and found (b)(3), (b)(6), who was in the drivers' seat. I opened the driver's door, he was laying on the steering wheel. He told me I was going have to drive. As I helped him out of the vehicle into the passenger seat I noticed the gunshot wound on his back and the blood all over his pants. We then loaded up. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I were in vic one headed to the CCP.

(b)(3), (b)(6) who was with (b)(3), (b)(6) in vehicle two followed. (b)(3), (b)(6), as previously mentioned, had already been casevac'd to the CCP on Camp Qargha. We stopped along the way where an Australian MRAP team was, (b)(3), (b)(6) and I dismounted and asked for the CCP. They appeared clueless that anything had happened so (b)(3), (b)(6) and I jumped back into the vehicle and moved onto Camp Qargha. We arrived on Camp Qargha where I saw an American Major. I open my door and asked where the CCP was. He motioned to follow him and ran on foot to where it was. We made our way to the CCP and helped (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) along with (b)(3), (b)(6) inside. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I then staged the vehicles out of the way and began to collect sensitive items. At this point, I coordinated with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) while (b)(3), (b)(6) went inside to be part of a litter team carrying casualties from the CCP to MRAP's and ATV's medical personnel were using to transport casualties to the LZ. I made contact with NKC BDOC and Task Force Volunteer and advised them of our situation on the ground. I then coordinated with (b)(3), (b)(6) to make sure he was tracking.

----- Nothing Follows -----







STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT New Kabul Compound DATED 20140809

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing else follows

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 9th day of AUGUST, 2014 at New K:

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)
Officer
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION New Kabul Compound	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140810	3. TIME 1638	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS USACE-TAA-HQ, Bagram Airfield, APO/AE 09354			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

As a follow up to my sworn statements made yesterday, I was asked to provide some additional clarification to a few of the statements I made.

1. Regarding where the Afghan soldiers were inside the building, can you describe in more detail the room they were in and how you got from there into the bathroom.

I recall that they were in an open space before we went into where the bathroom stalls were. That space could have been part of the bathroom, but I don't really know. I had never been in this building or this part of ANDU before, so I don't have a lot of knowledge of that space. We were in the building for only a few minutes, so I can't recall the exact layout.

2. Regarding the Afghan holding the weapon, can you describe a little more about what details you remember about the weapon and how he was holding it.

I really don't remember many details about the weapon. I think it was an AK-47, because that is what the ANA typically uses. But I don't recall any specific details about the weapon. I recall that the person wasn't a threat, because they would have been dead if they had pointed the weapon at us. I believe that there was a strap on the weapon, but I'm not sure. What I really remember thinking was that he was not a threat, and that he was not holding the weapon in a way that way that made me think he was a threat.

3. Anything else you can add from your recollections that adds more

My recollections of the event seem clear in parts, but I am not for sure about some of the details. With the adrenaline pumping through me, at times I felt like I had tunnel vision. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the first one into the building and was calm and executing. I'm sure he saw more that I did about what went on.

Nothing follows.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT New Kabul Compound DATED

20140810

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6)

HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 9th day of AUGUST, 2014 at New Kabul Compound Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

U.S. Army Corp of Engineers ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ART 136 UCMJ

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
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ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Bagram Airfield	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140809	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
USACE-TAA-HQ, Bagram Airfield, APO/AE 09354

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Please see the attached pages, numbered 1 through 2, entitled "Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)"

Please see the attached diagram entitled (b)(3), (b)(6) "Site Diagram"

Please see attached two Aerial Photographs of the site.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Bagram Airfield DATED 20140809

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Nothing ENTERED!

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 9th day of AUGUST, 2014 at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

On 5 AUG 2014, we departed from Bagram around 0700 headed to the Afghan National Defense University . I was originally the Driver in vehicle 3, but when one of the vehicles had electrical issues, two of the vehicles had to return to Bagram. When that happened, I switch positions with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) he drove and I was the truck commander in what was now vehicle one of the two vehicles that continued onto ANDU.

When we arrived at ANDU, we went to a big parking lot, where they pulled out the posters and stuff for a presentation. We then went to the big water tank.

From the big water tank, we drove down to the site of the incident. We parked our truck along the road, right before the turn. Once parked, we dismounted and our two civilian passengers went to the courtyard. Our civilian passengers were the Public Affairs Officer, (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Contracting Officer, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) and I stayed with the vehicle while the others continued to the site. About 5-10 minutes after they had dismounted, we heard shooting. We were at the vehicle watching the people on the roof of the building. We heard the shooting start a little before noon and we saw the people on the roof take cover.

(b)(3), (b)(6) and I began to sprint for the site. I assumed it was pot shots from outside the wall. When we got to the building, we went up the metal staircase for the roof. We went up to the roof to see if we could see the shooter or we the shooter was up there. A civilian on the roof, wearing ACUs, was pointing down over the wall, which indicated to me where he thought the shooting was coming from.

We went straight back down the stairs. When we got to the corner of the building, we could see bodies everywhere. I and (b)(3), (b)(6) ran into the middle of the opening and (b)(3), (b)(6) and I immediately began applying aid to either the female Navy Chief or the Captain. There was a Captain near us who was yelling loudly. When we were outside, I never saw the gunner, but we could still hear shooting.

I don't recall exactly what we did to help in applying aid, but the next thing I remember, (b)(3), (b)(6) yelled for me to get the med kits, and I sprinted back to the truck. When I was returning, I saw armored vehicles from another country approaching the area with soldiers taking cover behind them.

At that point I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) who appeared to be taking cover. I got him out and pointed towards (b)(3), (b)(6) vehicle. Once he was safely on his way to CSM's vehicle, I went back to the building.

When I was returning, I threw a med kit to a female soldier with a pistol who was taking cover by the corner of the building. After I handed off the med kit, I saw an Afghan soldier standing in the same general area. He did not say anything, but he pointed to the windows and a door of the building. I understood his pointing to be that he was indicating where the shooting was coming from.

I pulled around the corner and began pulling cover. I was looking through the scope of my rifle into the windows and doors.

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) started to put together a group to rush the room where the shooter was. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6), a soldier from another country, and I began to prepare to rush the room. I believe the soldier was British, but I don't know.

We entered through the doorway of the building, and turned right. We cleared a small room that looking like a dorm room. We entered into a bathroom. I didn't know it was a bathroom at the time, all I remember is the tile floor. When we entered the room, there were afghan soldiers in the room with weapons and ammunition. There were maybe 5 or 6 Afghans. The window across from the door was shot out and looked like someone had shot in or out through the glass. There was a walk-in room on the left that was skinny and had a turn in the end.

I heard one of the afghans charge a rifle. I and the other country soldier pointed our weapons at the Afghan who charged the rifle. We awkwardly stood there, and then we realized that they weren't the shooter. They were all pointing into the skinny room. The other country soldier said to get them (the Afghan's) out of there. We all pushed them out of the room.

(b)(3), (b)(6) looked through the doorway and around the corner into the skinny room and said there was guy in there laying on the ground. (b)(3), (b)(6) investigated and determined that he was no longer a threat.

I looked in the room, there was tons of blood and I saw what looked like M-16 magazines on the floor, but I didn't see a weapon. The Afghan was laying with the head towards the door, but was laying awkwardly crumpled in the room by the corner.

(b)(3), (b)(6) began to pull him out. He pulled him a few feet, then I grabbed the other half and we pulled him into the middle of the room to look for his wounds. He was still bleeding a ton and I think he basically bled out.

Once we got him out, I went back in to clear around the corner of the skinny room. When I came back out into the bathroom, the Afghan had died. A third country soldier checked his pulse and pronounced him dead. I didn't see anyone mess with him after that. He was shot in the chest.


We were in the building maybe 10 or 15 minutes.

After we were done in the building, we went back out to the courtyard and made sure that everything was clear and there were no more people to aid. I think that (b)(3), (b)(6) and me were the last ones to leave. When we got back to our vehicle, both civilians were safe inside. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) had already been extracted to Qargha. We drove as fast as we could back to Qargha.

----- Nothing Follows -----

(b) (3), (b) (6)

Diagram



(b) (3), (b) (6)

Diagram




(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Before entering building

(b)(3), (b)(6)

External view SITE DIAGRAM




(b)(3), (b)(6)

Entering / After Entering building

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Internal view SITE DIAGRAM



(b)(3) (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION New Kabul Compound	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140809	3. TIME 1535	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS USACE-TAA-HQ, Bagram Airfield, APO/AE 09354			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Please see the attached pages, numbered 1 through X, entitled "Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)"

Please see the attached diagram entitled (b)(3), (b)(6) Site Diagram

Please see attached two Aerial Photographs of the site.

Approved for Release

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

The following is my account of the events that happened at the Afghan National Defense University on 5 AUG 2014.

I was on the ground for the majority of the mornings events leading up to the attack. Myself, and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) were the security element for our 3 principals, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) at the previous location (site 2, water tanks) until approximately 1135 – 1140, as I recall looking at my watch just prior to us leaving site 2. We loaded back up into our respective vehicles as one large group, and convoyed down to site 3, to investigate a force protection issue at the ECP of what I was told is the ECP for route Orange. As part of our teams protocol, myself, and (b)(3), (b)(6) stayed with the vehicles as (b)(3), (b)(6) dismounted for this detail.

I stayed in the convoy by my vehicle parked approximately 100 meters, from the actual incident (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was in our other truck parked directly in front of mine. We sat in the trucks for approximately 10 minutes, and I noticed a small group of ANA troops walking along side our parked convoy, with one of the individuals walking apart from the group closer to our trucks than the others. He was looking in every vehicle as he passed it as he was no more than 2-3 feet away from them. When he walked by my truck, He had a very angry look upon his face and stared directly at me as if he was going out of his way to show his disdain for our presence there not changing or moving his gaze from me face until he was already at the next truck in front of me and did the same thing again. This particular event made me feel uneasy as my PSD team makes regular visits to ANDU, multiple times a week, and this has not been an issue before.

It was another 5 minutes more before myself and (b)(3), (b)(6) observed other PSD teams who were standing outside their vehicles, take cover on the opposite side of the parked vehicles as they heard the gunfire. At the time not knowing what was going on, myself and (b)(3), (b)(6) dismounted from our trucks, and met up on the safe side of the parked convoy to find out further details, as there was no radio traffic being sent to us from our team on the ground, I then ran up to the next soldier and asked what he knew or heard. We assumed it was most likely IDF as we observed a rising trail of black smoke coming from the site. But the soldier I was now speaking to informed us it was SAF, and knew nothing else.

I then ran back to (b)(3), (b)(6) who was monitoring the truck radio, and relayed what was told to me from the soldier. He then made the decision to go get eyes on the situation as we were still not getting any radio traffic after several attempts were made, and I was told to stay with the trucks. I began monitoring the radios and continued to try and get contact with any of our ground elements. I then noticed the interpreter who was translating during each site presentation, being looked over just opposite of my truck. I ran over and asked what he had seen, and all he told me that the general was hit, I then asked him if he meant the 2 star, and he replied with "yes, General Greene". I then ran back to my vehicle knowing that the group did in fact receive SAF, and knowing that no radio traffic being sent, and observing what appeared to be chaos on the site, I made the decision to lock up and secure our vehicle with the least amount of room, and then cleared the back and front seats of all gear by throwing them in the back of the truck over the rear seat. I then got into the driver seat and drove to the site knowing there had to be multiple casualties.

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

Upon arriving I was immediately stopped by a coalition soldier and asked if I could take casualties in my truck up to the Qargha collection point. I agreed and got out to find members of my team to relay information, and get accountability as they loaded wounded soldiers into my truck. I immediately saw fellow team member, (b)(3), (b)(6) being carried off on stretcher, at the time not realizing who it was. My Team NCOIC, (b)(3), (b)(6) was rendering aid to (b)(3), (b)(6) and came over to me as the SPC was carried off.

I relayed what was told to me, as I was to help transport casualties, I then handed my key to the locked vehicle to (b)(3), (b)(6), and relayed i locked it up and it was in its same location. He Acknowledged this, and took off running to the truck to bring it around so our team could convoy out back to Camp Qargha. I returned to my truck and had my own Commander as a PAX, (b)(3), (b)(6), Who had received a wound on his right upper arm from the small arms fire. (b)(3), (b)(6) then came up to my driver door, and asked where (b)(3), (b)(6) was, and I pointed out our other truck now being driven towards our location. He ran over to the truck, and I observed (b)(3), (b)(6) take over at the wheel of the truck, and (b)(3), (b)(6) move to the back seat, as this was the first time (b)(3), (b)(6) was aware of (b)(3), (b)(6) gunshot wound to his back. LTC, was in a good alert state, and gave me the accounts of what he witnessed as we made our way back to the Camp. During the trip we took account of sensitive items from the personnel we had with us, with the exception of (b)(3), (b)(6) who was already taken to the camp as priority on another truck.

When arriving on Camp Qargha, We pulled up to the collection point and unloaded the injured we had with us, I then went and parked my truck out of the way in a covered parking area and returned to the building with the wounded. I went inside and got account of where my team was, and once we were up on personnel, made myself available for helping the teams providing aid. I became part of the litter team taking casualties to the vehicles that were transporting them to the LZ for medivac, and anything else they also needed including holding and watching weapons for those working in the trauma area on the wounded. Several times during the approximate 45 minutes or more, of helping in the CCP, I would get updated statuses on our teams condition and report them to (b)(3), (b)(6) who were standing in the hallway of the CCP observing.

After the majority of the wounded were out, and no one else was to be medivac'd, I went to the room where the wounded were being held, and stayed with the last remaining wounded, who was one of my own, (b)(3), (b)(6), until he received full care as his wounds were not priority previously. Once he was cleared to leave under his own will, and I asked the doctors for any special instructions regarding (b)(3), (b)(6), we then reported to (b)(3), (b)(6) who was still in the CCP hallway, and we were told to meet the rest of the team outside under the covered parking area, where we had parked our Vehicles. Shortly then after, USACE, KAO TAA and the BAF TAA team, combined to make one convoy for movement back to NKC. (b)(3), (b)(6) was working on a sensitive items report and accountability. Once we confirmed weapons, and other sensitive items, we convoyed out in a four vehicle convoy back to NKC compound.

Upon returning to NKC we unloaded the vehicles of sensitive items, and began to debrief and



Approved for Release

Site 2

our Parked Trucks

Presentation

Approved for Release

ANNA
Franklin


Site 2, water tanks



Parked
Convoy

Presidential
Army Camp

SITE DIAGRAM



MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Account of [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] Statements Regarding the Incident on 5 August 2014

1. On 6 August 2014, the undersigned conducted an interview of [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] during which the Transatlantic Afghanistan District Counsel, [redacted (b)(6)] was present. We asked [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] about the events of 5 August 2014, his actions, and the actions of others that he witnessed. Because he was under heavy medication at the time, a sworn statement could not be taken, however, I found [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] to be clear and lucid throughout the interview. What follows is a paraphrase of his account of the events that day.

2. On 5 August, [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] and his team arrived at Marshal Fahim National Defense University (aka Afghan National Defense University), a site they visit often. But on this day [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] perceived something to be off or different, "I knew it was going to be a bad day."

3. As [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] and his team dismounted at their first stop, he heard the small arms range in use and could hear crew-served weapons and other small arms being fired.

4. At the third stop at MFNDU the team dismounted, walked around bend in road and walked with [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] to the briefing area. [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] said it seemed "sketchy".

5. Immediately prior to the attack, [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] was standing adjacent to [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] and a British Soldier (later identified to him as a colonel). Also prior to the attack, he reported hearing a phrase or chant coming from outside the area, similar to a call to prayer, but comprised of only five words. It stopped just before the shooting started.

6. At the moment of the attack, approximately 1155 local time, [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] heard a boom that he initially believed was an exploding mortar and felt a bullet wound to his left shoulder. He then dropped to the ground and attempted to shield the British Soldier, who had also dropped but was not wearing ballistic protection, from the small arms fire that he saw coming from a nearby first-floor window. As [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] said, "I put my whole body on him." [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] returned fire with his M4 rifle, which jammed after firing 3-4 rounds; he then unholstered his M9 pistol and continued to fire into the window. He indicated that he could not clearly see the attacker, but was firing at silhouette through the window from which hostile fire was coming. While he returned fire he felt several bullet rounds impact his Small Arms Ballistic Inserts as well as his left arm and right leg. He estimated that he was hit by a total of eight rounds.

7. After the threat was neutralized, the British soldier whom [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] had been shielding began to treat [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] wounds, to include applying a tourniquet. The tourniquet was applied at 1200 local time. Also at this time, [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] saw [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]

CETAA-PO

SUBJECT: Account of [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Statements Regarding the Incident on 5 August 2014

(b)(3), (b)(6) complete his move to the Navy Senior Chief who was at the event and begin apply a pressure bandage to her wound.

8. After being initially treated, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was loaded onto a stretcher and taken to the casualty collection point at Camp Quargha by a team including [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6). As he was being moved, he observed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) speaking with [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) near the Casualty Collection Point (CCP). He waited there at the CCP for approximately 20 minutes and was then loaded onto a MEDEVAC helicopter at the Quargha Helipad.

9. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) or DSN: [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Operations Officer

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Bagram Airfield	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140813	3. TIME 2315	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
USACE-TAA-HQ, Bagram Airfield, APO/AE 09354

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Please see the attached pages, numbered 1 through 4, entitled "Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)"

Please see the attached diagram entitled "(b)(3), (b)(6) Site Diagram"

10. EXHIBIT	11. (b)(3), (b)(6)	NG STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT Bagram Airfield

DATED

20140811

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Nothing Entered

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6)

HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 13th day of AUGUST, 2014 at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

When we arrived at the Afghan National Defense University, we went to the helicopter landing zone, where the first brief was going to be. We discussed that this visit we would be moving around without our Body Armor on so we took it off and put it in the vehicles. We weren't first, but we were pretty close to the first people there. We were there before the main party and were waiting for them to show up. I don't recall exactly what time it was. A couple of the VIPs were running late, so we didn't start on time. There were a bunch of chairs set up and we met some of the parties from the other countries. I remember talking with some of the British soldiers that were there. We did a couple of rehearsals of the TAA brief with (b)(3), (b)(6)

After a little while, the official party arrived and took their places in the chairs. At the end of the brief, the visit coordinator, (b)(3), (b)(6) said that we were going to move. We got into the same vehicles we arrived in and went to the next stop – it was where the large blue tank for water storage was located. We went up a small hill next to the tank that overlooked a junk yard of old steel and vehicles. There was a live firing range behind us where some Afghan Soldiers were shooting at the time.

At the time, I didn't feel right about the situation, but I don't know why. The live fire training was going on behind us and (b)(3), (b)(6) was giving his brief. I just thought that it was odd that we were there with the live fire going on behind us. (b)(3), (b)(6) from CSTC-A was getting ready to brief, but MG Greene began to talk during (b)(3), (b)(6) presentation about the water issues. MG Greene said that he couldn't in good conscious spend their (the NATO partner's) money without a written commitment on securing the 5" water line from the reservoir. After that, an Afghan in a suit began answering questions about MG Greene's comments. It was a lengthy discussion.

(b)(3), (b)(6) was supposed to brief, but he didn't because we were running so late. He told me that he would brief at the next stop. We got in the vehicles and went down the hill to the next site. I think it was about 1130, because I remember thinking that we were very late. We were towards the end of the convoy, and we parked at the top of the hill on the corner. I walked down to join the group near the ECP.

The larger group headed down through the wall to the building with the buried storage tank. I did not immediately join them but after a few minutes I decided to head down there to join the group. You had to go into a small structure and then through a hole in the wall. There was a fence outside the wall. It was probably 150 feet to the other building where the tank was. It seemed like we were very close to the road there. While we were in the building that housed the tank, we discussed some general issues, someone made the comment that we were not in a very secure location where we were and that we should probably head back. I walked back up the hill with (b)(3), (b)(6) and another Colonel.

We went back just inside the wall to a small open area for the presentation. I remember seeing the roof top on the right side of the building that was close by and noticing that it had something like a bunker that was sand bagged – like a fighting position on it. I didn't think too much about it since the exterior gate was there and the wall was close to the road on the outside. There were some soldiers on the roof. I think that they were British but there might have been some Afghan soldiers up there too. There were at least 3 or 4 soldiers on the roof. I was standing with the main exterior wall to my back, facing the low

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

planter and the easel (b)(3), (b)(6) had set up for his brief. The counter weight for the ECP swing gate was very close to my left. To my right was MG Wendel and to his right was MG Greene.

(b)(3), (b)(6) gave his presentation and then asked for questions. I started to turn towards MG Greene when (b)(3), (b)(6) asked for questions. That is when I heard the gunfire. To me it didn't sound like an M-4, but I don't know what it was really. It did sound like the shots were rapid and together.

When I heard the sound, I knew what it was, but I wasn't expecting it, so it took a second to register. There was a lot of shouting and I remember someone yelling over and over, 'get down, get down, get down!' I looked towards the building, but I don't recall seeing anything. I turned to take cover and struck the weighted portion of the drop arm gate hard with my shoulder. I crouched there, but not behind anything. There were still gunshots at that time. At that point, I saw MG Greene down.

I moved more behind the concrete base of the gate swingarm. I was trying to see what was going on. There was an Afghan, whom I think was there to operate the gate, who was telling me in perfect English to get down and trying to keep me from leaning out. I could see MG Greene from there. He was maybe 8 feet away, lying on the ground, and there was no one between us. His eyes were open and he was looking right at me.

(b)(3), (b)(6) moved over to MG Greene. I think there was still gunfire going on, but maybe there was not. I went over to help (b)(3), (b)(6) took MG Greene's pulse and was yelling, "officer down, get the medics, get the medevac."

(b)(3), (b)(6) and I started to move MG Greene. A black suburban pulled up on the road behind us and a very large man in civilian clothes got out. I had a hold of his belt and leg and started to move towards the suburban. The big guy from the suburban grabbed MG Greene's shoulders. I still had one hand on MG Greene's belt and one hand underneath his leg. (b)(3), (b)(6) was also there helping carry MG Greene. We got him into the back seat of the suburban shoulders first from the passenger side. Someone went around the other side of the truck and the two of us lifted him the rest of the way into the vehicle. I thought he was still breathing slightly when we put him into the truck, but I am not certain. We closed the doors and the big guy backed up the hill with MG Greene in the vehicle.

I walked back across the road after the suburban backed up and saw (b)(3), (b)(6) lying on the ground on the opposite side of the low wall from where he gave his presentation. Other people were around him. I went back around the low wall and I saw a soldier on the ground. It was (b)(3), (b)(6) of the USACE NKC drive team.

When I got to him, there were other people already rendering aid. One of them was a US Officer; I know that he was an officer because he wasn't wearing an IBA. (b)(3), (b)(6) reached out his hand to me and I took it. I asked him what his name was and he said (b)(3), (b)(6) knew that it was about noon because someone was saying to write 12:00 on his forehead because they had just put a tourniquet on his leg. (b)(3), (b)(6) couldn't get her pen to write on his forehead, so I told (b)(3), (b)(6) that he needed to remember that it was 12:00. I remember thinking that my Sharpie pen was in my first aid kit which was attached to my IBA – in the vehicle. The other guy was putting a bandage on his left shoulder. He asked me to hold

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

the bandage against his shoulder while he got another to put on (b)(3), (b)(6) was talking to him the whole time. (b)(3), (b)(6) didn't seem to be in pain because he was talking and seemed pretty calm.

Someone showed up with a stretcher. I held onto his injured arm and shoulder as we rolled him towards me, so that they could put the stretcher underneath him. Right before we picked up the stretcher, I saw a 9mm pistol on the ground. I picked it up and put it into my pocket because I didn't think I should leave it there on the ground. We picked up (b)(3), (b)(6) and carried him over to a vehicle waiting to take people to the clinic. They opened the back and we loaded (b)(3), (b)(6) in next to another person.

I went back over to the open area and saw that (b)(3), (b)(6) of CSTC-A was still on the ground. A couple of people were there with him to include (b)(3), (b)(6). Someone showed up with a stretcher. We were getting ready to roll him like (b)(3), (b)(6) but someone stopped us because they thought that he had a back injury. We agreed that we should just lift him up and get him on the stretcher on his stomach. I grabbed him by his pant leg and shirt around his upper torso. We put him onto the stretcher. We began to run with him on the stretcher up the road. We ran to the top of the hill because the other vehicles were already full of people. I remember that (b)(3), (b)(6) was running with me. I believe (b)(3), (b)(6) was running with the stretcher too because she was there when we put him in the back of the truck holding onto (b)(3), (b)(6).

(b)(3), (b)(6) and I all got into the bed of the truck with (b)(3), (b)(6). I yelled back to a USACE person I saw to tell them that I was going to the hospital so they knew where I was and to let (b)(3), (b)(6) know that I was OK. (b)(3), (b)(6) was up by the cab of the truck. I was on the driver side of the truck bed beside (b)(3), (b)(6) was lying down next to him holding his hand and had her other arm around his back with her hand against the bandage. (b)(3), (b)(6) told me to help keep pressure on his bandage on his side. It looked like his shoulder was bleeding and he had a lot of blood coming out of the bandage on his back.

As we were heading up the road, (b)(3), (b)(6) said, "I'm sliding." Both she and (b)(3), (b)(6) were sliding out the open tailgate. The front legs of (b)(3), (b)(6) stretcher got lodged in the gap between the bed of the truck and the tailgate, but (b)(3), (b)(6) continued to slide. She asked me to ask (b)(3), (b)(6) to hold onto her boots so that she didn't slide out of the back of the truck. (b)(3), (b)(6) held on to her as we drove.

We were going pretty fast and hitting a lot of speed bumps. (b)(3), (b)(6) was in a lot of pain. He started saying something to the effect, "tell my wife I love her, we're having a baby in February." Both (b)(3), (b)(6) and I told him he was going to be able to tell her himself. We started asking him questions to keep him alert and from going into shock. I asked him if this was his first baby and he said no, that it was his 5th or 6th (I don't recall which). (b)(3), (b)(6) was talking to him too and she said a prayer. He said his legs were numb and that his body was starting to get numb. We just kept talking to him and I kept my hands on his bandage.

When we got to the gate at Qargha, (b)(3), (b)(6) was yelling to check the vehicle. I knew exactly what he was talking about, so I jumped out and started to look under the vehicle to see if there was an IED planted on the vehicle. I didn't see anything under the wheel well or along the bottom of the truck. .

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

The vehicle started moving again so I jumped back over the side into the bed of the truck and went back to pressing on (b)(3), (b)(6) bandage.

When we got to the medical clinic, they took (b)(3), (b)(6) out of the back and into the clinic. I remember standing there, (b)(3), (b)(6) was also there. (b)(3), (b)(6) stayed with (b)(3), (b)(6) when he went into the clinic. A bunch of other people arrived with various injuries. At some point, (b)(3), (b)(6) came up with his arm immobilized and bandaged up. (b)(3), (b)(6) came up and he had something wrong with his leg.

I remember seeing the Afghan General with the white beard as well. We were standing near the entrance of the clinic for a while until they told us to move. I walked across the street and underneath the vehicle shelter where our B-6 truck was parked. I joined the USACE people who were standing there. (b)(3), (b)(6) gathered us all up to do personnel, equipment and weapons accountability.

I was standing behind him to his left. I waited until he was done speaking, tapped him on the shoulder and then I said to him, "Sergeant Major, I have a 9mm in my pocket." I think that I said to him 'I haven't cleared the weapon.' I handed it to him and then he cleared it. I told him that I picked it up near (b)(3), (b)(6) and that I thought that it was his. There wasn't much else to do so I helped (b)(3), (b)(6) change one of our tires that had gone flat on the black vehicle. (b)(3), (b)(6) didn't want me to help but I asked him to let me help because I had some adrenaline that I wanted to work off. Most of the other guys that weren't injured also helped. It gave us all something to do while we waited to find out what was happening next.

I walked back over to the ramp of the clinic. (b)(3), (b)(6) were there. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was talking on his phone to some people including MG Wendel. They were talking about the MEDEVAC plans.

They were putting some of the wounded into heavy military vehicles. (b)(3), (b)(6) was there, as was (b)(3), (b)(6). You could tell there was something wrong with (b)(3), (b)(6) hand, but he kept refusing aid because he said he was fine and they should attend to the others that were more seriously injured.


By this point they were re-doing accountability and getting people assigned to vehicles to get back to NKC. CSM told me I was going to be Truck Commander in his vehicle because we were down a number of people. We moved back to NKC with our four vehicles, we were vehicle 4 in the convoy. We dropped the other guys off at NKC. (b)(3), (b)(6) were checking some things inside for a while. We were there a while and then got in our vehicles to head back to Bagram in our 2 Bagram Vehicles.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

b)(3), (b)(6)

SITE DIAGRAM

* At the start of the brief.



Not to scale?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

- (B) M6 Wrenches
- (W) M6 Greene
- (C) Me
- (N) (b)(3), (b)(6)
- (D) Other US Col
- (O) Other People

(b)(3), (b)(6)

13 August 2014

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Kandahar Airfield	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140815	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS USACE-TAA-HQ, Bagram Airfield, APO/AE 09354			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Please see the attached pages, numbered 1 through 2, entitled "Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

Please see the attached diagram entitled (b)(3), (b)(6) Site Diagram

Please see attached two Aerial Photographs of the site.

Approved for Release

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF <u>2</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar Airfield DATED 20140815

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 15th day of AUGUST, 2014 at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Officer in Charge KRO
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) SPECIALIST, GS-13

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

Sworn Statement of [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

We arrived at the helipad about 0900. A few others were there at the time. There were a bunch of steel folding chairs set up on top of the helipad for the brief. Someone told us that the brief will start about 0930. Since we had time, we got our briefing boards out and [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) asked the TAA team who was going to brief [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) and I responded that [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) would brief. They began to practice the brief.

They were having live firing on the ridgeline behind us. You could see people moving up the ridgeline. A British officer, I believe was a Brigadier General, introduced himself and said that it was an exercise to practice an assault on a hill.

Another British officer started the brief with an introduction and then the Brigadier followed with an orientation to the site in front of us. There were a few Afghan officers there as well.

After this brief, we all drove over to the water tower. Next to the water tower, there was a small hill with a concrete structure on it. The presentation was set up in front of that building with the building behind the group. Among the group there were also 2 Afghans in suits, at least one of them I know was from CPMD from the Introduction by [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

On the hill behind us there was more firing. The security personnel I could see were spread out. I could see them behind us and by the bottom of the hill. They were also around the vehicles by the tower.

A presentation board was set up overlooking the site towards the east and gave an outline presentation on the water wells and the water lines. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed the site orientation. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) some of the ANDU Program, then [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) started his briefing the comparison of the timeline for the water requirements versus the timeline for the water supply from the various sources. While he was briefing, MG Greene got up and pointed out they then needed a waterline from Lake Qargha. He wanted assurance that the waterline would be done in time to provide water for the population served by ANDU Phase 2. One of the Afghans in suit from CPMD, moved over to the briefing board and tried to explain the problem with the waterline from Lake Qargha. When this concluded, they said we were going to another site.

We drove down and we parked our vehicle right about the bend in the road. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) and [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) began to walk down to the site, and I followed behind them. We walked in front of the incident building and through the open area where the presentation was to be. I saw what looked like a shed, and I thought there was a lot of people going into this small shed. Then I realized it was just an opening in the perimeter wall.

We went into the shed and out through the opening and walked down to the building that housed the water tank. The water tank was basically an abandoned tanker truck in a basin like a swimming pool that they had build this building around. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) explained that this is currently where 65-70% of their water comes from. We walked back up and through the door that let back to the shed.

We formed up in a semi-circle in front of another briefing board to hear a briefing on the sustainment cost of the ANSF program presented by [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) from CSTC-A. As he briefed, I looked around the

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

site a bit and noticed the majority of the crowd between myself and the building. There were a few security personnel on top of the building, a small tent with antenna on the southeast corner of the roof with a British soldier crouched in front of it looking over the group. And a vehicle, I believe a ANA HiLux truck, parked in the roadway facing the ECP gate He finished his presentation, and asked if there were any questions. The British Officer who had started the presentations at Site one, said 'excuse me' and began to move past me. He walked up and stood in front of the board. He started to say, "this concludes our brief."

About that time, I hear a crackle and saw rock flying in front of MG Greene. My impression was that it was coming from the direction of the building and I moved behind the end of the planter box and lay on the ground. I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) go behind the vehicle that was in the road next to me. I think that (b)(3), (b)(6) came in behind me, but I am not sure. I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) crawl over the top of the planter box to take cover behind it. He was yelling, 'oh f***, oh f***.' At this point I was lying face-to-face with (b)(3), (b)(6) tried to comfort him as he had been hit in the leg and a couple of solders were trying to take care of his wounds in the legs, but he was more concerned about his eye injury. I looked into his eye to see the extent of the wound. There was what appeared to be blood around the iris, but I could not see any puncture or blood flow.

I remember seeing an Afghan by the gate, because I began looking out that direction to see if it was a larger attack.


After it began to settle down, I came out from behind the planter. I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) near MG Greene helping with him. I saw other people on the ground who were all being attended to. At this point I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) moving past the front of the building towards our vehicle and I followed him. When we got to our vehicle we both got in.

(b)(3), (b)(6) r said to (b)(3), (b)(6) that we need to do accountability. Someone came up to the vehicle and said that they needed more vehicles to help evacuate people to Qargha. (b)(3), (b)(6) drove down towards the building. Someone brought (b)(3), (b)(6) to our vehicle. I remember throwing things into the back to make room for (b)(3), (b)(6)

They put him in the back seat. I grabbed the med kit and started to put a patch on his eye. We went to Qargha, and I helped him get out of the vehicle. We moved him into the building.

The oddest thing to me about the day was that we didn't have a briefing about where we were going to go for the trip and what the security procedures were. (b)(3), (b)(6) and our force pro gave us all a brief before we left Bagram, but there was no coordinated security brief on site.

SITE DIAGRAM





1:10,000

LIVE FIRE

SECOND BRIEF SITE

FIRST BRIEF SITE

HILL ASSAULT SITE

THIRD BRIEFING & INCIDENT SITE

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AERIAL PHOTO 1



Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AERIAL PHOTO 2

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION New Kabul Compound	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140809	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS USACE-TAA-HQ, Bagram Airfield, APO/AE 09354			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Please see the attached pages, numbered 1 through 3, entitled "Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

Please see the attached diagram entitled "(b)(3), (b)(6) - 1 Site Diagram"

Please see the attached diagram entitled "(b)(3), (b)(6) - 2 Site Diagram"

Please see the attached diagram entitled "(b)(3), (b)(6) - 3 Site Diagram"

Please see the attached diagram entitled "(b)(3), (b)(6) - 4 Site Diagram"

Please see the attached diagram entitled "(b)(3), (b)(6) - 5 Site Diagram"

Please see attached two Aerial Photographs of the site.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF <u>2</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT New Kabul Compound DATED

20140809

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing else follows

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10th day of AUGUST, 2014 at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

10 AUG. 2014
USACE - TAA - PSD
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

On 5 August 2014 we arrived at the Afghan National Defense University (ANDU, now called MFNDU) around 0805. We had two USACE vehicles in our movement from New Kabul Compound (NKC). We met at the ANDU helipads. At that time we found out that the brief had been pushed from 0900 to 0930. (b)(3), (b)(6) team from Bagram arrived around 0900 and we did dry runs of the presentation that we (USACE) had to give.

General Greene's contingency was the last to arrive and they arrived about 0945-0947. There were two rows of chairs on the helipad looking over the site.

The Generals, along with (b)(3), (b)(6), sat down in the front row and the presentation started. The British (b)(6) welcomed everyone, and the British BG made remarks. The presentation was an overview of ANDU itself. Nothing there struck me as unusual, I am out at ANDU at least once a week, and nothing seemed out of the ordinary there. During the presentation, two helicopters flew over and I assumed they were heading towards Qargha.

The group got back in vehicles and headed out to the blue tank. On the way there, we drove through Phases IIIA and IIIB sites, meandering to see the site. I didn't expect them to do this kind of tour with all the Generals.

We came up around the tank and parked. They already had security forces positioned out there from Qargha. They were doing live target practice at the firing ranges about 100-150M behind the tank. I assumed they were firing M-16s based on the rounds. There were people standing on the buildings.

(b)(3), (b)(6) started the presentation by giving an overview of the water supply and distribution systems of all of MFNDU. (b)(3), (b)(6) followed next and put up his water slides. After about 10 minutes into the presentation, MG Harold Greene took over the presentation by taking another 20-plus minutes of asking questions and pointingly asking CPMD if they were going to get two of the water sources done by the time Phases IIIA and IIIB came online. MG Greene stated that if CPMD did, we would continue with Phase II, otherwise it made no sense to continue without water. While we were there, I overheard someone saying that there was a possible breakdown of security at an ECP. I don't recall who said it. They said something to the effect of the possibility of a breakdown at an ECP or something along that line.

Several of the Afghans were also taking calls. One was the aide who passed a phone to a general. The Afghan Colonel that interpreted for the British BG took calls as well. Some of the security forces radios went off as well. The phones and radios were more at the second site than at the first site, which is why it seemed weird to me.

We came down the road that goes to the ECP. We turned down the road to the right, and went about 100M and parked along the road. I had never been down to this part of the facility before. It also seemed weird that we just parked along the road. We didn't know where the road goes and we knew the way out was the other way.

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

When I walked down, I didn't see anyone going into any buildings. The group was going down to see the water buffalo – an underground water storage tank. I didn't see any PSD down there, so I didn't go down with the first group. I waited for my team and walked down with a USACE person. We followed a Danish soldier. We walked out a hole in the wall and down the wall to the square concrete building where the water buffalo was. After a bit, we came back up to where the presentation was. The total time from dismount to going back up the hill to the start of the presentation was probably 15 min.

The presenter was centered on the road side of the open area. The area was about 40'-50' from the building to the outside wall and 15'-20' from where the presenter was to the perpendicular Jersey wall. There was one or two vehicles parked behind the low wall that was behind the presenter.

The group had arranged itself in a semi-circle around (b)(3), (b)(6) who was the presenter. (b)(3), (b)(6) was at one end, standing next to him was (b)(3), (b)(6) MG Greene, and MG Wendell (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) were standing just behind this group. The Afghan Generals and Soldiers were standing towards the middle.

I was standing just in front of (b)(6) and the Senior Chief and to the right of the Afghan Generals. There were two coalition soldiers on the roof of the building to my right, as well as along the base of the wall of the building. There was also at least one soldier on the other side of the jersey wall.

(b)(3), (b)(6) was up towards the front to the right of the speaker near the jersey barriers along the road. (b)(3), (b)(6) was near him at the opposite end of the semi-circle from MG Greene; as was (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) started off the presentation. It was at least 11:30 when they turned it over to (b)(3), (b)(6) to start his presentation. About 15-20 minutes later (b)(3), (b)(6) was basically done and had asked for questions. The shots were fired, and I didn't immediately know what it was. I was looking down towards the rounded wall, and it didn't immediately register. You could hear it go through the air and you could hear people screaming. I first thought the shots were coming from across the road.

I took cover by the wall. There was an Afghan near me that I tried to pull around the wall to safety, but he was hunkered down and I could not move him. There were several people on the other side of the wall and down in the metal square that goes through the wall. There was a pause in the shooting. I saw MG Greene on the ground and not moving. I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) on the ground. An Afghan Colonel or General was down just to the south of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was kneeling on the ground by the jersey barrier.

(b)(3), (b)(6) and the Senior Chief were all right there. (b)(3), (b)(6) was maybe also near them too.

From around the barrier, there was someone asking MG Greene if he was okay. He was also yelling, "call it in, Medevac!" He was at the head of MG Greene, and a couple other folks came out to help.

(b)(3), (b)(6) came over to help. He put his weapon down and was applying tourniquets on the (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and I think (b)(3), (b)(6) While he was rendering aid, I laid prone and pulled security with

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

his M-16. Once he was done, he got up, and took his weapon to go into the building. As (b)(3), (b)(6) grabbed his weapon he yelled to write 1159 down on the Sr. Chief's tourniquet.

I grabbed the Sr. Chief and helped her up onto her good leg. She put her arms around me, but she could hardly move. I told her I was going to drag her and I drug her to the vehicle while she mostly kept her bad leg (right leg) in the air.

The truck had a bunch of stuff in the back. Another troop went in first and dragged her in from the top. She screamed as we pulled her in because it jockeyed her leg. I yelled that Sr. Chief's tourniquet time was 1159. A second person was put in next to her. A second vehicle was parked at a 45 degree angle behind the one we loaded the Sr. Chief in. The vehicle sped off.

On the North side of the U-shape building I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) and I went to where he was. (b)(3), (b)(6) was also there. Someone brought (b)(3), (b)(6) his camera. It might have been (b)(3), (b)(6) He said, "thanks for grabbing it."

Some of the Danish soldiers that were doing security were there. One of them said that the shooter was in the building. (b)(3), (b)(6) freaked out a little bit about this. I then ran over to our vehicles losing site of (b)(3), (b)(6) was in the back of a truck and he yelled to me that he was going to Qargha.

(b)(3), (b)(6) came up and we went into the vehicle. (b)(3), (b)(6) was already in on the driver's side. (b)(3), (b)(6) traded with (b)(3), (b)(6) because he was wounded in his right arm and couldn't drive. We started driving towards Qargha. I noticed that there were about 6-8 uparmored vehicles on one of the ANDU helopads in a tight semi-circle and stated that I thought that's where they must of taken MG Greene. When we got to Qargha and waited around there.

----- Nothing Follows -----

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Second site by big blue water tank.

ANDU PH IIIA & B

Site of opening remarks.

ANDU PH I

ANDU PH II

Third site where the incident to place.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Orange Project Offices
Kabul Branch Project Offices

Approved for Release

Parking area location

Presentation location.


Jersey barrier.

Building where you go through the wall.


Jersey barrier.

(b)(3), (b)(6)


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(b)(3), (b)(6) - 2 SITE DIAGRAM




(b)(3), (b)(6) - 3 SITE DIAGRAM



Digitally signed by

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) - 4 SITE DIAGRAM




Digitally signed by

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) - 5

SITE DIAGRAM

Approved for Release



Digitally signed by
(b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Qarga, Afghanistan	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2014/08/05	3. TIME 0830-1400	4. FILE NUMBER
-----------------------------------	----------------------------------	----------------------	----------------

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)
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8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
USACE-TAA-PM (based at New Kabul Compound Kabul, Afghanistan)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6) WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

0830 to 0930: I was with group waiting at briefing site #1. See Exhibit #1 ANDU Qarga (b)(3), (b)(6) Aug 2014 accompanying document. While waiting observed a group of presumed to be ANA soldiers first going up then apparently returning or coming back down toward ANDU immediately prior to the 1st briefing.

0930: First briefing

1000: First briefing completed and drive to briefing site #2 (the blue tank). See Exhibit #1 ANDU Qarga (b)(3), (b)(6) Aug 2014 for location. Route of travel was through ANDU phases IIIA and IIIB. No outstanding observations during route.

~1015-1100: Briefing #2, See #1 ANDU Qarga (b)(3), (b)(6) Aug 2014 for location. Water supply issues. Nothing of note beyond ANA personnel doing PT along the road to site #3 and ANA personnel on the range immediately west of the briefing site. Security was evident observing in all directions.

~1100~1110: Travel to Briefing site #3. Vehicles of TAA parked approximately in the location marked on Exhibit #2-ANDU Qarga zoom (b)(3), (b)(6) Aug 14.

~1110~1145: Briefing 3 location. Group first went into covered water tank adjacent to the perimeter wall. I felt uncomfortable and stayed in briefing area. There were some type of security personnel on the roof of the adjacent building (part of the building was 2 stories). See Exhibit 3 Site Diagram (b)(3), (b)(6) Aug 14 for approximate locations. Group returned to briefing area at (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) gave brief #3. Brief was completed and questions were being taken by 1145.

~1150: I heard sharp noises. I saw people going for cover and did the same as I noticed the gravel being kicked up by bullets 5-10' in front of me. Prior to getting down I felt burning in my right calf and knew that I had been hit by something. The shooting stopped and I heard security delaing with casualties. I saw very little as I was pinned by the Master Chief, who had also been hit. (b)(3), (b)(6) placed a tourniquet on my left leg with assistance of (b)(3), (b)(6) assisted me to a vehicle (a German equivalent of Mrap) for transport to Qarga TMC and triage.

~1200: Triage at Qarga. Catagory C for me and a land movement to KIAA Hospital for treatment. Patience.....there were others in greater need than I.

~1830: Discharged from Hospital at KIAA.

~2030: Transport to NKC.

10. EXHIBIT 3 accompanying documents	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT NKC

DATED 2014/08/14

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 14 day of AUGUST, 2014 at 1700

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ART 136 UCMJ (Authority To Administer Oaths)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TAD-A PSD Team Leader ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS


INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

AR 15-6 Investigation - Marshal Fahim National Defense University Incident - 05 AUG 14

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

(b)(3), (b)(6)

11/18/2014 - 248



(b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit 1

Briefing Location #1
5 Aug 14

Briefing Location #2
5 Aug 14

Briefing Location #3
5 Aug 14

Approved for Release




Exhibit 2

2 - Oarga Zoomed - Briefing #3
Locations: 5 Aug 14

TAA Support Vehicles Parked
here: 5 Aug 14

MFNDU Briefing Site #3
5 Aug 14

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit 3:

5 Aug 14

MFNDU Briefing 3 SITE DIAGRAM

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Story Board Location for Briefing 5 Aug 14
X is the location (b)(3), (b)(6)


(b)(3), (b)(6)

MG Green and other Generals ~1150 5 Aug 14

Shooter approximate location (b)(3), (b)(6) actually saw shooter

(b)(3), (b)(6) 14 approximate location

Entry to Water Storage Area



Digital Sender Cover Sheet Agreement User Agreement

I accept the responsibility to safeguard the information contained in this document to a level commensurate with the classification of the information from unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure or use.

I understand that Communications using, data stored on, or information being transmitted over government networked information systems (IS) are not private. I understand that the use of USFOR-A networks or any other DoD computer system or network constitutes consent to being monitored at all times for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personal misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations. At any time, USFOR-A may inspect and seize data stored or transmitted over government networks.

I will not scan information onto a network if the information has a higher classification than what the network is currently accredited. I will not enter information that is proprietary, contractor-excluded, or otherwise needs special protection or handling, unless approved in writing by Information Assurance (IA).

I will have the information to be scanned reviewed and verified by another person for Two Person Integrity (TPI) to prevent unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure or use. I and the TPI person certify to the best of our knowledge that we have taken all appropriate measures to ensure the information contained in this document is authorized for transport over the network on which it will be sent.

I will report incidents pertaining to unauthorized storage or transmission of information of a greater sensitivity than what the system or network is currently accredited for to my servicing Help Desk.

I understand that violations of agreed upon conditions will result in the suspension or termination of my privileges to access classified data. I understand that my access may be suspended, revoked or terminated for non-compliance with DoD security policies. These repercussions also apply to the TPI person.

The undersigned consents to interception/capture and seizure of ALL communications and data for any authorized purpose (including personal misconduct, law enforcement, or counterintelligence investigation). The undersigned understands that violations are punishable by UCMJ action, punitive actions and/or other adverse administrative actions.

Classification of information being scanned: Unclassified - ~~FOUO~~

Subject: (b)(3), (b)(6)

YYYY/MMM/DD and Time: 2013 16 AUG 2014

Print Rank/Title Name or User: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

User Signature: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Print Rank/Title Name or User: (b)(3), (b)(6) Exec Asst.

TPI Signa: (b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Bagram Airfield	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20140809	3. TIME 1600	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
USACE-TAA-HQ, Bagram Airfield, APO/AE 09354

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Please see the attached pages, numbered 1 through ~~X~~, entitled "Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)"

Please see the attached diagram entitled (b)(3), (b)(6) "Site Diagram"

Please see attached two Aerial Photographs of the site.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Approved for Release

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Nothing Entered

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FOR MY OWN BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Person Making Statement

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 9th day of AUGUST, 2014 at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

We arrived at ANDU around 0845 and we were told that everyone would be there about 0930. We were able to view the entire site from the first location. There was already Danish security forces on the ground when we got to the site. I knew they were Danish because I was talking with one of them at one point. I was walking around and taking pictures of our folks and the VIPs. I didn't notice anything unusual at this point.

There was a live fire range to the north and someone mentioned that they were doing maneuvers. I don't recall if General Greene was there yet, because at that point I didn't know what he looked like. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was talking with [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) about the presentation they were about to give. It quickly got pretty crowded. There were maybe 25 vehicles in the landing zone. There were German MPs at this point too.

They did the brief and we loaded the vehicles to go to the blue water tank. When we got to the tank, there was live firing going on there as well. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) talked about water, then [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) talked for a while as well. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) got to a slide about water consumption and this started a discussion about a lake. That is when MG Greene got involved, and said the numbers didn't make any sense. Two people from the Afghan version of DPW got involved in the discussion. I think they may have been Colonels, but they were wearing civilian clothes. I think the presentation and discussion was around 45 minutes.

While we were still at the blue tank, someone (I think [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)) said that they didn't know if we were going to the next site or not, because of the security. He said the site was secure, but it was a small area, so only the senior folks should head down.

We drove down the hill to the third site and parked along the road, maybe 100m from where the incident occurred. Then we walked down to the courtyard where the incident occurred. I don't know how many people actually went down to see the tank, but I stayed up in the courtyard.

When all the senior folks were back, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) started to give his O&M brief. I noticed that there were security personnel on the roof of the building - maybe 4 soldiers. It looked to me like 2 British and 2 Danish soldiers. There were sandbags along one part of the rooftop as well.

There was a head high wall near the road behind where [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was presenting. Behind us, there was a chest-high barrier. It had diagonal red and black stripes.

As [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was finishing, I started to turn to my right. I heard a couple of pops and the Navy Chief and [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) went down. I didn't know what was going on or who was shooting. As I looked down, I saw a couple of ricochets near my feet and I hit the deck. I assumed the firing was coming from the building because [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) and the female Navy Chief were hit in the back and because of the way the dirt kicked up around my feet. They both started to say that they were hit.

The Chief was saying that she couldn't feel her legs. I believed she was starting to go into shock. I put my hand on her head and had her talk to me. If she hadn't have been standing between me and the

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

firing, I would have been hit. (b)(3), (b)(6) said he had been hit in the calf. There were still shots being fired. At that point I think (b)(3), (b)(6) said that he was okay.

I looked to my left and saw MG Greene down. There were 2 or 3 people over him calling for medics. I heard someone say that he had a weak pulse and they may have been trying to do CPR.

2 Medics came with big bags. One began to render aide to MG Greene and the other was working on another person, but I don't know who. They had gotten the general on what looked like a poncho liner and were trying to sprint him out of there.

Someone was working on who I think was (b)(3), (b)(6) was maybe 15 feet from the building. They rolled him over and began working on him.

I also saw that the Afghan general who wore the French looking hat with a bill and the long white beard was hit. (b)(3), (b)(6) came around the corner and an American Soldier gave him a weapon and told him to stay there.

(b)(3), (b)(6) came over. (b)(3), (b)(6) and an American soldier put a tourniquet on the Chief. The soldier who brought the tourniquet picked her up and took her away. She screamed when he tried to pick her up because he had initially picked her up from the wrong side.

I went over to (b)(3), (b)(6) and with (b)(3), (b)(6) we pulled up his pant leg and saw the bullet hole. At that point I looked up at the force protection on the roof. One asked me if I needed anything, and I said I needed a tourniquet and he pulled his out and threw it down to me. Someone else came and got (b)(3), (b)(6) and took him out.

Next thing I remember is that someone yelled for everyone to get to the vehicles, so I got up and began to run to out vehicle. (b)(3), (b)(6) ran up to the vehicle and yelled at us to get our gear on and get in the car.

(b)(3), (b)(6) came up to the vehicle and (b)(3), (b)(6) came up a few seconds behind him and said he had been in the building. We made a U turn and went to Qargha. On the way back, (b)(3), (b)(6) was trying to call back to somewhere to give them a status update. He tried by telephone and radio because he kept losing the signal.

(b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) were already at Qargha when we got there. The COL's vehicle was already under the carport when we got there. You could tell (b)(3), (b)(6) had something wrong with his finger, but he wouldn't see a doctor because, he said, there were people who were more injured than him.


----- Nothing Follows -----

(b)(3), (b)(6)

SITE DIAGRAM

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)



THERE WAS
ME A
TOWN I GUET
to use on

(b)(3), (b)(6)


Briefing




- 1- (b)(3), (b)(6)
- 2. (b)(3), (b)(6)
- 3
- 4 (b)(3), (b)(6)
- 5-MG GREGG
- 6-AFGHAN General
- ⑦ I think (b)(3), (b)(6)
NOT SWITZ
- (AW) (b)(3), (b)(6)
Given a weapon by
Soldier. Told to
STAY there..

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)



(b)(3), (b)(6)



SWORN STATEMENT

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5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS USACE-TAA-HQ, Bagram Airfield, APO/AE 09354			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 9th day of AUGUST, 2014

USACE-TAA
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) (Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)
COMMISSIONED OFFICER (b)(3), (b)(6)
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

I arrived to the Afghan National Defense University site on 5 AUG 2014 with the PAO (b)(3), (b)(6) as my battle buddy in the vehicle. Upon arriving on the site, we met up with (b)(3), (b)(6) from the Kabul team. Our team consisted of (b)(3), (b)(6) the Deputy for Project Management, plus our two teams of PSDs.

All personnel, other than the PSD, removed their battle gear. The areas chosen for the first two briefings were probably chosen for their great views of the overall project.

The first briefings began after a 30-45 minute delay waiting for the final general officers to arrive. Soon after their arrival, the briefings started with an introduction by the British Officer (I assume the British BG's AID) and then a brief description of the ANDU project and the lay-out of the site as seen from the viewing area. This was conducted by a British Officer, I believe a BG in rank. After the Corps was introduced, (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed the group on the overall projects, the different phases and their locations, and associated BODs with the 3 phases. This portion of the briefing took about 10 minutes. The British Aide monitored the time and tried to keep everyone on schedule.

Immediately after the conclusion of (b)(3), (b)(6) briefing, the caravan of approximately 20-25 vehicles took off to the 2nd briefing site near the Blue Water Tank overseeing the area from the southern section facing north. Here the briefer was (b)(3), (b)(6) who described the challenges associated with water. It was during this portion of the briefings that MG Green began asking questions on the water hook ups, the time lines, and commitments to ensure that water would be available prior to the award of Phase II of the ANDU project. These questions produced discussions from many different individuals and the time associated with this portion of the briefing and the O&M portion began to extend beyond that time which was allotted for this portion of briefings. After perhaps more than an hour, the aide canceled the O&M portion of the briefing and asked everyone to go back to their vehicles to now go to the underground

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

vehicle storage area ((#4) on the briefing slides). The Caravan went through the Phase I portion of the project and parked several hundred feet from the underground storage area. Everyone walked the distance and later most of the individuals went to the vehicle storage area and were briefed, while at the underground storage area, of the current water set-up and future tie-ins required to sustain future water requirements for the project.

Immediately upon exiting the entrance of the Vehicle Water Storage area, (b)(3), (b)(6) had set up briefing charts to discuss the O&M portion of the sustainability of the ANDU project. This was the area that the ambush took place. There were approximately 40 - 50 individuals in a small confined area listening to the briefer, with the VIPs within 10-15 feet of the charts and the rest of us behind or to their sides being guarded by numerous American, NATO and Afghan security personnel. During the approximate 1 1/2 or 2 hours from the beginning of the presentations to this point, all personnel other than the PST had removed their protective gear and were wearing soft gear. Note: The entire morning presentations were done in the sun, with no or little available shade, no provided water or breaks.

At the time of the shooting, I was at the end of the concrete barriers that were behind the VIPS, closest to the building where the shots came from. The Naval Chief (woman) was standing next to me. Both of us were leaning against the concrete barrier. I was watching the guards on the roof of the building where the shots were fired and, at the time of the shooting, I was looking away towards the side of the building towards a field. I didn't see the effect of the shots but rather heard the shots and heard someone shouting "S***, S***, S***."

At this moment, I actually don't remember the next 10 seconds or so. I do realize that at the moment of the shots, I took off towards the side of the building that I had been looking at. As I got close to the corner, a soldier other than our PST team, was right behind me and said that he had put 3 shots through the window. He continued around the corner of the building and I hunkered down on the side of the

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

building away from the shooting. I saw an Afghan running away from the building down through the field that I had just been looking at. I pulled out my camera and took a picture of him and also saw an Afghan Truck coming down the hill towards him and stopped him.

I then looked around the corner and saw; whom I assume may have been (b)(3), (b)(6) and several others who had been shot in the middle of the area from what I could see. This was the group closest to the building and not the location of where the VIPs had been. What I remember is seeing a medic or an individual in the middle of the 3 or 4 that were down rendering aid to someone that had been hit and lifting his shirt where there was a lot of blood exposed. I don't believe he had a first aid kit and remember seeing a medic's bag tossed from the roof of the building to his location. I tried to take his picture so that he could be recognized for his valor. At this time, I did not know if the area had been secured or if there were other gunmen in the area.

Describe what happened after the incident including aid that was rendered and how you and other responded to the incident.

After perhaps 3-5 minutes of so, the young man who had said he had put 3 rounds in the window and (b)(3), (b)(6) returned from the front of the building and back to the corner that I was located (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) told me to go back to the area where the others were (the place that I had originally been prior to the shots.)

Immediately after turning the corner of the barrier I saw four wounded individuals, the wounded Naval (b)(3), (b)(6) Two individuals were trying to help the naval officer and (b)(3), (b)(6) was on the ground with a M4 facing the building. I stepped over (b)(3), (b)(6) and asked him if he was ok? Those that had been helping the naval officer asked her if she could stand and they helped her up and then evacuated her from the area. I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) bleeding and trying to put a tourniquet by

(b)(3), (b)(6)


Sworn Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

himself, on his arm by his shoulder. I went over to him inspected the wound and placed the tourniquet on him. I then went to help (b)(3), (b)(6) who was trying to help (b)(3), (b)(6). Neither of us had any tourniquets – they were in the vehicle. (Somewhere during this time, (b)(3), (b)(6) had left the area (b)(3), (b)(6) pointed to the medic bag in the middle of the clearing, that had been tossed from the roof, and said that there were tourniquets in the bag. I ran over there, grabbed a tourniquet and went back to help (b)(3), (b)(6) was already putting a tourniquet on (b)(3), (b)(6) and I remember telling him that it had to go above his knee and then helped place the tourniquet on (b)(3), (b)(6). About this time, a young man came over and told us to move (b)(3), (b)(6) out of the area so we picked him up and followed a British Officer, who told us to bring him to his vehicle. We loaded (b)(3), (b)(6) in the vehicle and they took off to the hospital. Both (b)(3), (b)(6) and I returned to the building where we learned that the shooter had been killed but that there might be others in the building. All wounded had at this time been removed (b)(3), (b)(6) and I went back to our vehicle, several hundred feet away, put on our battle gear and waited in the car for our PST to arrive. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived, we loaded up, and after confirming that the COL was ok and that they had taken the wounded to Qargha, we headed out to the British Camp where we met up with the rest of the TAA team.

The person that was performing first aid on (b)(3), (b)(6) was outstanding. (b)(3), (b)(6) was cool under fire and a true professional during the entire episode.

----- Nothing Follows -----

SITE DIAGRAM



(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release



GREEN ON BLUE INCIDENT - MARSHAL FAHIM NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY - 5 Aug 2014

When the shooting started at 1200 hrs I got down as fast as I could and found myself in the drainage ditch. When the shooting stopped, there was confusion over where the shots had come from, and if the shooter was still alive. (b)(6) (my interpreter) and I ended up together near the small shed that led to the sunken tank, concerned about the GSU guard in the perimeter watch tower to the east of the contact point, thinking that he may be the shooter. He was standing in the door to his watchtower holding a long barreled weapon. At the same time it was running through my mind that the initial shots had a 'ponk' sound to them – like they had been fired from inside a building. There was more than one burst of fire. I then moved to tend the wounded. BG Sakhi, Comdt NMAA, had been shot in the lower leg and the wound was bleeding, but not profusely. The wound was right in the middle of his shin and I assumed that the bones were shattered. He was in pain and moving from side to side. Others were tending other wounded. I recollect Maj Gen Greene (I think), who I thought had been shot in the Back/Chest and he was covered on blood. I also briefly went over to (b)(3), (b)(6) who had been shot in the leg. Both MG Greene and (b)(3), (b)(6) had people tending them. I went back to BG Sakhi. There was still concern over the safety of the site, although the shooting had stopped, so I moved BG Shakhi to the safety of the shed where (b)(6) was, along with MG Shah COM MFNDU and BG Sharifi Comdt ANAOA. Subsequently I learned that (b)(6) (CPMD), who was also wounded, was moved there. It was difficult to get BG Sakhi in to the shed as the doorway is very low. I then returned to coordinate the allocation of wounded to vehicles; I recall some vehicles attempting to leave without casualties. I helped ensure that casualties were allocated to empty vehicles. (b)(6) who had by now applied a tourniquet to BG Sakhi's leg in the shed, then appeared next to me and so I then entered the guard room building with him to confirm that the shooter was dead. There were a group of about 5-6 ANA personnel, some carrying weapons inside the entrance to the guardroom. They pointed me in the direction of the ablutions. On entry to the ablutions the shooter was on the floor and being guarded by two (?) Danish CP members. One thought that he had hit the shooter. I asked if the shooter was dead. They thought he was. Having checked for a pulse in his neck, I confirmed that he was dead. I then returned to the vehicles and got hold of an Afghan Ranger pick-up vehicle and ordered it to prepare to take BG Sakhi to the medical center at Camp QAA. I sent (b)(6) back to the shed to collect BG Shaki with some others. On arrival we placed BG Shaki along the back seat, and made him as comfortable as possible. He was longer than the seat, so had to be slightly propped up in an uncomfortable semi-sitting position, but his legs were straight. I told (b)(6) (who was slightly wounded in his flank) to get in the front and I went in the back with two other unknown Afghans (who I have subsequently learnt were BG Sakhi's (b)(6) and another NMAA officer). I remember trying to get hold of my Ch Instr (b)(6) on my mobile, as I knew that help would be required back at Camp QAA. I was unable to raise him. We proceeded to Camp Qargha where both BG Sakhi and (b)(6) entered the Role 1 medical facility. There I met Maj Gen Bathurst. He told me not to enter the Medical facility. We chatted. The scene was as ordered as possible given the circumstances. We discussed that MG Greene had been hit. We left the medical facility and went to find the OC (b)(6) We spoke about the situation. I was concerned that the Danish UTAG CP team may still be at the scene, securing the body of the shooter.

At 1225 I departed again in my own vehicle with a RMP CP NCO from Maj Gen Bathurst's CP team, who Maj Bathurst had detailed to go accompany me, and with QRF (b)(6) commanded by (b)(6) COLDM GDS. Having spoken to about 3 Afghan officers (through an interpreter, who was not in military uniform) I entered the building again to find the Danish OC of the UTAG CP team. I told him to withdraw his team, which included an Australian marksman. I spoke to a group of about 6 GSU personnel, some with red head dress, who were unarmed. I apologized for the death of their comrade. The senior man who was an officer, said I had nothing to apologise for – 'the dead man was worse than the Taliban'. I handed over the scene to the man I assumed was the GSU PI Comd (short/chubby/reb beret). He spoke broken English, and seemed sensible. At 1240 I arrived at the AMEC compound (HQ ANAOA) and spoke to BG Sharifi, who was having lunch with (b)(6) and others. I was invited to stay, but instead spoke to BG Sharifi about the casualties, including BG Sakhi, and what I knew of the incident. He knew that MG Greene had been hit. I then returned to Camp QAA.

On arrival at Camp QAA I spoke to Maj Gen Bathurst again, and visited the medical centre with him and (b)(6). We decided to go and see MG Shah, COM MFNDU. I remember speaking to Maj Gen Bathurst and (b)(3), (b)(6) about MG Greene. We had not seen him or his CP Team. We spoke about looking for his CP team using the Aerostat Balloon (which had already been done). We then met his CP Comd in Camp QAA. He told us that they had gone to the original K-SPAN HLS, and had tried in vain to flag down helicopters using smoke.

At 1350 I attended the Maj Gen Bathurst/MG Shah KLE in MG Shah's office, with (b)(6) UTAG. Others present included BG Sharifi, MG Maron Fahri A-MOD Ch J2 who told us that the shooter was from Paktia Province, DOB 1991, trained at KMTC, not on a special list and that his department had already removed over 2000 personnel from the ANA. BG Khawar A-MOD Ch legal Advisor and some others were also present. The KLE consisted mainly of reassurances and sympathies. MG Shah said that he had ordered his GSU guards not to be armed. We were told that the investigation would be led by MG Payenda. As we left MG Shah's office, MG Payenda arrived, followed shortly by BG Hetherington COM NTM-A. We departed at about 1440. Maj Gen Bathurst dropped me off on his way back to HQ ISAF and I walked back in to Camp QAA.

I was told that COM ISAF's ADC had phoned to speak to the senior officer. I briefed Gen Dunford COM ISAF at approx 1500 – 1530 over the phone.

At 1600hrs I addressed the whole of Camp QAA (FP Coy/ANAOA mentors/UTAG). I compared this incident to the 26 Oct 13 Green on Blue (animosity towards us then, but not on this occasion – Afghan horror at the shooter's actions this time), described what had happened through out the day, told them that this was nothing to do with the ANAOA, warned them that the inspection phase would now begin, warned them that there were to be no 'stray volts' from personnel at Camp QAA, and thanked the medical staff and indeed all who had help throughout the afternoon; it had been a truly Camp QAA team effort. I did not tell them about the death of MG Harry Greene, which I was already aware of, as it had not at that point been announced.

ANAOA/G3

13 Aug 14

COS NCC

Copy to:

Dir UTAG CO KSU

GREEN ON BLUE/GREEN ON GREEN INCIDENT AT MARSHAL FAHIM NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY – TUE 5 AUG 2014

1. **Aim.** This visit was an ISAF visit with Afghan partners (CPMD/ANA), coordinated and planned by UTAG as an in-place NTM-A unit. The aim of the visit was to inform ISAF and ANA senior leadership of potential critical vulnerability to MFNDU site due to a lack of water provision. This has been a long running problem, as CPMD is responsible for a large part of the water provision plan for the site. It was discussed in detail at the recent MFNDU Programme Review Board on 23 Jul 14 and has necessitated previous GO visits to the site, in the past.

2. **Attendance.** The following personnel attended the visit but the group numbered upwards of 50 pers with PSDs, additional pers, staff offrs etc:

(b)(6)	
MG Wendel	DCOS SA / CG CSTSC-A
MG Greene	DCG CSTC-A
MG Shah	COM MFNDU
Maj Gen Bathurst	Dir MoD MAG
BG Bartscher	Dep Adv MoD
BG Sharifi	Comdt ANAOA
BG Sakhi	COM NMAA
Brig Russell	Ch Mentor ANAOA
(b)(3), (b)(6)	

3. **Outline Programme.** Tour of site comprised of three briefing stands to specifically focus on water infrastructure including viewpoints to observe the entirety of MFNDU project in order to demonstrate the totality of the investment in the site that could be negated by the lack of a sustainable water plan. Sites were also chosen to deliberately emphasise ANAOA training (there were OCdts on the ranges and across the training area); the visit took place against a background of live and blank firing. The visit was to conclude with an office call with the COM

MFNDU, who was present throughout the visit, followed by lunch in his office. Time was very tight and made tighter by a delay of almost an hour to the start of the visit due to the late arrival of senior visitors.

4. **Pre Visit Planning.** The MFNDU issue had been raised as an Essential Function concern/target and in UK Comd's Conf and UK ASSESSREP. The visit was announced and the warning order briefed to DCOM MFNDU (representing COM MFNDU), CPMD and CF SMEs at the MFNDU Programme Review Board on 23 Jul 14. CONOPS and a briefing pack including maps and satellite images of MFNDU site showing stands and COM MFNDU office were issued 1-2 Aug 14. COM MFNDU was briefed in detail during a KLE on 4 Aug. OC UTAG DNK FP Tm was the 'On the Ground Commander' for any C2 in the event of an incident, so UTAG DNK FP Tm were responsible for liaison with the QFPC. UTAG conducted visit planning including requests for QFPC to secure the K-Span HLS (Stand 1) as they do for all visits. The MFNDU ranges, at the rear of which Stand 2 took place, had been subject to the preparatory searches and checks by the QFPC as the ranges were being used by ANAOA. QFPC were also asked to search the water pumping station (Stand 3) with AES dogs, which they did. QFPC also provided (b)(1) 1x AUS marksmen who were attached to the DNK FP Tm. They provided in-depth protection of Route Orange to the south of the MFNDU site, in the area of Stand 3. UTAG DNK FP Tm requested 1x PMR IOT enable comms with FP Coy Ops Rm – this is standard operating procedure for QAA based C/S operating on the MFNDU site. UTAG decided that the visit was inside the confines of MFNDU and the threat was NO CHANGE to daily routine business – ie personnel FP levels would be adhered to (carriage of PPE, not worn). OC UTAG DNK FP Tm and Dir UTAG conducted visit recce and threat assessment. QFPC J2 is shared with UTAG on a twice daily basis although no specific consultation or advice was requested for this visit, as the situation was NO CHANGE. MG Greene's CP team also conducted a FP recce with OC UTAG DNK FP Tm and (b)(3), (b)(6) (UTAG). QFPC knew of the sites to be visited due to request for clearance ops. All visitors were given a verbal ground orientation brief following a visit programme brief at Stand 1 on arrival, including the location of Camp QAA (easily identified by the aerostat). The fact that Camp QAA has a medical facility was not mentioned.

5. **Contact.** At approx. 051150D* an ANA soldier opened fire from the ground floor bathroom window of the GSU Security Building during an unscheduled stop of the visit party to listen to a CPMD brief. The visitor group was 5-15m away from the firing point and facing away from the gunman. The gunman fired approximately 2-3 bursts from an automatic weapon. The (b)(6) returned fire. The gunman was killed inside the building. No contact report was sent to the QFPC from the COM UTAG DNK FP Team. The CAS were treated in situ and evacuated in CAVs to the R1 medical facility at Camp QAA, triaged and CASVAC'd to BAF R3 by DUSTOFF in seven lifts, that operated in three waves. The first CAS were w/u at 1247D* with the final CAS w/u at 1317D*. 1445hrs CAT C CAS had arrived at KAIA R2E medical facility by road. BDA was 1 x ANA gunman KIA, 1 x KIA (US), 6 Cat A (5 x US, 1 x UK), 1 x Cat B (AFG), 14 Cat C (6 x US, 4 x UK, 3 x AFG, 1 x DEU).

6. **GSU / MP Coy.** GSU soldiers are posted into the unit for 2 years or more from ANA Fd Army – viewed as 'rest' from operations. They spend 3 months on a single FP tower on the fence line before rotation to other duties such as ECP security. OC QFPC and his J2 staff have regular KLE with GSU. The unit has been implicated in corrupt activities under the previous COM ANDU MG Karim, who was removed from post in early 2014, following an ISAF/ANA investigation. The COM GSU has more recently been replaced. Relations at that level are good under new GSU leadership. The gunman was later identified by the ANA and confirmed during the KLE with MG JALANDER SHAH as being Rafiqullah (ANA ID: (b)(6)) (b)(6) of Paktiya Province. He is believed to have been in the ANA for 3 years and

completed 18 months at S KAIA Support Battalion before moving to the GSU where he has been for the last 18 months. ANAOA (b)(6) stated he had been biometrically enrolled and had not had any INS connections; he was a social and happy individual who had not presented any hostility towards ISAF until the attack.

7. **Initial Lessons.** Visits are almost an everyday occurrence to the MFNDU site. ANAOA alone have had over 100 in 9 months. Group sizes are sometimes 20+ (principals, CP team members, ADCs, MAs, POLADS, etc), and occasionally many more, which present good targets – multiple VIPs are not uncommon: ANAOA opening ceremony, DAS' Association of Kabul, MFNDU Leadership seminar, NMAA graduation ceremony and the forthcoming ANAOA passout parade, are examples. This was an ISAF visit to attempt to nail an ongoing infrastructure issue that will lead to the failure of the MFNDU site if not sorted out; seeing the infrastructure in question was important. Official investigation teams are still to report their findings. That said, lessons, so far appear to be:

a. **MFNDU as an AO.** There is limited CF understanding of the MFNDU and elements within it. That risk is exacerbated when there is no obligation for visiting CF units to report their movements to Camp Qargha. The QFPC who work daily across the MFNDU, have an established J2 cell, QRF and Medical Facilities which provide the capabilities required to respond to a wide range of incidents, and yet too few CF units and personnel are aware of its existence. Serious consideration should be given to the MFNDU becoming a QFPC Area of Operation where all non-Afghan visitors are required to book in and out, get a J2 update and understand the capabilities available while also ensuring they have comms with QFPC even if it is by mobile phone. The same visibility is required of visitors (including CP teams, MAs, ADCs etc) who arrive by helicopter. The practicalities of this would need refining, particularly to understand the resourcing implications for QFPC. This approach would be relevant to other CF locations across Afghanistan. Greater on-line information on MFNDU site should be available to ISAF personnel on line.

b. **Command and Control.** Camp QAA, although a UK lead, is also home, amongst others, to UTAG (a standard NTM-A organisation consisting of (1)1 pax from 7 nations – contractors, CP teams, advisors etc, who depart Camp QAA for good between mid Aug 14 – mid Sep 14 for their new home at New Kabul Compound). UTAG has no ops room and NTM-A a limited Base Defence Operations Centre (BDOC) at New Kabul Compound in central Kabul to support movement across Kabul. UTAG are also required to move around and organise regular visits to the MFNDU site. Communication and the level of QFPC visibility of UTAG movements/visits on the MFNDU site needs to be formalised between the two organisations. Reporting from the visit party to the QFPC ops room was poor throughout.

c. **Visits to the MFNDU site.** There are occasions where large visits are appropriate and the risks need to be accepted and managed. However, self evidently visits should be kept to a minimum, in frequency and participants, to reduce targets.

d. **IJC Support to the incident.** Having identified that there was a MASCAL the QFPC Coy 2IC, having worked as the KSU LO to IJC and knowing individuals and their responsibilities, rang a number of people in IJC to warn of a significant incident and the requirement for support, these included RC-E PECC, IJC CJOC Director, IJC CJOC Shift Director, IJC CJMED Desk, IJC RW Desk. None of the phones were answered and the KSU took the lead in coordinating the CASEVAC to BAF and KAIA R3 with HQ IJC. The

KSU LO to IJC, who was on his handover, was called and he assisted in ensuring that all relevant parties in the HQ were informed. The local CASEVAC and treatment was coordinated by the QFPC. As a 3* HQ having to support tactical action, IJC need to be able to be in a position to respond 24/7 to a MASCAL incident.

e. **Communications.** The QFPC work on UK Bowman and PMR which work well for those who have it. If not in possession then it is very difficult to communicate to co-ordinate a response through the QFPC. Communications on the MFNDU site, including for visitors, will be looked at again.

8. **Conclusion.** The visit turned in to tragedy. It was planned, executed and the follow-up prosecuted by representatives from across ISAF, without the privilege of a clear national chain of command. One CF individual died at the scene. The reaction, handling and evacuation of the casualties were excellent in the circumstances. Lessons will concentrate on the detail of C2 and communications on site between the units here, and particularly visitors to the site, and from the QFPC upwards. Resource implications for the UK/PN focused QFPC need to be clearly understood, especially as from mid Sep 14 UTAG, and their FP capability, will no longer be located at MFNDU, which will nevertheless remain a focal point for CF Resolute Support visitors. The bigger the visit parties to the site, the bigger the target, however for some visitors CP teams, ADCs, MAs etc are non-negotiable. That said, there is a requirement to minimise visitors and the size of their parties, but there is a balance. Wider lessons on J2, PSD training and other matters are still to emerge from investigation teams.

B W O RUSSELL
Brig
Ch Mentor ANAOA

Russell, Bruce WO. BRIG GBR ANAOA Chief Mentor

From: Russell, Bruce WO. BRIG GBR ANAOA Chief Mentor
Sent: Thursday, August 14, 2014 10:17 PM
To: (b)(6) ISAF HQ DETINT UK NCC COS IS; (b)(6) (GBR) (b)(6) NTM-A DCOM-A HQ Director; (b)(6) ISAF CSO KSG RHQ CO 2 IS (FOC+)
Cc: (b)(6) ISAF HQ UKNCC DCOS IS; (b)(6) ISAF HQ NIC HQ NCC POLAD IS
Subject: RE: ~~(S//REL)~~ JCAT Report for 5 Aug GoB

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

(b)(6)

Many thanks. Please pass to BG Ed Jackson.

1-16 5(b) should say: UTAG highlighted a serious ongoing critical vulnerability for the MFNDU site and ISAF requested CSTC-A to conduct a KLE.....

2-16 5(c)four locations (not five). Sites 2 and 3 were condensed to single briefing location because they were co-located at the main water storage tank. Delete sentence...From the range... Next sentence: Their for delete 'fourth', insert 'third'.... Penultimate sentence should be ...Their fourth....

2 2-16 5(f)(2). The was originally scheduled to start at 0900 hours.... The start was amended to 0930 hours at the request of CSTC-A, which was confirmed on the morning of the visit. The start of the meeting was subsequently delayed by a further 20 minutes, due to the late arrive of MG Greene and MG Wendell. There was no site security or medical emergency plan briefed at this time, although the location of the QAA Security Force base was clearly indicated.

2-16 (f)(3) delete...and less than 50 meters from a group of ANA Soldiers conducting live firing training (because it is not true). Add: There was significant additional FP around the range from CF GAs, where ANAOA OCdts, under close supervision ANAOA instructors and CF mentors, were conducting a zeroing shoot.

7-16 6(b) line 10. ...'There had been zero contact with ISAF forces on Kabul Military Training Complex'...Should this read: He had had zero contact with ISAF forces on the MFNDU site...?

7-16 8(a) Line 6 delete 'KMTC area" insert MFNDU.

11-16 (2) Question: Did both Greene's and Wendell's PSDs conduct FP recces?

11-16 (3) Line 3 NMAA? or should this be 'MFNDU'?

11-16(5) line 7 A final run-through of the route , including confirmation of FP arrangements, was conducted.....

13-16 10a6 – refer to amended para 2-16 (f) (3) above. Comment – non-concur with this statement.

13-16 10 a (5) Comment: Efforts were made to mitigate risk throughout the visit.

C-2-2 Ser 58 Russell, Bruce BG is ANAOA, not UTAG. Ser 62 (b)(3), (b)(6) Ser 74 and 75 are QFPC not UTAG. Ser 81 is CPMD not ANA.

D-16-24 3. is Akhtar. 38 is a GSU offr. 39 is (b)(6)

D-22-24. Delete red dots from 15 and 40 (they were not hit). Insert red dot on 3. Repeat on slide D-23-24.

E-1-1 Ser 11 insert (b)(6) delete (b)(6). Delete B insert C. Additional serials: (b)(6) AFG CPMD and AFG GSU (b)(6) both Cat C. Ser 10 was Cat C.

warded a request and two documents for a review with a direct response to the requester, Ms. Valdes. Ms. Valdes is requesting disclosure of Memoran

Brig B WO Russell GBR-A | ANAOA Ch Mentor | Qargha LSA | Op HERRICK | BFPO 759 | Red 6627, DSN (b)(6)
VoIP (b)(6) Mobile (b)(6) Russell, Bruce WO. BRIG GBR ANAOA Chief Mentor

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

15 Aug 14

TAAC-N JCAT

GREEN ON BLUE INCIDENT 5 AUG 14 - STATEMENT

I, (b)(6) provide the following information regarding the events that took place at MFNDU on 5 Aug 2014. I certify that this statement to be true and correct to the best of my recollections.

My staff had raised concerns over the lack of water infrastructure planning for MFNDU as a critical vulnerability in the short to long term sustainability of the site in mid Jul. We conducted an initial tour of the water infrastructure on the MFNDU site to view the particular areas of vulnerability and concern. We developed and submitted the concern as an Essential Function 4 target and I also raised it through UK Comd's Conf and UK ASSESSREP as an issue, in part due to the UK investment in ANAOA. ISAF identified the need for KLE and requested CSTC-A conduct a visit with key ANA interlocutors to MFNDU. Having been informed of the intent to conduct a visit to MFNDU, we warned off DCOM MFNDU (representing COM MFNDU), CPMD and CF SMEs at the MFNDU Programme Review Board on 23 Jul. We were informed of the date of the visit as 5 Aug on/around 27 Jul. The QAA Force Protection Company (QFPC) were warned off about the visit on 28 Jul, as we developed the outline plan, followed up by a request for elements of FP support. We provided a draft outline programme to CSTC-A on 29 Jul and received direction in return to avoid conducting briefings in classrooms (which had been included for the initial briefing in QAA CF base in the first version), thereby implying maximizing outdoor venues around the MFNDU site. An initial draft version of the CONOPS and programme was circulated for comment and approval on 31 Jul, and then updated and re-issued on 2 Aug following some comment from CSTC-A and CJENG on a difference of opinion on some of the facts relating to water usage, provision and proposed solutions.

FP risks assessed at each stand were to be mitigated by planned FP measures. As well as the presence of the DNK FP team at each stand, which included an advanced element and a main body, the following FP would be in place:

Stand 1. The HLS would be secured by the QFPC QRF multiple.

Stand 2. The range would be cleared as part of the ANAOA range detail and FP would include the additional QFPC FP/GAs covering the ANAOA cadets on the range, and close supervision of firers on the point by ANAOA and CF staff.

Stand 3. The water tanker building would be cleared by an Arms & Explosive Search dog and two QFPC marksmen would provide depth cover for the move to and from the building from the inner perimeter wall.

Site specific and wider J2 Int reporting was checked daily by DNK FP Team, and following no increase or specific change in threat reporting for MFNDU, there was no change to the standard personal FP profile for personnel conducting KLE on MFNDU - GAs deployed and personnel to have PPE to hand (defined as being in the vehicles they have travelled in).

The CONOPS included a map of MFNDU which included the labeled location of the QAA CF Base, and satellite imagery of MFNDU identifying numbered locations for the stands. A separate programme contained detail of participants, the programme of serials including stands, timings and briefings to be presented at each stand. We were also recommended to

include the opportunity to view training to set the context of MFNDU, and having discussed with ANAOA, adjusted the location of the planned brief at Blue Water Tank to an elevated viewpoint on a bank above the tank approximately 300m from the firing point on the ranges in order that there could be a backdrop of training (thereby incorporating the original stands 2 and 3). This would also provide the opportunity for ANAOA to provide a short brief on training activity at that location. This decision was taken having given due consideration to the mitigation of a live firing zeroing practice by: the clearance of the ranges by QFPC; an additional level of FP and GAs from QFPC focused on the ANAOA students on the range, and; the close supervision of firers on the firing point by ANAOA staff and CF personnel.

MG Greene's CP team conducted an FP recce for the BFC which included FP coordination discussions with OC DNK FP Team, (b)(6) on 2 Aug. A planned working level "water shura" was conducted at QAA on 4 Aug which included a recce of the briefing locations and routes, confirming the detail with briefers of which presentations would take place at which briefing stand. Having confirmed that COM MFNDU staff had made aware of the visit on 3 Aug, I briefed him on the detail of the visit during a KLE 1100-1230hrs on 4 Aug. He appeared fully content with the BFC plan, and his questions focused on lunch arrangements and timings for him to be at the HLS to meet visitors. We conducted a final confirmatory walk through/talk through of the entire BFC on the ground with DNK FP (b)(6) focusing on the FP arrangements, briefing activity and timings at each phase and stand of the visit, as well as the routes and movement in between stands.

Later that evening, (b)(6) received a message that there might be a 30 min delay to the arrival times of MGs Greene and Wendel due to commitments. The following morning this was confirmed. I informed the QFPC CSM to add 30 mins to all timings of the BFC programme with a revised start time of 0930. We also spoke to COM MFNDU and ANAOA to make them aware. (b)(6) already had his link-up party at the major junctions from perimeter entrance to MFNDU to guide the participants to the HLS RV. He also attempted to stop vehicles to confirm occupants against known visit parties but not all stopped. I departed from Camp QAA to the HLS with elements of my drive team at approx 0840. On arrival I noted that vehicles were already being parked up in designated areas and security was in place. Various visit parties began to arrive and I was involved in welcoming the guests. (b)(6) provided additional hard copies of the CONOPS and programme in both English and Dari. At approx. 0945 we were informed that MG Greene and Wendel were entering MFNDU and they arrived at the HLS at approx. 0950. They were the last elements to arrive and the CP team was familiar with the route to HLS, so (b)(6) collapsed in his guides. Once the GOs had been met and moved to their seats, I conducted an initial brief explaining the aims and the programme for the BFC including the 3 briefing stands and locations followed by KLE and lunch at COM MFNDU's office. I then handed over to Ch Mentor ANAOA Brig Russell who provided the ground orientation brief, beginning by identifying the location of the QAA CF base, easily identified by the aerostat suspended above it. Including the US ACE brief on site development and timelines, the brief at the first stand took 30 mins which was the planned duration. I ended the first brief by confirming the location of the next stand at the blue water tank by the ranges, explaining that the route would take us through the ANAOA construction site, and that there would be a short scramble up a bank when we got there. We then moved to vehicles and were led via the ANAOA site to the Blue Tank.

On arrival, vehicles were parked up in the low ground around the water tank by elements of our advanced party. The dismounted party then moved up the bank to a location behind the

building at the opposite end of the ranges to the target end, approximately 300m from the firing point where a zeroing practice was taking place. The FP/GAs provided by QFPC were in place covering the firing points of the range. I introduced the stand and then Brig Russell gave a very quick overview to ANAOA training, pointing out both the range training serial and dry COIN assaults taking place on the hillside on the opposite side of the area. (b)(6) provided an outline of the water infrastructure at that site. CJ ENG began his presentation followed by (b)(3), (b)(6). Both of these presentations initiated significant discussion from both CF and ANA partners, including a lengthy discourse from CPMD. The total time on that stand had been planned for approx 60 minutes. When the time reached approx. 70 mins, although (b)(3), (b)(6) appeared to want to speak on CPMD concerns, we indicated that we needed to move and that he would brief at the next stand, which was the plan anyway. I then announced that we would be moving to the next stand, mentioning that there were FP issues as it was on the edge of the perimeter, and that access was awkward. In order to try and reduce the footprint of visitors, I also requested that the group going down to the water tank be limited to GOs and one principal advisor, OF5s, CJ ENG and those conducting the briefings, with CP personnel. There was a further discussion between the CF GOs for about 5 mins before the group moved to the vehicles.

We then moved to the designated parking area for Stand 3 which was on the bend of the road about 60m to the north of the guardroom. FP was again in place and I moved down with MG Greene exchanging a few words. We walked down the path through a small entrance and down to the wall. I asked one of my FP team at the entrance to try and ensure that it was just those visitors designated that came through, to avoid unnecessary personnel coming through and thus keeping our footprint at that stand as limited as possible. From there we moved through the wall and down to the building housing the sunken water tanker. I was one of the first in as I was aware that there was a fall hazard and I wanted to ensure that we had one of the UTAG team in place as planned to warn people entering the building of the immediate drop. I moved around the elevated walkway to the opposite side of the building to the door. The majority of the group came in behind me. An FP guard was positioned at the door. Once introduced, (b)(6) began his briefing on the water infrastructure at that site which lasted about 10 mins. When he had finished I looked around to see where (b)(3), (b)(6) was as he was due to brief next in the building. There was no sign of him and the visitors closest to the door had begun to exit the building. MG Greene who was next to me asked a question and I waited until it was answered. I then followed the last of the group out. When I entered the area at the back of the guardroom, I was surprised to find that (b)(3), (b)(6) had set up an easel with some graphics displayed and was beginning his brief, as this was not a scheduled stop. He spoke for approximately 10 mins during which time I noted the two QFPC marksmen, who had been covering our movement to and from the water tanker building, on the roof of the guardroom with one of our contractors. As (b)(3), (b)(6) drew to a close, I prepared to move forward to then announce that we would now move to the final location for KLE and lunch with COM MFNDU. As I was close to Maj Gen Bathurst and we knew that MGs Wendell and Greene need to depart imminently, Maj Gen Bathurst suggested that I ask if the two US GOs wanted to make any remarks before they left. I was just beginning to move out to the front of the group when the firing began. The sound of the initial firing was distorted with a sort of echo, and it was initially hard to identify exactly what it was, how close it was and the location of the firing point. The first burst seemed approx. 6-8 rounds. I took two steps forward shouting "Take Cover! Take Cover!" and dived to the ground. I had a low wall partially covering me and I was able to move to the side of a vehicle parked beside it. At this point it was hard to identify the firing point although it was clear we had come under fire. I noted (b)(6) who was partially covering (b)(3), (b)(6) body with his own against the low wall. I

asked if either was hit and (b)(6) responded that (b)(3), (b)(6) had a wound in his leg. There was a UK CP team member crouched against the front wheel of the vehicle in front of me and I asked him to reach inside and throw me the medical bag. I then moved forward at a crouch and passed (b)(6) a bandage. I could see (b)(6) was applying pressure to the wound. As I moved forward I could see a number of other casualties in the open area and I went forward to begin to render first aid to a casualty lying on his front with a gunshot wound in the back. At this point I was unsure whether the shooter had been neutralised, but when I looked up from the casualty, I noticed a number of bullet holes in the ajar window of a ground floor room in the Guardroom. Subsequently one of the DNK PM Team Medics joined me treating the casualty. I called for a stretcher and with other personnel moved him to one of a number of vehicles that were manoeuvring to collect the casualties and take them to the R1 facility at QAA. Having moved back to see whether there were any remaining casualties, from what I recollect I think all of them seemed to have been moved or be moving to vehicles. My drive team then directed me to return to the vehicle with my interpreter, and after the DNK SNCO had checked with the Team Comd that the area was secured, he directed the driver to take us back to QAA CF base. On arrival I located the UTAG CSM, XO and Adjt and directed them to conduct a 100% accountability check for UTAG personnel. I called DoS NTM-A to give him a brief on the situation, and directed XO to contact NTM-A CJ1 to warn them that we were going to provide an accountability status. Once accountability had been confirmed, I asked CJ1 and DoS to ensure that the SNRs in NTM-A were informed that all of their National personnel in UTAG were accounted for.

We contacted COM MFNDU by mobile through my interpreter and confirmed that he was unhurt. We also asked him for any details on ANA casualties and whether he had any information on the shooter. He provided a name, ID number and home Province which we passed to the J2 team in the QFPC Ops Room. Brig Russell who had informed me that he was taking part of the QFPC QRF down to the incident site to conduct a RIP with the DNK FP team who had secured it, returned with them. I confirmed again that all the DNK team were OK. Brig Russell then recommended that he, Maj Gen Bathurst and I conduct a KLE with COM MFNDU. We coordinated this again through my interpreter and received a further update of details on the shooter including when he had joined the ANA and his previous military service, which we relayed to the J2 Cell. I travelled with Brig Russell and Maj Gen Bathurst to COM MFNDU's office. There were a number of other ANA senior officers in the room including the Chief J2 and Ch Legal Advisor from AMOD, who had arrived to begin their own investigation. Following sharing of condolences and some discussion on ANA casualties, COM MFNDU confirmed the detail of the shooter. He also reported that the GSU Company Commander had been directed to disarm the personnel in the Guardroom ahead of the visit. As we were leaving the KLE, BG Hetherington DCOS NTM-A arrived to also offer expressions of sympathy to COM MFNDU. Afterwards I returned with him to QAA.

(b)(6)

NTM-A



HEADQUARTERS
 ARMY INSTITUTIONAL ADVISORY TEAM (UTAG)
 NATO TRAINING MISSION – AFGHANISTAN
 CAMP QARGHA, KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
 BFPO 758 / APO, AE 09320



Date: 15 August 2014

SUBJECT: IA at MFNDU on 5AUG14, Personal Statement

I, OF-2/[(b)(3), (b)(6)], provide the following information regarding the events that took place at MFNDU on 5AUG14. I certify this statement to be true and correct to the best of my recollection.

- On 23JUL14 during the MFNDU Project Review Board (PRB) meeting; it was determined UTAG would host an on-site, general officer level meeting to discuss the MFNDU water infrastructure issues.
- On 27JUL14, while completing the MFNDU PRB meeting minutes, [(b)(6)] UTAG, informed me the General Officer MFNDU water infrastructure meeting would take place on 05AUG14 and to include this information in the meeting minutes. The minutes reflected his comments and were issued to all attendants of the 23JUL14 PRB on 31JUL14.
- On 27JUL14 I received an email from [(b)(3), (b)(6)] CSTC-A/CJ ENGINEER, beginning to formulate the agenda for the 05AUG14 meeting. A series of emails were sent between me, [(b)(6)] [(b)(3), (b)(6)] and [(b)(3), (b)(6)]. In these emails the issue of limiting the size of the group for force protection issues was raised and agreed.
- On 29JUL14 I emailed [(b)(3), (b)(6)] CSTC-A CJ-ENG, a draft of the agenda for the 05AUG14 meeting.
- On 30JUL14 I received an email from [(b)(3), (b)(6)] [(b)(3), (b)(6)] asking for my support for his team recon and site survey on 2AUG14. I replied via telephone and together we outlined a recon schedule.

- On 31JUL14 (b)(3), (b)(6) informed me via email that MG Greene, MG Wendel, MG Bathurst, (b)(3), (b)(6), and (b)(3), (b)(6) will come with +6 each as a planning factor for the 05AUG14 meeting.
- On 31JUL14 (b)(3), (b)(6) informed me via email MG Greene had been briefed on the draft agenda and requested modifications of areas of focus for discussion. I was directed to eliminate any type of sit down briefing in lieu of an on the ground site-walk.
- On 01AUG14 I received an email from (b)(3), (b)(6) adding BG Jackson to the attendant roster. (b)(3), (b)(6) also stated that he would like to add several members of USACE to the attendant list as speakers.
- On 01AUG14 I received a call from (b)(3), (b)(6) MG Greene's Aide-de-camp, informing me of the General's need to leave early on 05AUG14 for a follow-on meeting. As a result, MG Greene would not be able to attend the final portion of the meeting, which was to be a KLE with the MFNDU commander, MG Shah.
- On 02AUG14 MG Greene's PSD arrived at Qargha for a recon of the 05AUG14 meeting. The PSD consisted of (b)(1)1.4 Corporals and (b)(1)1.4 Specialists. We conducted the recon with me, MG Greene's PSD, (b)(3), (b)(6), and (b)(3), (b)(6). The PSD took many photographs and asked several questions. I instructed the team that the meeting would be run similar to a convoy; (b)(3), (b)(6) would act as the convoy commander and each GO's PSD would serve as immediate force protection for their prime. Our recon encompassed the entire route outlined on the previously issued agenda, specifically including the portion of the meeting that would take place outside the perimeter of MFNDU.
- On 02AUG14 I issued the final agenda and technical data to the primary coalition attendants on our agenda via email. This agenda included a satellite image which located the four stops the meeting would be held at; meeting point/ overview, main water tank/ training site, buried water tanker, and KLE with MG Shash. Additionally, the agenda outlined what brief would be discussed at each point as well as a timeline for the entire meeting.
- From 0900 - 1200 04AUG14 a water shura was held by CSTC-A at MFNDU. This meeting was attended by CSTC-A, UTAG, USACE, CPMD, IT EXCELLIS, and various water experts contracted by CSTC-A. The meeting reviewed the MFNDU water infrastructure issues. This meeting was not intended to be a preparation meeting for the GO meeting the following day and as such the 05AUG14 meeting was not discussed.

- From 1300 - 1400 04AUG14 I, [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] and [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] conducted a recon of the site for the 05AUG14 meeting. The recon was conducted as the meeting was to occur, from point one through point four. During this recon it was discussed who would speak and in which order. Additionally, we identified the exact location at each stop on the meeting where easels would be set-up and the speaker would present.
- From 1400 – 1500 04AUG14 I, [redacted (b)(6)] and [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] conducted a recon of the site to ensure the UTAG component and force protection was coordinated. The recon was conducted as the meeting was to occur, from point one through point four. During this recon it was discussed who would speak and in which order. I informed [redacted (b)(6)] we had just conducted a recon with CSTC-A and all speaking parties were aware of their positions and timelines.
- At 1632 04AUG15 I received an email from [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] informing me MG Greene would be 30 – 45 min late for the 0900 start of the 05AUG14 meeting.
- At 0830 05AUG15 I arrived at point one for the MFNDU water infrastructure meeting. The site had already been secured by Qargha force protection and we set-up for a 0930 start.
- From 0900 – 0950 05AUG14 guests arrived to point one and Quargha force protection was augmented by individual GAs.
- At 0950 05AUG14 the initial presentation began with [redacted (b)(6)] welcoming the guests to the meeting. I handed out hard copies of the previously emailed agenda to all GOs and key staff. I also handed out copies in Dari to the ANA and CPMD key staff.
- At approximately 1010 05AUG14 point one's briefings were over and all guests moved to their vehicles. [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] and I led the convoy of approximately 27 vehicles to point two where [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] team had already secured the site.
- At 1015 05AUG14 [redacted (b)(6)] welcomed the guests to point two where CSTC-A had set-up an easel with presentation boards as discussed during the previous day's recon. After [redacted (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(6)] introduction I presented a quick overview of the water infrastructure to the crowd after which I passed the floor to CSTC-A which presented next. The CSTC-A brief had been interrupted by other groups and had become a conversation instead of a brief. [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] moved forward with a presentation board in his hand when I reminded him he was scheduled to speak at the next stop as we rehearsed during the previous day's recon.

- At approximately 1120 05AUG14 (b)(6) concluded the briefing at point two and suggested to the crowd that they limit the number of occupants to the next point as it was limited in size and presented a force protection concern. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I led the convoy of approximately 27 vehicles to point three where (b)(3), (b)(6) team and Qargha force protection had already secured the site.
- At approximately 1125 05AUG14 I led the group from the pre-established parking area approximately 250 meters NW of the MFNDU South Gate, past the ANA MP guard buildings, to the entrance of the buried tanker trail approximately 75 meters east of the MFNDU South Gate. As I entered the entrance I asked one of (b)(3), (b)(6) force protection men to keep count on the number of individuals entering the trail. I was told later that number was 28.
- At approximately 1130 05AUG14 the group arrived at the buried tanker building already secured by (b)(3), (b)(6) team and I presented information on the location. At the conclusion of my presentation I looked for the next speaker, (b)(3), (b)(6) who was not present. I asked (b)(3), (b)(6) where he was, and was told he intended to present at a different location.
- At approximately 1145 05AUG14 the group left the buried tanker and moved towards the parked vehicles. Once passing back through the entrance of the trail head I saw that (b)(3), (b)(6) had set-up an easel between the ANA MP guard building and the MFNDU South Gate. The crowd had formed around him and he had already begun presenting.
- At approximately 1155 05AUG14 (b)(3), (b)(6) concluded his brief and responded to one question after which the first burst of gunfire initiated. The gunfire consisted of two bursts; the first approximately 1-2 seconds, the second 2-4 seconds. Due to the small size of the area and hard surfaces, it was difficult to determine the origin of the gunfire. I was struck in the left ear with debris and immediately took cover behind a concrete planter. From my position I could see (b)(3), (b)(6) had also taken cover and was injured. I moved forward to render aid. (b)(3), (b)(6) had been struck through the left thigh and the bullet had lodged itself into his right inner thigh, and had been struck with debris to his right eye. He was fully conscious and aware. I applied pressure with my hands to the bleeding wounds and protected his body with mine as much as possible not knowing if the site had been secured. Peering over my cover I could see several members of the group had been injured and others were treating them. (b)(6) had taken cover next to me and had secured some medical equipment. I

asked for a bandage and told him of (b)(3), (b)(6) status. (b)(6) moved to treat an injured soldier who was face down on the ground. I applied a pressure dressing to (b)(3), (b)(6) left thigh until the bleeding had subsided. From my position I could see individuals being evacuated from the site by foot to coalition vehicles directed by (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) I waited to have (b)(3), (b)(6) evacuated until the more severely wounded had been moved. I moved (b)(3), (b)(6) to the back of a coalition vehicle and described his injuries to the passenger. I turned back to the scene to see if there was further assistance needed. I carried (b)(6) from the entrance of the buried tanker trail to an ANA vehicle. His right leg had been struck with debris and had minor bleeding. He was fully conscious and aware. I moved back to the scene that was now empty. I spoke with (b)(3), (b)(6) asking him for his account of what had happened and instructed him to secure the scene from tampering. I moved back to Camp Qargha with (b)(3), (b)(6)

- At approximately 1215 I returned to Camp Qargha and reported present to (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) for accountability.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
 (b)(3), (b)(6), USA
Schools Transition Team Infrastructure Officer
Unified Training Advisory Group
NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan
 DSN: (b)(6)
 NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6)
 CENTR (b)(3), (b)(6)

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

Camp Qargha 8/16/14 at 1503

He made (b)(6) aware of the severity of water infrastructure problem. (b)(6) reached out to higher levels at IJC to figure out problem by briefing GOs from CSTC-A. It was mainly CSTC-A funding.

The target audience was decision-making individuals -- essentially MG Wendel and MG Greene.

Suggested to CSTC-A they keep the group small, it was not a good idea to have a big group, but then it started to pile on. E-mails kept coming from CSTC-A adding people to the manifest.

It became a Staff Event, rather than the initial plan.

He did three site visits -- Added 3 more people to brief. UTAG in charge of event.

(b)(3), (b)(6) was the coordinator.

Had O-6s making decisions to add people to the list. (b)(3), (b)(6) added people. MG Greene added about 12 individuals.

It was initially supposed to be 16 pax, ended up being 70 pax.

Decided not to link up at HLZ due to the size.

MG Greene and MG Wendel sent (b)(1)1.4 E-4s as part of PSD team to do the recon (he thought it was odd). (b)(1)1.4 corporals and (b)(1)1.4 specialists.

Were to treat entire site visit as a convoy. Each PSD was in charge of their own General Officer. Danish driver commander was his (b)(3), (b)(6) PSD.

The major concern was going outside the wire, which was mitigated as much as possible (sharpshooters).

He did not do a formal risk assessment. He put up a briefing package and agenda. All four points in agenda. (b)(6) did a hot wash.

He coordinated with PSDs, they came in and visited.

Started at site 1, then route 22, then point 3, drove up to last one, and described what would happen at each spot as they went through.

(b)(3), (b)(6) was involved in multiple recons. Went through that route four times. He visited eight times in a span of seven days. He mentioned there were sporadic visits around the area, and that it wasn't uncommon to visit sites that many times.

He has been around the gate about 18 times since he's been here.

He felt confident about what would happen at each location. He didn't know how many people were going to show up on the day. They were delayed by half an hour as told by Generals the day before the visit, but they ended up delaying by 50 minutes.

Point one was right on, there were no issues or delay there. Point two got a bit sidetracked, became an open discussion. (b)(3), (b)(6) was eager to make his point and wanted to brief right then and there, but (b)(3), (b)(6) told him to wait until they arrived to the other site.

He briefed point three, and everything went well. All of sudden he didn't see (b)(3), (b)(6) there any longer. He wondered where (b)(3), (b)(6) was as people were trickling out of the site. It appeared (b)(3), (b)(6) had already set up outside and people were gathering.

He didn't know ANA soldiers were going to be armed. He didn't see them around before the incident site.

(b)(3), (b)(6) did his presentation, and then fire started. Thought fire was coming from above because of how rounds were landing on the ground. He normally carries a rifle, but didn't have it with him at the time. He doesn't think it was a full magazine worth of rounds fired by the shooter. Fire was returned by FP.

People were being attended to. (b)(3), (b)(6) started doing a triage which worked pretty well bringing in vehicles taking casualties to medical facility. They had a medical evacuation plan.

He got (b)(3), (b)(6) out of there, as well as (b)(6)? Then most people were gone. He went to the building to talk to (b)(3), (b)(6), told him to lock down the building.

He left (b)(3), (b)(6) gave accountability and went back to Camp Qargha.

He really wanted a smaller footprint on the visit. It would have been good with just 10-15 people. He could barely fit everyone at site 2.

Would have liked bigger participation from PSDs, and concrete information as far as who was coming to the visit.

He was dealing with (b)(3), (b)(6)

He didn't know from looking at the pictures that Head of CPMD was not there (Gen Amini).

He had a signing sheet, but PSDs wouldn't sign in.

Each individual entity was in charge of themselves.

He thought they had a very good plan in place. It was bad that they didn't stick to the plan. He didn't feel comfortable telling all the high ranking individuals to move from that area once they were in place ready to be briefed.

CSTC-A presented a lot of technical data. MG Greene stepped in and said "cut to the chase" if you don't provide this, we can't provide that.

Augmented site with dogs.

People were generally scared, other ANAs were standing by, they were equally surprised. Didn't notice much from ANA. Interpreters took people back and forth to care in front of other ANA personnel (which could be dangerous perception for helping out the coalition).

General Izmandullah appeared he wanted to be helped by Afghans rather than any other individuals.

He didn't see anything being physically swept by dogs or which sites they swept.

He never told anyone not to have IBA.

Approved for Release

Statement of [redacted] (b)(6) gmail.com, Camp Qargha, 20140808 1345

Q. What is your duty description?

A. I am an [redacted] (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(6)

Q. What was the purpose of the event you attended at MFNDU and what was your role?

A. The main issue was water. There is a critical shortage of water on ANU – they wanted to bring it to the forefront at the highest levels. I had a support role. I took the chairs out to the first stop, answered questions, etc.

Q. Who was the host of the event, and who was overall responsible for command and control?

A. UTAG hosted the event and coordinate with CSTC-A. [redacted] (b)(6) wanted to bring the water issue to the forefront.

Q. Who was responsible for planning, coordinating and executing force protection measures in support of this event?

A. The FP was the Danes. The British have movement. I'm not aware of any security planning.

Q. Did you have a PSD/CPT Assigned to you? Did you have a Guardian Angel? If so, how many? Were they trained? What instructions did you give to them?

Q. Were the efforts of your PSD/CPT/Guardian Angels coordinated with others, or synchronized as part of an overall force protection plan?

Q. Did you receive a security brief upon arrival at the site that day? If so, how effective was the security plan briefing? Did it cover medical evacuation and the location of the nearest medical treatment facility?

A. There was no security briefing.

Q. Did you notice anything unusual with the atmospheric at MFNDU...any body language or other behavior that could be viewed as hostile?

A. Everything was pretty much normal.

Q. Please describe the events that took place from your initial arrival through the final stop where the incident occurred.

Statement of [redacted] (b)(6) gmail.com, Camp
Qargha, 20140808 1345

A. There were three interpreters with vehicles. At the first site, people were milling about. [redacted] (b)(6) did the introductory remarks and talked about the purpose of the visit. He used charts and later, [redacted] (b)(3), [redacted] (b)(6) had charts. [redacted] (b)(6) has the charts and he coordinated with CSTC-A. Stop 2 got into water near the water treatment plant near the firing range. It was about 200M behind. I wasn't concerned about security because of the PSDs. Stop 3 was at the Old Russian gate. We parked at the intersection, walked down to the site, and left the fence line to get to the water tank pump facility. I took the Danes down to the site about 10 minutes prior, because they wanted my interpreter to help. I went on top of the building with the Danes. I asked the Danes how much information to give to the Afghan guard. They talked to the sergeant of the guard on the roof and told him they were checking the area – he had no issues with them being there. They didn't tell him about the VIP party that was coming. I stayed on the building from then on. The Australian snipers stayed and the Danes left the top of the building. There were probably about [redacted] (1), [redacted] (1), [redacted] (1) Danes. I wasn't aware if the Danes had cleared the building. [redacted] (b)(3), [redacted] (b)(6) brief was unplanned, as the group was going to look at the underground tank and then leave for lunch. I saw the MP commander walking back up in front of the building. I don't remember the green truck parked by the roof ladder.

Q. In your own words, please describe the actions that took place upon arrival at the final stop.

A. The shooting started close together, but there were breaks in there. I got down on the roof. I looked over the edge and saw dust flying. It sounded like it could have been three round bursts. I started to move over to the M240 position on the roof. I heard someone screaming in pain in Dari, not English. The sergeant of the guard went in the tent to radio and I heard him talking on the radio. The Australian sniper was worried about the unmanned M240 and I told him that [redacted] (b)(6) (the photographer) and I would cover it. I moved to the back of the building and told the PSD who were running down that the shooter was in the building because I wanted them to watch for him through the windows. I stayed on that side of the building and heard people calling for MEDEVAC.

Witness Statement by (b)(6)

Job Title: (b)(6)

Date this Statement: 7 Aug 14

(b)(6)

SUBJECT: Green on Blue Incident at ANDU-Qargha on 5 August 2014 at approximately 12:00hrs.

1. The (b)(6) and AEP -UTAG (b)(6) were involved with support roll and assistance for the Command briefing at the ANDU complex Qargha by UTAG. I was to catalog with pictures each event for record on the VIP visit.

2. Pre gathering and setup at the LZ on ANDU. Time: 0900-0930



This is the first location, at the LZ area of ANDU near the GSU to which I was involved with the set up of chairs for the briefing at that location.

Pages 4 through 5 redacted for the following reasons:

DUPLICATE PAGES

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Enslity (b)(6)
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 20140808
3. TIME: 13:45
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: (b)(6)
6. SSN: (b)(6)
7. GRADE/STATUS: (b)(6)
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: Enslity AEP Camp Qarshu APO AE 09366 (b)(6) @gmail.com

9. Enslity, I, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1. What is your duty description. (b)(6)

2. What was the purpose of the event you attended at MFNDU and what was your role?
Main issue was water. Critical shortage of water on ANU - bring it to the forefront @ the highest level. Support role - took chairs out, answer questions, etc.

3. Who was the host of the event, and who was overall responsible for command and control?
VTAG hosted event. Coordinated w/ CSTCA. (b)(6) wanted to bring it to the forefront.

4. Who was responsible for planning, coordinating, and executing force protection measures in support of this event?
Have FP MONITOR - Dares. British have mount. Not aware of security planning.

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(6) TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

5. Did you have a PSD/CPT assigned to you? Did you have a Guardian Angel(s), if so how many? Were they trained? What instructions did you give to them?

No security briefing.

6. Were the efforts of your PSD/CPT/Guardian Angel(s) coordinated with others, or synchronized as part of an overall force protection plan?

7. Did you receive a security brief upon arrival at the site that day? If so, how effective was the security plan briefing? Did it cover medical evacuation and the location of the nearest medical treatment facility?

8. Did you notice anything unusual with the atmospherics at MFNDU...any body language or other behavior that could be viewed as hostile?

Everything seemed pretty much normal.

9. Please describe the events that took place from your initial arrival through the final stop where the incident occurred.

Three interpreters w/ vehicles. @ first site people milling. (b)(6) did intro. Talked about purpose of the visit. Used charts. (b)(3), (b)(6) had charts. (b)(6) had charts. he coordinates w/ CSTC-A. Stop 2 got into water near W treatment plant (near firing range) (maybe 200m behind). Not concerned about security due to PSDs. Stop 3 @ Old Russian Gate. Parked @ intersection walked down to site and left fence line to get to water tank facility. Took Daves down to site about 10 mins prior. Went on top of bldg w/ Daves. Asked Daves how much to tell guard. Spoke to SOG on top, told him they were checking area. No issues from SOG. Didn't tell them about coming

STATEMENT OF

(b)(6)

TAKEN AT

DATED

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

10. In your own words, please describe the actions that took place upon arrival at the final stop (see attached).

party. Stayed on bldg from then on. AVS snipers stayed and Dames left top of bldg. Probably about (b)(1)1.4a Dames asked if he and interpreters could come and help coordination. Not aware if PSD cleared bldg. (b)(3), (b)(6) brief wasn't planned. They were going to look@ the underground tanks and leave. Saw MP commander walking back up in front of the bldg. Don't remember the green truck parked by roof ladder. Started close together - breaks in there. Looked up and saw dust flying. Sounded like 3 round bursts. Started to move to the 240 position on the roof. Heard someone in pain (in Dari - not English). SOG went in to radios. Aussie was worried about 240 unmanned. Told Aussie that he & (b)(6) (photos) would take care of it. Told running PSD guys that the shooter was in the building. Stayed toward the back of the building. Heard people calling for evac.

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

AR 15-6 Investigation - Marshal Fahim National Defense University Incident - 05 AUG 14

(b)(6)



(b)(6)

10m

Statement of [redacted] (b)(6) @hotmail.com ,
Camp Qargha, 20140808 1645

Q. What is your duty description?

A. I work for Engility Corporation as a [redacted] (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(6)

Q. What was the purpose of the event you attended at MFNDU and what was your role?

A. I am [redacted] (b)(6) I work with the Garrison Support Unit. They tell me their needs and I tell the UTAG staff, who facilitates getting them what they need. The main issue was the water supply. I took pictures and took UTAG staff around. I serve as the continuity between units, who rotate frequently.

Q. Who was the host of the event, and who was overall responsible for command and control?

A. UTAG was the host and USACE and CSTC-A were participants.

Q. Who was responsible for planning, coordinating and executing force protection measures in support of this event?

A. The Danish did the force protection. Each general brought in Personal Security Detachments /Close Protection Teams of their own. Some came in the days prior for a recon.

Q. Did you have a PSD/CPT Assigned to you? Did you have a Guardian Angel? If so, how many? Were they trained? What instructions did you give to them?

A. I had a guardian angel and I talked to him in my office. Most of my guardian angels have been to these locations before. I told him of the location we were going. I took the Danish to the site the day prior. I go to these sites three times a week.

Q. Were the efforts of your PSD/CPT/Guardian Angels coordinated with others, or synchronized as part of an overall force protection plan?

A. I think they were synchronized. MG Greene's PSD went to all the locations. I assumed they coordinated. The Danish pushed out early from the second location to go to the MP gate.

Q. Did you receive a security brief upon arrival at the site that day? If so, how effective was the security plan briefing? Did it cover medical evacuation and the location of the nearest medical treatment facility?

A. I didn't see such a briefing. I wasn't within listening range.

Statement of [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted]@hotmail.com ,
Camp Qargha, 20140808 1645

Q. Did you notice anything unusual with the atmospheric at MFNDU...any body language or other behavior that could be viewed as hostile?

A. There was nothing unusual. I previously spent a year with an Afghan battalion. I had no concerns.

Q. Please describe the events that took place from your initial arrival through the final stop where the incident occurred.

A. I went to LZ (b)(1)1.4a and set chairs up. I had four trucks for chairs so I went out early. We stayed at the LZ about 30-40 minutes later than had been planned. We were at the Helicopter Landing Site for 30-40 minutes. Then we moved to the water tower and were there for about 30-40 minutes. There was no argument. I had 3 of my 4 interpreters with me. They had been with me for a year. After the water tower we ended up at the Russian entrance to the ECP. There are T-walls on Qargha road. We went to the underground water storage tank facility. The pump runs hot, so 2 people must be in the facility at all times and they live in there. We needed to show key leaders that they needed to fix it. It supplies water for the entire area. We spent about 35-40 minutes in the facility then went to the incident site.

Q. In your own words, please describe the actions that took place upon arrival at the final stop.

A. I took several pictures and moved around the location. When the shooting started I was behind the road guard arm. An ANA guard brought me to an entrance in the inner section of the barracks and pushed me through a door and to a room with a window and signaled for me to go through the window. The shooting outside sounded sustained. I heard additional shots inside the building. There were 2-3 minutes between the outside firing and the inside firing. My trucks had been parked up at the intersection and they came down and began loading wounded onto the back. My truck took MG Greene to the HLS along with his PSD. One had dropped off chairs and was returning. I didn't notice a green truck on the side of the building when I came out the window. My trucks made several trips between the site, the HLS, and the medical center. The last truck came back and I called (b)(6) off the roof, along with (b)(6) and the photographer. There were no casualties left. The Danish were on site when I left and I returned to the base. I saw the NMA general and the injured female. I hadn't seen anything unusual. Sometimes I go down with just me and a guardian angel. The stop at the incident site was not planned. (b)(6) has my statement. He had everyone make up statements.

16 August 2014

RE: Shooting Incident at MFNDU on 5 AUG 2014

This is my account of the events immediately prior and following the incident. I was requested by (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(6) to take photos to document the site tour by the VIPs. I was transported via an Engility vehicle to the initial site where the VIPs and their entourages gathered to begin the tour. After an overview brief the entire group moved to the water storage tank near the live fire range. Before the main group left the water storage tank, (b)(6) his driver and I moved to the next tour stop, the water pump building.

Upon arrival at the MP station near the water pump building, I waited with (b)(6) (DNK) at the intersection north of the MP station. The main body arrived about 30 minutes later. I moved ahead of the main body taking more photos. We moved through the opening in the wall to the water tank and pump building. The VIPs received a short brief regarding the situation of the water system.

When I left the water pump building most of the group had already moved back towards the incident site. I took a few photos from inside of the crowd and then moved to the roof of the MP building immediately north of the incident site. I snapped a few more photos of the VIPs below my position.

I was speaking with a soldier when the shooting began. I immediately hit the surface of the roof and began to assess my situation. After some period of time I decided to begin recording video. While staying low I filmed 4 video clips in the next 15 minutes. I was then extracted back to Camp Qargha via an Engility vehicle.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

DynCorp International

(b)(6)

– **Multimedia**

Camp Qargha 8/16/14 at 1654

He was asked by (b)(6) to take photos of the visit.

He has worked for DynCorp for 4 years.

Runs the multimedia department, video, photo, graphics to develop training for ANA. Has been at Camp Qargha since January.

He was at the roof, there was a Danish Sgt, Australian Sgt. maybe two or three ANAs, and (b)(6) (b)(6) He laid flat on the rooftop when shooting started. He slid over to sandbags for cover, he decided to shoot some video. He thought it'd be a good idea to put a round in the chamber of his pistol.

(b)(6) came over to get him from the roof, after most people were MEDEVAC, his was one of the last ones to leave.

He works mostly at Camp Qargha working on recruiting video for Officer Academy.

He didn't know that briefing wasn't a scheduled stop. He felt it was a pretty safe place. He didn't notice anything suspicious. He didn't anticipate the guy firing from the building below him. He was in the crowd at about 1140, then moved to the roof at 1142, shooting started at around 1147. He was concerned if the guy had a bomb with him.

It was about 5 minutes after he stopped taking pictures when the shooting began. He wasn't sure if he should've taken video, but decided to do it anyways.

He remembers hearing the first volley of shots, wasn't listening to anymore shooting (either he didn't notice or there was no more shooting).

There was about a 30 minute window that he wasn't with the main group during the trip.

It seemed like the gunner at the roof (ANA) was in shock just like everybody else.

ANA soldier left machine gun behind while he left to go somewhere else. He was concerned about the abandoned rifle.

He took the latest picture at 1045.

(b)(6)

Camp Qargha 8/16/14 at 1342

Interpreter / Driver

Works for (b)(6) -- Has been at Camp Qargha since 2011.

He learned about the visit on Saturday (2 August). He went with (b)(6) and PSD to do a site recon. He then goes every day to MFNDU with (b)(6).

On 3 August (Sunday)... Went again with US Army PSDs (1) along the same route. Drove MPs from site to site - They asked him what he was doing, but (b)(6) instructed him not to let MPs know who was coming. Walked to water tank that day, ANA normally always there.

He knew the shooter – Mentioned that 6 months before the shooting he (Rafuqullah) was at South ECP, and they used to bring him candy and soda. (b)(6) used to escort people through the South ECP, and used to shake hands to Rafuqullah. Once the South ECP closed, he never saw him again. He doesn't know any of his friends – (R) was usually sitting at South ECP alone, some days he was happy, sometimes not. South ECP closed about 8 months ago.

On Sunday or Monday went to site three times -- Showed (b)(6) Did 3 to 4 different recons to same place within a couple of days.

He knows every location on Camp Qargha.

He studied English at Kabul Institution.

They went to HZ, he was the lead vehicle in the convoy. After finished at HZ, they went to Blue water tank -- there were 40 vehicles behind him. He stayed in the car while they were briefing at the blue tank. Then went to South ECP, everybody went to water tank (lead vehicle again).

The truck by the building was already there when he pulled up. A PSD asked him for directions, as he was giving directions shots were fired.

Everybody got down, (b)(6) was running up the hill, (b)(6) came up running up the hill. 3 or 4 US personnel went to his vehicle that had been injured. Took them to Camp Qargha. One PDS, two Army, one female (b)(3), (b)(6) Interpreter, (b)(3), (b)(6). Everyone was hurt except the interpreter. Made trip back to site with a PSD.

As soon as he got back a (b)(6) asked him to translate inside the building. He wanted to know the name of the shooter. Another PSD told him to stop and not go any further.

He drove to the HLZ. He covered the area with his vehicle - asked where the other HZ was located. 10 minutes later the helos arrived at the sites. UK QRF came and directed them to go to

the other HLZ. Helped take MG Greene into back of the truck for movement to HLZ, then Helo arrived.

He went back to the office.

At 1600 went with (b)(6) back to GSU. (b)(6) called (b)(6) and asked him to bring (b)(6) to his office. Once he arrived he was called by MG Rasashi to meet him at the site. He drove (b)(6) with his dad to the site and dropped them off. He waited there for about 20-30 minutes.

One of the guys had contact with shooter. He went back on Thursday to site - A prisoner was yelling "Let me out" real loud.

He frequently saw Rafuqullah. When he would go through the gate, if (b)(6) offered Rafuqullah a drink or snack, Rafuqullah wouldn't take it from him, but if (b)(6) offered it, he would take it.

Rafuqullah once asked him why he was working with the US Army. He didn't say why didn't like Americans. (b)(6) explained why he worked with US Army, that it was his job, and was working for US Army as well as for Afghanistan.

A lot of cadets complained and asked him why he works for the US Army. A lot of cadets say that he's working with non-Muslim guys. He had an altercation with a cadet (grabbed him by the shirt). (b)(6) told him not to argue with cadets or anything like that. Thinks they're not showed respect at home.

Some of his friends called him the day of the incident to see if he was ok.

A lot of ANA guys are not very disciplined.

They shower once every 3 to 4 days

Rafuqullah listened to Indian, and Parsi songs

(b)(6)

Camp Qargha 8/16/14 at 1245

(b)(6)

Learned English at Private Department (Kabul, English institution)

He heard about the event two days before incident.

He went to see MG Shah with (b)(6). MS Shah doesn't speak English so all discussions go through Ahmad. VIPs were coming to talk about water and construction problems. It was the first time MG Shah was made aware. MG Shah was glad that the visit was happening because CPMD had been unable to solve the problem -- they were talking about the briefing. They talked about Force Protection, FP was being arranged by Qargha, plus each General had their own PSD team. (b)(6) didn't ask for help concerning security. (b)(6) asked General Shah to ensure area was safe -- Did not discuss disarming Afghans.

They talked about the length of visit, and whether lunch be included in the visit.

The plan was to have lunch with MG Shah... he asked to participate in the entire visit. BG Sharifi was invited by Brig Russell -- MG Shah asked to also invite BG Sharifi. They discussed the details of the lunch, to include feeding the security details -- No food for PSDs.

General Shah talked about having gone to the village, having seen family (etc)

They had discussions over arrival times, and whether they would use a helicopter -- Plan to arrive by 0845, others coming by ground. Time changed to be in agency by 0915.

Moved to HLZ at 0845 to set up the site (chairs, etc)

He went to agency, everybody was waiting for the Generals -- General delayed on the ground.

When the GSU/MP commanders arrived at the HLZ, MG Shah told them no Afghan security was required, and to disarm the ANA soldiers outside and around the visit sites -- No questions or concerns were expressed.

ANP Soldiers were guarding and armed. Afghan soldiers should have been unarmed on the places they were going.

(b)(6) started the briefing, then BG Russell -- went to the second area (water tank).

There was a heated discussion at the water tank. CPMD told MG Greene CPMD had it under control. MG Shah challenged (b)(6) that CPMD could not solve the problem... called him a liar. MG Greene said that the Phase II would be delayed if water problem not solved -- MG Greene was not disrespectful.

Leadership was mindful of the time, so wanted to cut off the brief and move on to next site by vehicle to South ECP. Walked from road to South ECP -- there was a crowd of people.

(b)(6) led a smaller group out of the gate to the submerged tank -- (b)(6) briefed the delegation on the current situation and problem. They stayed at water tank for about 10 minutes, discussed issues at water tank which was the main source.

General Shah was busy on his telephone, were briefed to leave because they were visible.

Everyone moved out through the gate then gathered around (b)(3), (b)(6) discuss the budget. They brought a briefing board. (b)(6) was interpreting the briefing -- (b)(6) asked (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) a question... then shooting began.

Rounds landed between him and (b)(3), (b)(6). They thought the rounds were coming from off base -- nobody knew the shots came from inside the building.

Everybody then began to treat the wounded, and evacuate them. They said MG Greene was really bad and had to help him. He continued to help provide first aid and evacuation. Mentioned his pants were covered in blood.

They carried the wounded to UK Medical facility in vehicles.

He mentioned he had nightmares (sound of shooting and sound of people).

He didn't notice anything out of the ordinary prior to the shooting.

He has been at Qargha since 2011.

He hasn't spoken to anyone except (b)(6). Called him from a friend cell phone.

At around 1330, (b)(6) tried to get in contact with General Shah to inquire about the shooter. MG Shah asked about everyone's well-being and asked specifically about MG Greene. MG Shah gave (b)(6) the shooter's (military) number.

At 1400 called back to General Shah, MG Bathurst wanted to talk to him about the incident. He (b)(6) didn't attend that meeting. BG Hethington & NTM-A wanted to come see MG Shah.

(b)(6) was on the roof and went into building with Denmark team.

MP ANF was corrupt. ANP was taking bribes (he saw them), so they laughed and communicated that they were surprised he (b)(6) was still alive.

He was not happy to down to the ECP with ANA/ANP -- He did not trust the ANSF

Camp Dargha 8/16/14 1245

(b)(6)

UTAG since 4 JAN 09 - From

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

private school learning English after returned from Pakistan

2 days prior on visit to MG Shah w/ (b)(6) - power, water 2/ M/G

First time MG Shah became aware of the trip. PSD could ^{cooperate} ~~not~~ fix water

There was discussion about FT - Dargha - G/Os have own PSD/CPT

Didn't ask MG Shah for help w/ security - (b)(6) told MG Shah to secure areas of visit

MG Shah doesn't speak English - all discussions go through (b)(6)

Plan was to have lunch w/ MG Shah @ the end but MG Shah came on the visit - MG Shah wasn't planned

BG Russell wanted BG Shaqfi + the other general was invited, as well

Food for PSD/MA - (b)(6) said no food for / his advisor was French

PSD/CPT since they are on duty / MG Shah wanted to come to H22 @ 0845

On the 5th told to call + tell MG Shah that party coming by ground @ 0915

Arranged tables + chairs for briefing by (b)(6) / BG Russell - Shah + 2 G/Os

waited for General - delayed program for 15 minutes

GSU CDR + M.P. CDR told by Shah - ensure ANA soldiers disarmed

Approved

disarmed - sent away guard @ water tower

Briefings @ HZ then went to water tank - discussion between (b)(6)
"CPMD" has ability to fix problem - MG Shah told him CPMD isn't
capable to fix - CSTC-A is here to fix water problem - MG Greene told
(b)(6) that if water isn't fixed, they would delay Phase II
No disrespect shown by MG Greene.

Due to time, they moved to third site @ S ECP, dismounted from
road through south ECP to underground storage tank
70% of ANA water coming from this source - MG Shah got a call - everyone
moved to S ECP. CJ-ENGA began brief about how they could help ANA
At the end of brief - (b)(6) asked Qs + (b)(6) answered. Shooting
started - shots between translator + generals. Thought shooting was
from outside - no one knew shooting was inside - shooting stopped - people
helped injured - PSDs brought vehicles - close to MG Shah - very bad -
evacuated areas - pants were bloody - helped evac wounded to UK MTF
Didn't sleep well for a week

Since 2011 been @ Baghdad - didn't notice anything different that day - line off camp
(b)(6) called him to check on him @ abt 1320 a team checked w/ MG Shah -
got name - MG Shah asked about how everyone was doing - asked ID number
of shooter - asked to tell (b)(6) - MINDEF asking about coalition generals
@ 1400 MG Bathurst MOD MAF - wanted to see MG Shah - (b)(6), BG Russell,
MG Bathurst saw MG Shah ref incident - No seat for him (exp) 15-20 mins,
BG Hethington & NTM-A, wanted to come see MG Shah.

English team went w/ clearing team

talk to (b)(6) (b)(6) on roof of building

Saw guards ANA taking bribes - laughed that he was still alive
Stay away from ANA + ANP check points

(b)(6)

Camp Qargha 8/16/14 at 1437

(b)(6)

He found out a few days before the event by (b)(6).

Before DVs arrived, he helped set up chairs at HLZ and stayed for briefing. He took the convoy to the blue tank, stayed with the car (waited for (b)(6)). He left early with Danish PSDs, (b)(6) -- climbed to the top of the building, there were (b)(1)1.4a Australian (b)(1)1.4a Danish personnel and (b)(6). ANA was manning the machine gun – a commander and two soldiers from ANA.

Shooting started, then Danish guy told him to go into the building during shooting. Went into the bathroom, passed ANA who said he took the rifle of the shooter was about to die. ANA soldier was in bathroom, an (b)(6) said he took his rifle. He was asked to tell ANA to get out of the building. He was told by (b)(6) to get the vehicle, so he went up and brought the vehicle down. He, (b)(6) all went to take casualties.

They were the last vehicle to depart before ANA security. Danish guys were still at the location. Headed back to Camp Qargha.

He doesn't know any of the ANA soldiers in the GSU MP Company. Saw the rifle of the shooter was an M16.

He was ANA officer, platoon leader with training at Ft. Bragg and Lackland AFB.

He said company commander was piece of crap. The perception is not good, hears others talking from ANA -- selfish company commander who is involved in extortion, bribes, etc. He (MP Commander) has never been investigated, even though he has caused problems.

1437 8/16/14 Camp Darcha

(b)(6)

/DLI - Fort Gordon/

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

learned about visit from PM a couple of days prior
No details - only visit

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Before visit took chairs to (b)(6) - stayed out for briefings - finished went to
blue tank - discussion - stayed of car w/ (b)(6) w/ photo - (b)(6)

waited for convoy - 5-10 minutes prior - left w/ (b)(6) Danish PSD, (b)(1)1.4a (b)(6)

went on top - A/S (b)(1)1.4a, ANA on stop of bldg w/ (b)(6), truck was
there, there it was - MP CSR brought it. Discussion ended @ storage
tank - briefing finished, shooting started. Dane asked him to go
down, he went into bldg between (b)(1)1.4a, went into bldg, went
to bathroom, ANA soldier took rifle, Shorby was almost dead, then
went out - asked ANA to leave, brought truck - (b)(6)

(b)(6)

were last ones to leave area, aside from Dames. Came back to camp.

Doesn't know ANA soldiers @ gate. Never had anyone question him
about why he works w/ Americans. People think ill of company commander -
piece of crap.

Approved

Statement regarding insider attack on august 5 2014.

This is a statement explaining my planning, recce and rehearsal prior the VIP meeting on august 5 and execution of the mission.

On Juli 28 2014 I first heard of the meeting. I was informed by (b)(6) about the concept in general and where the locations would be.

- We briefly discussed that the water tank location next to ORANGE would be the most dangerous place because it was outside the concrete perimeter in line of sight of the road (ORANGE) and from some buildings.

On juli 29 I did my first recce with myself, my 2IC and (b)(6) a contractor that is involved with the water supply problem here on Qargha. (b)(6) showed us around the water tank outside the perimeter and the surroundings of the guard buildings where the Insider attack took place.

- I concluded that the Water tank would be the most vulnerable place during the VIP visit since the line of sight from ORANGE.
- My initial plan was to push some of my own people outside the barbed wire that circles the building the water tank is placed in.
- On a later occasion, I do not recall the specific time, I discussed the concern with (b)(6) and we agreed that all VIP should be pushed inside the building out of line of sight.

On juli 31 I did a recce with (b)(6) in order to know the route between the different locations.

On August 2 me, [REDACTED] (b)(6) and MG Greenes PSD team did a recce on the site where we drove the route and stopped at each location.

- I briefed the guys about the security situation on the site. I told them we had IDF one week before, that the latest Green on Blue was last October and that we didn't have any problems with the ANA on Qargha.
- On this day, as far as I recall, I came to the conclusion that I wanted to have an as low profile down by the water tank as possible not to draw any attention to the VIPs.
- After the recce I asked [REDACTED] (b)(6) company in Qargha, if I could borrow a sharpshooter or a sniper from him in order to provide overwatch from the roof of the building that the incident later occurred. It was granted by the MAJ. The sharpshooter was to provide overwatch to the south looking at ORANGE and the adjacent buildings.
- Meanwhile I would put my FP down by the water tank in concealment. This was if we were engaged, my guys could suppress the enemy while the US PSD could extract the VIPs.

On August 3 in the evening I briefed my 2IC and my SGT about the plan. We made a ROC drill IOT make sure they understood the scheme of maneuver and that any faulty things were terminated.

On August 4 I gave the 5 paragraph operation orders to my FP team. Afterwards we rehearsed it on the actual locations and drove the exact route. The focus was on what to do on the different sites and to make sure we had it all covered.

- Later that day I did a last recce with [REDACTED] (b)(6). There were some adjustments to the locations, cutting a few off. Also there were some adjustments to my own plan, nothing significant.
- In the evening I briefed my guys about the changes in the plan and made sure they understood the concept of operation after changes.

Limitations known before execution

- I wasn't able to coordinate with all the FP teams coming in, so my plan was to rely on my own personnel to handle the critical parts regarding the security.

- We couldn't get any confirmation how many VIP or vehicles coming in, so my plan had to be flexible IOT handle various number of vehicles and anything from a small crowd to a large one.
- I was on radio with my own guys, but not with any of the CP (close protection) teams. That lead me to the conclusion that if things went wrong it would be hard to have an combined effort since communication is key to success. A small solution to this was I divided tasks between myself and (b)(6). If anything went wrong, I would react to the threat with my FP guys IOT handle the situation until the VIPs was out of the way, and he would make sure the VIPs and the column of cars would be evacuated.

Execution

August 5 at 0650 I departed with 3 out of my 5 NTVs IOT receive the incoming VIP callsigns and the advanced party (AP) from MG Green and Wendell.

- At 0700 my 2IC (b)(6) departed with (b)(1)1.4 Australian sharpshooters IOT link up with the US AP.
- At 0705 I was ready in position with my 3 NTVs from ORANGE to the HLZ where the RV point was. I was at ORANGE myself with my driver PFC Bang.
- At 0730 I received the US AP and send them in direction of my 2IC.
- 0815 the first callsign came in.
- Around 0840 I was informed by (b)(6) that Greene and Wendell's callsign would be late. (I was supposed to collapse at 0910).
- Somewhere around 0940 one NTV from Wendell and Greene's AP came down to ORANGE IOT escort them to the HLZ. I collapsed my 3 NTVs and linked up with the rest of my unit at the HLZ.
- Right after my arrival at the HLZ, Greene and Wendells column came in.
- Somewhere around 1005 the briefing started at this location. After 15 minutes I dispatched my own AP, which was my 2IC with the (b)(1)1.4 Australian sharpshooters and a couple of my own guys. They had linked up with the US AP IOT do a combined outer cordon at the next location and to secure it prior to the VIPs arrival. I still had FP guys with the VIPs.
- Approximately 1025 we drove to the next location, the blue water tank overlooking Qargha.
- At this location my men were in place providing overwatch with the sharpshooters and the rest in position around the tank.

- About 1045 I send off my 2IC IOT secure the next location at the GSU old main gate. I used the US AP to secure the VIPs at the blue water tank for the remainder of the time, since they needed to leave shortly after and thereby would not be able to be a part of FP at the next location.
- We arrived at the next location approximately at 1115. At that point I had my 2IC and (b)(1)1.44 guys at the buried water tank and the (b)(1)1.44 sharpshooters on the top of the roof, where the perpetrator eventually was shooting from.
- After 10-15 minutes the VIPs came back up, but a civilian contractor had put up a diagram on a board. It seemed to me that he would give a briefing there. That was not a part of the plan, but since it was out of line of sight from ORANGE and the atmospheric was as usual, I estimated that it would be safe to go through the briefing there.
- A couple of minutes after, I dispatched two of my team members to GN Shaha house IOT secure the area.
- When they arrived at the location they said that they needed additional guys because there were a lot of people up there, some civilian workers.
- Around 1150 I could hear the civilian guy who was doing the brief had ended the briefing and they started a dialogue. I estimated that they were about to be done at this location and thereby dispatched additionally 3 team members to the GN house.
- Shortly after I had dispatched those 3, I heard gunfire, what I believe was bursts of 3 to 4 rounds. Initially I was confused about the direction the fire was coming from.
- I took a quick look to my left but saw nothing. I immediately turned to my right and saw a barrel sticking under a tilted window from the building that was just behind me. I didn't see the shooter since the window was tinted. It looked like the barrel was pointing slightly downwards comparing to the optimal level.
- After locating the shooter I raised my rifle and started firing into the window where I believed he was standing. First round was slightly too far to the left, so I walked my rounds to the right. The shooter stopped firing pretty fast after I opened up. After firing about 5 rounds, another person began to shoot at the threat. He was standing to my rear and slightly to the left. I didn't see him, could just feel it and see additional impacts in the window besides my own. I fired 8-10 rounds in total.
- After firing into the window I walked up to the window while I was screaming "He is inside the building". I thought about jumping in, but realized that if he wasn't dead or if there were more than one shooter I would be gunned down when entering through the window.
- I ran to the right and decided to clear the building on my own, since there was no backup close to me. I wanted to call my men on the radio for backup, but I could

hear my 2IC calling them already. I had an understanding that he was calling my men from GN Shahs house down to this location, so my main concern was to eliminate the threat.


- I entered the building from E through the back door and stumbled across 4-5 ANA MP soldiers. I couldn't communicate with them, and at that point didn't know if one or more of them was in on this plot, so I decided to bring a backup inside with me.
- Just before leaving the building IOT get back up, I saw a US soldier to my left inside a small room.
- I went in and saw he was wounded, so I couldn't use him as back up. He had taken a round to his arm and it looked like he had injuries to his stomach.
- I went out of the building again with the wounded and stumbled across one US PSD. I told him to stack up after me, and went in again.
- This time there were more ANA soldiers when I entered. I realized I hadn't heard any shooting for some time, what I recall as since I ran to the back entrance of the building the first time. When I entered this time I was worried about there would be any misunderstanding and maybe an accidental green on blue because of the tense situation.
- I told the US PSD we needed an interpreter, and we went outside the building again.
- On the W side of the building we found one, and I also linked up with one of my guys (b)(6).
- At the same time I saw my Suburban that was used as a MEDEVAC vehicle, was backing down the road and some people were being helped to the vehicles.
- I think it is about this time I shouted to my 2IC to activate the QRF which he was already trying to do. I had dropped the PMR radio in a vehicle when exiting it at this location, so was not able to call them myself.
- I told two US PSD and (b)(6) to stack up after me. The interpreter didn't want to come along, so I decided to go in anyways to make sure the threat was neutralized.
- We went in and again I saw a lot of ANA in the hallway. I turned right 180 degrees to go down to the room where I thought the room would be.
- I went inside the room with my rifle lifted ready to engage, but at the same time I knew that there could be friendlies inside.
- I immediately saw the window with the bullet holes that I had produced, and discovered a couple of ANA soldiers that didn't look threatening to me.
- In the back of the room that was some sort of horse shoe shaped, I found what I believed was the perpetrator.
- He was wounded and looked like he would die within a short period of time.

- I told (b)(6) and one of the US PSD guys to administer first aid, because if we could keep him alive we might be able to figure out his motive.
- Realizing that the threat was down I ran outside IOT tell people that the site was secure.
- I remember telling BG Russel and (b)(6). They were both involved administering first aid to the wounded.
- Then I entered the building again IOT see how my guys were doing with the first aid.
- (b)(6) informed me that the perpetrator did not have a pulse anymore.
- I wanted to check for myself and rolled him slightly over. I looked for life signs, but he was dead.
- I immediately told (b)(6) to take pictures of the body and the bathroom itself IOT to have some sort of evidence from the scene.
- I went out again. This time I linked up with an interpreter that was helpful.
- I tried to speak with what I believed was the ANA MP OC. He was clearly in shock, like most of the ANA I saw, so it was hard for me to get any information out of him.
- Only thing I got was his name, the perpetrator, written on a piece of paper. It said "Rafiq Ullha, MP Soldier"
- Afterwards, about 4 middle or senior ANA officers came to my location and I tried to talk to them too through the interpreter. I was trying to tell them what had happened, and I would appreciate their help.
- A bit later additional 4 senior ANA officers came to the location, what I believe was some of the most high ranking officers on Qargha. I greeted them but didn't talk too much with them since I was busy figuring out my next step.
- I had the entire location secured, all casualties had been evacuated, I had pictures taken of the place and there were no signs of danger.
- Shortly after, BG Russel came back and I gave him a SITREP and asked what to do next and I recall asking him if I should hand it over to ANA.
- He told me to hand it over and I asked him if he could go down to talk to the senior ANA officers to hand over the place.
- Two minutes after, BG Russel was done and I collapsed from the site and drove back to camp

1. (b)(6)

Camp Qargha 13.th august 2014


Depiction by Danish Security



Depiction by Danish Security

On the Roof

- My 2IC on the roof and (b)(1)1.4a x Australian sharpshooters under my command



(b)(6)

Camp Qargha 8/16/14 at 1111

Something he would do different is certain parts of cooperation between Close Force Protection Teams. (b)(6) wanted to know how many people were coming to the visit. (b)(6) didn't have an opportunity to inform them prior to the incident. He would recommend that FPs team could come to site to see the area.

Recommends to have all the CPTs there in advance to plan C2 and actions on contact.

His FP team did exactly what he wanted them to do in the situation, but the coordination was the biggest lesson learned.

He thinks instance would have still occurred.

He had no reason to distrust the ANA on that day.

Working together with ANA could be beneficial, big concern regarding trust.

Can't eliminate threat, but can be mitigated. He would like to be able to trust ANA.

It wasn't planned that they were supposed to be at that spot (where incident happened). He vouched for security of the situation. He had a plan going from location to location. He knew there were armed men, and knew the layout of the building.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

The only way to prevent the incident was to walk into the bathroom at the exact moment the shooter was about to fire.

Radio communication with every team could be beneficial. Doesn't see it as a major issue, but would be nice to have. At least one person in each group needs to be in communication.

There was a lot of confusion; he was one of the only guys that knew what was going on at the time the shooting began. His sharpshooters were focusing on orange; he had other guys by water tank. He had established 360 security at the spontaneous stop. He sent three additional guys out. The perpetrator drove to the building. When they were about to move out, he pulled the 360 security before shooting incident occurred. Three of his guys drove off as meeting was about to end.

When he went out, his understanding was business as usual, that ANA were going to be armed. He didn't want to tell ANA that VIPs were coming to visit for OPSEC reasons. He let them know that there were going to be sharpshooters on the roof as observation technique (through

(b)(6)

He had no understanding that ANA soldiers would be unarmed.

He felt someone shooting from his left shoulder; they put accurate shots to the window. It was simultaneous shooting. He's pretty sure he fired 8 rounds because he always puts 28 rounds in his magazine and when he checked he had 20 rounds left in magazine after shooting.

He was standing from outside, couldn't see much, he could only see rifle out the window. He doesn't recall any more firing after he (and other person) started firing back through the window. He can't say for sure there wasn't any more gunfire.

He saw other PSDs wearing civilian clothes, knows for sure they were Americans the third time in went into the building. First time in the building it was just himself. Second time in the building, was himself and US PSD. Third time in the building, was himself and two PSDs, one of them was (b)(6). He asked one of his guys to administer first aid care to the shooter, because of LOAC reasons and potential information gathering as to why he did what he did.

(Regarding spontaneous stop) He thought they were away from orange, didn't need to worry about direct line of fire. He didn't feel any immediate danger. They do security all the time, they're part of security (ANA guys), but he didn't interpret them as a danger. Did not sense concerns on atmospheric, no reports from his team either.

He was not thinking whether it was a good idea or not to have the spontaneous stop, his job is to provide security and not make any other decisions. He felt secured at the spot; his guys were lined up and prepared.

He didn't walk around looking at ANAs. He wanted an interpreter at the roof for the Australian guys. It would be helpful to have interpreter with their teams.

He relied on (b)(6). Interpreter could be helpful.

His Insider Threat training came down to atmospheric; he hadn't been part of Insider Threat training as far as what to do after an incident. He asked (b)(6) what to do next after he had situation under control. BG Russell came into the building, (b)(6) gave him a SitRep and proposed to him if they should handle the crime scene to the ANA. BG Russell said yes.

After the incident, he found an interpreter and asked him to get the shooter's name, he had him write it on a piece of paper. He just pushed the guy to bathroom, thinks it wasn't (b)(6).

He dispatched some of his guys, needed to provide Security as well, was looking down to the building but not the window.

He was facing the wrong direction when firing started.

GSU Commander was totally in shock.

(Regarding Guardian Angels) Concept of the operation was that Danish guys would look outwards, and GA's inwards.

He would have needed coordination and communication, but probably wouldn't have prevented the incident.

ANA soldiers were standing in shock in the building. Some Afghans were standing in the killing zone (outside).

He doesn't recall Afghans helping out with casualties in the aftermath. He received a lot compliments directed at the interpreters for their help.

Approved for Release

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, August 07, 2014 8:30 AM
To:
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Details of Incident from Danish Security Force (b)(6) ref Qargha 20140805: FW: ~~(S//REL)~~ Insider atk

~~Classification: SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

(b)(6)

(b)(6) He is attached to the Unit Training Advisory Group (UTAG) out at Qargha. He is the officer in charge of the Protection Mobility Cell.

Cheers,

(b)(6)

ISAF CJ7

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, August 07, 2014 8:28 AM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Details of Incident from Danish Security Force (b)(6) ref Qargha 20140805: FW: ~~(S//REL)~~ Insider atk

~~Classification: SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

(b)(6)

Thanks for the heads up. Good to know. I know you're adding it to your report, but quickly what unit and nation does he belong?

Again, thanks.

(b)(6)

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

(b)(6)

ISAF Joint Command

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, August 07, 2014 8:04 AM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Details of Incident from Danish Security Force (b)(6) ref Qargha 20140805: FW: ~~(S//REL)~~ Insider atk

Importance: High

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

(b)(6)

I'll add this to my report, but wanted to get this to you all straight away to fill in some puzzle pieces. (b)(6)
was the first to return fire and first to enter the building.

Cheers,

(b)(6)

ISAF CJ7

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, August 06, 2014 11:42 PM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: ~~(S//REL)~~ Insider atk

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

Sorry for the late response (b)(6)

I'll answer the questions I can right away, some I will elaborate on tomorrow ASAP.

- I'm with UTAG. My position is Protected mobility cell, (b)(6)

- Did we investigate Marshal Fahim National Defense University Incident from 05 AUG 14, but I believe (b)(6) 11/18/2014-319

(b)(5)

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

(b)(5)

- Did anyone clear the building before the shooting? No is the short answer. There are two guard buildings where the event took place. I had three guys on the roof and other guys in the surroundings. I was standing slightly to the left of the window where the shooter fired from. A couple of minutes before I sent off a couple my guys since we were about to move out and I needed to secure the other site. But they were neither inside the building. I knew that there would be armed men in that building, since it's the guard building where the MPs is staying when not on duty. There was also a M240B on the roof with an ANA soldier watching road ORANGE. In reality there were multiple ANA soldiers all over the place with guns and I knew that. In a couple of guard towers, inside the two guard buildings and some outside.
- Did we have an Guardian angel inside? I'm certain that none of my guys entered the building prior to the shooting. I was the first man in the building, but that was after I had returned fire through the window. Just when I entered, I saw one US soldier that was wounded that had fled from the killing zone and had ran for cover just inside the building but a long way from the bathroom. He was clearly not an force protection guy. He wasn't wearing PPE, only armed with a Beretta M92. A younger guy not high ranking. Maybe an Aid or something. He had a gunshot wound to his left arm and as far as I could see, maybe also to the stomach. He was standing and I got him outside the building. I believe that I was inside the building 25-35 seconds after the first shot was fired. If I had had an guardian angel inside I would have known at the time and for sure afterwards when we have debriefed. No one from my team was outside the bathroom inside the building when it started.
- We did not coordinate in general with the ANA prior to the meeting. I did not want to, because of OPSEC. In general terms we trust the guys at the MP station, but me and (b)(6) did not want to take the risk to tell them that so many VIPs would be there on that particular day if one of them casually would mention it to the wrong people. Only coordination done was that the day before, I had one of the American contractors that knows the MP commander well, made him tell that there would be (b)(1)1.4 sharpshooter coming down to the station IOT to practice observation technique on the top of the building. The reason of that, was to ensure they wouldn't be offended when we came down there and invaded the rooftop where the M240B position was (On top of the building where the perpetrator was firing from)
- The perpetrator was hit in his torso. No rounds to his face or neck. I don't know if he was hit in the arms or legs. He was wearing his uniform so it was hard to tell. But it was obvious that he was hit in the torso, he was bleeding badly and was barely breathing. From I entered the bathroom and found him to he died, it took about one or two minutes. From I fired through the window to I entered the bathroom I believe there went about anything between 3-6minutes. Since i was pumped up on adrenalin I don't have clear recollection of time. One thing I find important is that it seemed like I have injured him when I fired through the window because of the way the gun was pointing out of the window he must have some of the body exposed and the firing clearly stopped quite fast when I started to engage. But when I discovered him, it looked like they had taken his body armor of (What I believe was his). And the place I found him was not at the window, it was further into the room where my rounds defently could not reach him. And where he was sitting there was what looked like bullet holes in the wall. This is only speculations from my side, but I think I injured him and ANA went in there before I was on the scene and shot him again. Only thing that contradicts that, is that I didn't hear any more gunshots after my brief firefight with him was over. But as I said, I was so fired up on adrenaline that I could be wrong. Otherwise it would have been bullets hitting the wall and damaging the wall further into the room, but again speculations from my side.
- Regarding the 5 paragraph order: I have a laminated piece of paper where I write my orders on where all the headlines already is written. Since it's a standard, I just fill in the different stuff like scheme of maneuver, actions on and so on and other stuff that varies from assignment to assignment. I can write to you what was on it?
- Outlines of the event I will clarify for you tomorrow. I have written it in Danish for the Danish MPs, I just need some time to write it in English.
- Regarding the recce plan and rehearsal, I will also send it tomorrow.
- Regarding my units SOP, do you mean from back home or the UTAG?
- I will try to make a diagram tomorrow.

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

Sorry I can't deliver all the detail right away, I'm a bit tied up on different reports and still ongoing operations here in UTAG.

Regarding my telephone number, let me know if you want to speak on the phone. The connection out here is terrible so I will connect with you if you want to.

(b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, August 06, 2014 8:43 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: ~~(S//REL)~~ Insider atk
Importance: High

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

Hello (b)(6)

Appreciate the information you provided on the phone today.

When able, please send copies of the 5 paragraph order and your recce plan for the 5 Aug event. That will be key in my section of the assessment for pre-mission planning.

Can you also send me your local unit SOPs for how you are to conduct security operations like this one?

Can you provide a quick outline of the events of the day and focusing in on the time of the shooting?

Can you also provide a list of all Danish personnel that were part of the event? What unit are you with?

Do you have a diagram of where everyone was when the shooting began?

Did anyone see the shooter enter the building?

Did anyone clear the building before the shooting?

The Afghans claim a guardian angel was in the building outside the bathroom when the shooting started. Can you confirm or deny?

Were the Afghans coordinated with before the operation to blend their security into yours and the PSDs?

The Afghans will not let us see the body. Where was he hit? Was he wearing armor?

Sorry for so many questions.

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

Cheers,

(b)(6)

ISAF CJ7

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, August 06, 2014 2:10 PM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: ~~(S//REL)~~ Insider atk

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

Hey (b)(6)

You did already speak to the person (b)(6), so everything is good, he just need your phone number? (b)(6) is Cc this email.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, August 06, 2014 1:19 PM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: ~~(S//REL)~~ Insider atk

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

Hej (b)(6),

(b)(6)

Regards

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

(b)(6)

Qargha

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

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Camp Dargha 8/16/14 IIII

(b)(6)

Done differently? Cooperation between (b)(6) tried to figure out who
winning teams were. No opportunity to inform them prior. If big VIP-CPTs
come to site + gather FP to brief them. It worked but not due to coord.
I had coordinated, but even more wouldnt have prevented.

Worked w/ KNA - guarantee high level of safety - no reason to distrust
take into consideration high level of ADA

Some reseris not planned that they'd be in that spot. vouched for
security.

Knew there'd be armed men - knew layout of building

Only could have prevented if they walked into bathroom @ the time
Comms - it will be impossible to have radios w/ teams - OK if people
know actions on contact. At least one member on @ team that can
come out to outlies

Wanted sharpshooters to focus on RTD range

There was a gap for when he sent advance team to next site

(b)(6)

Statement Tuesday on site 4

I was on the roof of the ANA MP building, when the shooter started to fire in to the crowd.

I was providing over-watch with (b)(1) Australian sharp-shooters. We were focusing on highway ORANGE, as we felt this was where the main threat would present itself.

When I was on top of the building I stood with my binocular and looked at some empty buildings on the other side of ORANGE to see if there could be any threat such as snipers and ect.

When the firing started I yelled to the people on the building to get down (some just did it by instinct).

I looked over the top of the roof to see what had happened. I saw several casualties. I said to my Danish PSD team over the radio to aboard the mission at the generals house. I had send some of them up there, because we were the advanced party, so we should clear the site before the main party arrived. I told my men that the situation still was unclear, so they should be careful when they arrived at site 4.

After that I called MOVCON and told them that we had been shot at. I told them to scramble the QRF at once to point 4 in camp Qargha.

I hung-up and coordinated with my superior (b)(6). He told me that he had got the shooter and he was getting control of the ground situation and told me to stay on the roof with the (b)(1) Australian in case there would be a follow up attack.

Then MOVECON called, but I could not give them any details on how many had been wounded or killed.

At this time we where evacuating the wounded personal away from site 4 and back to Qargha.

I was one of the last to exit from site 4 together with the Australian and my (b)(6) before handing it over to the British QRF.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

I heard there was a shooter and some wounded.

I drove down to the wounded to help out.

I got some of the wounded on cars and i got into a car to with 2 wounded and drove into qargha med center and helped out the doctors.

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(b)(6)

I started at General House, (b)(6) say shoot
fire on RDO, I say get in the car,
we drive to the place where the shoot
was, I sent (b)(6) to (b)(6) so they
cut clean the house, I help the navy girl
in the DK ambulance (suburban) and (b)(6), (b)(6)
also, I sent (b)(6)
in the suburban to do first aid on this
2 person, (b)(6) was the driver and I sent
them to the camp. After that (b)(6)
sent me and the house to sikner the shooter,
me and (b)(6) security the body,
After ANA took over we leave the house
together and drive long to camp.

(b)(6)

Statement 05/08-2014 Qargha

(b)(6)

Servic nr: (b)(6)
MST/UTAG

At first when the shooting happend, i was at the generals house, providing security. I was just asking for two more guys to come up and helping me, because it was a big area. After i put them at there spot, i heard a loud round, but i did think to must of it, because the ANA war on the range all day!

But 2sek after i heard (b)(6) in the radio, screaming "we have a wounded" and in a few second i had all my guys in the vehicle and head down to the scene of action.

we park around 250 meters from then building the shooter was in. I run down in cover off a german vehicle, because i didn't know where the scooter was at. Down at the building i saw (b)(6) i asked him what he needed, and he said he needed a terp. I went up on the top af the building where i knew there was a terp. I took him down to (b)(6) and then (b)(6) told me and three american psd guys too clear the building, first (b)(6) Second one psd guy, third my self, four and fifth 2 psd guys. (b)(6) then ask the terp to go in whit us, but he didn't have his gear, so he wouldn't go inside.

We enter the building at the main entrance in the middle of the building. I quickly spot 10-15 ANA MP, and the most off them have weapons. We then enter the toilet/bathroom where the shooter shot from. there are coming four ANA MP out of a little back room, at least two of them had a wapon (m16) after we got them out of the toilet, we found the shooter in the little room. the shooter was still alive, i took his pulse, and then we drag him out, so we out do first aid, but when we got him out he had no pulse and was dead. (b)(6) and the americans left the building, and i got a danish SG too guard the door, meanwhile i took pictures of the scene and the shooter (Danish MP and CID have them)

After a little while the ANA was taking over the place, and we extracted back to ours vehicle, and headed back to camp Qargha.

I have given a more detail statement to (b)(3), (b)(6) from the danish MP at the danish NSE in KAIA. And the american CID.

(b)(6)

Statement

(b)(6)

When the shooting started I was at site 5, by the generals house.

I heard over the radio that there was wounded CF at down at the other site we just left.

I jumped into the car with (b)(6) and down down to the site where the wounded was.

When we arrived I didn't know what was actually aware what was going on so I just grabbed my medic pack at went for the wounded. I soon it was clear to me that the threat was neutralized, I started give aid.

We attended a person called (b)(3), (b)(6) who had some severe injuries to upper left arm and lower left leg.

I found a stretcher and got him into a vehicle so that we could move him to QAA MED CENTER for better aid.

I the vehicle was also another patient named (b)(3), (b)(6) and a Danish Medic called (b)(6). We did the best we could for our two patients and got the in to the the Med CENTER.

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(b)(6)

(b)(6)

and I sat in the bar by the roundabout, when we heard the gun shooting.

- I drove the car down to help the casualties
- We got 2 casualties in my vehicle
- I drove to Camp Gargha trauma center with (b)(6) and the 2 casualties
- I stayed there to help the doctor
- I helped casualties to the helicopter

(b)(6)

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(b)(6)

I heard there was a shooter and some wounded.

I drove down to the wounded to help out.

I got some of the wounded on cars and i got into a car to with 2 wounded and drove into qargha med center and helped out the doctors.

Approved for Release

14/03/2014

Statement

When the first shots were fired I was guarding the vehicles with (b)(6). Approximately 50-60m from the incident. I thought the shooter was outside the fence.

When i realised the shooter was inside the house at the gate i ran to the site to help.

When i came down there the shooter had already been killed and searched.

I saw (b)(6), who had been a part in my vehicle, running around trying to do first aid.

I grabbed the (b)(6) and escorted him to my vehicle.

I drove to a gathering point for the Danish vehicles at the circle 100m from the incident.

Then i made sure with (b)(6) that the situations was under control and took the (b)(6) back to camp.

(b)(6)

PM Cell

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, August 14, 2014 11:21 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Statement regarding the event on 05AUG2014

Statement regarding the event on 05AUG2014

(b)(6)

This is my recollection of the event as experienced with the information I had at the time.

After having completed two scheduled site meetings of a planned high level key leader engagement, I was conducting perimeter security following a sweep of a planned third meeting site.

While performing this duty the sound of a burst of automatic gunfire rang out, different from the blank machinegun fire which had occurred throughout the day.

Shortly thereafter a signal on the radio from my teamleader ((b)(6)) was heard. He said that they had an wounded American.

I hastily made visual contact to a teammember on my right and we sprinted towards the nearby parking lot and our waiting vehicles.

After quickly mounting the vehicle with my vehicle commander ((b)(6)) we drove with breakneck speed towards the second meeting where the rest of the convoy including my teamleader ((b)(6)) were located at.

Upon arrival at the traffic circle 50 meters north of dismantled convoys location, my vehicle commander dismounted and I due to the level of chaotic activity at the site, an gate guardhouse, I decided to park at some distance from the site on some ground between the traffic circle and a parade square.

Immediately after parking the vehicle I dismounted and started perimeter security towards the north and east, covering the traffic circle and the parade square. After getting a visual overview of my area I coordinated my perimeter security west of me with another driver ((b)(6)). After a short time people on the parade square started moving towards the site, I waved them off and gave ((b)(6)) the order to do the same and not let anyone through.

A short while after a call came through on the net from ((b)(6)) that he needed one man to help bounce back a third driver ((b)(6)) and I responded over the radio that I was available, at this point I also coordinated with a fourth driver and told ((b)(6)) to coordinate the perimeter security with him and follow his orders.

After having handed over my area, I sprinted towards the guardhouse and asked for the position of ((b)(6)) over the radio and ((b)(6)) reported back that he was in a small metal shed concealing an opening in the outerwall. I then arrived at the shed and got contact with ((b)(6)) and quickly bounced back with him towards the guardhouse and took up position along its western side securing the area towards the gate.

After some time in the position I received confirmation over the radio that the shooter had been neutralized and that we could lower our protective posture, so I moved to south of the guardhouse to gain an overview.

From that position I started relaying radio traffic to the drivers still at the parked vehicles.

After sometime relaying and coordinating from that position, two armored vehicles arrived to reinforce us and I facilitated contact between them and my commander ((b)(6)) and after a brief coordination with them he transmitted to the order to withdraw and I moved northeast of the guardhouse to provide overwatch southeast to enable the withdrawal. With the team I then bounced back to the parked vehicles and drove back to camp.



Statement from (b)(6) on the Green on Blue incident on 5th of august 2014 at Qargha.

Normally I am advisor in the multifunctional advisory team under UTAG/NTM-A. On the 5th of august I was supporting the Danish Movement Support Team (MST) as driver.

I was a part of the team that protected the areas before the VIP would arrive. At approximately 11:30 I was waiting and guarding the vehicles when members of the Danish MST searched the area around the GSU south gate. I was standing there together with US (b)(6).


Soon after the VIP had arrived I and two members of the Danish MST was tasked to drive to the house of MG Shah, where the VIP should have lunch.

When the shooting started I was still in the car, but I could hear in my radio that a US soldier was shot and wounded at the south gate.

Within 3-4 minutes I and the other (b)(6) members of the Danish MST returned to the south gate. We parked the cars at the roundabout and went outside the vehicles.

We cordoned the arear and I guarded the road so no one entered from the north.

We secured the area until everybody had left the area and the Afghan Garrison Support Unit Commander came. At the same time the ISAF QRF and BG Bruce Russell arrived and we could leave the area.



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Shootout at MFNDU (Marshal Fahim National Defence University) TUE 5th of August 2014

Until approx. 1150 – 1155 all had gone well regarding FP.

At the site, when the shooting began my position was between the green shed and the low T-bone wall pointing towards route orange. My position was 4 – 5 meters from the crowd. My head had direction away from the crowd towards the green area EAST of the site. Arch: right side of the guard house to green shed.

My first reaction was to kneel down and instantly release safety on my rifle and shout to the crowd to get down. I shouted it loud three times while I was orienteering myself to find the shooters position. The sound was tremendously loud since I did not wear earplugs. I could see people civilian and military US and Afghan, falling in the crown 4-5 meters from me.

I could not find out where the shooting was coming from due to the reflection of the sound in between the walls and the houses on the site.

I went backwards searching for cover near by the green shed, while I shouted to people from the crowd to come my way. I then I started to drag/push people inside the shed amongst them BG GN Shah (commander FMNDU) While I was still trying to watch to find the shooter, I told people to move on, to the other site of the shed through the door (I knew that area was secure because I had been there two times during the briefing to check out whether it was still secure. I shouted to and American soldier to secure in the direction "route orange" on the other side of the wall he had a pistol drawn. He later on came back shouting he was "shot in the ass". I took a quick look at him and told him he was not bleeding and to go securing again.

I went low out of the shed and shouted at the people at the roof where the shooting was coming from (while there was shooting) but they said they did not know.

I then went inside the shed again to see to the wounded persons I had three, one bleeding massively from his right leg (b)(6) one American soldier shot in the "behind" as mentioned above and an Afghan (b)(6) shot in the "love handles, the head (touch shot) and through his hand". I realized that the general was the one with the severest wound; he needed to get at tourniquet instantly. There was also and an American soldier who came and asked me how bad he was wounded, he had a touch shot above his elbow.

The shooting had just stopped when I again shouted where the shooting was coming from, one of the guys from the roof, (b)(6) one from the Australian sniper team shouted to me it came from inside the building, I saw to the wounded again and ran outside to get tourniquets and bandages, I did not know if the shooting had completely stopped, but if I stayed low I could avoid the windows in the house, I ran to the T-bone wall again asking where the shooting was coming from. At that time the shooting had been stopped for approx. 45 sec – 1 minute.

I had bandages and tourniquets thrown down from the roof and went to the green shed to start the treatment of the wounded. The wounded was then evacuated successively I myself extracted right after and went to the guard building being part of the security there both outside and inside.

(b)(6)

Danish Army

STATEMENT BY

(b)(6)

On Tuesday the 5th August (b)(6) and I were conducting an overwatch task primarily with the Danish UTAG group. After finishing one task at the large water tank near the range we moved position to the main entry point of the MFNDU. There was a large group of ISAF and ANA Generals and other high ranking officers and civilians in attendance, our task was to overwatch route Orange and high vantage points to our front to mitigate and prevent incoming fire from that direction. (b)(6) and I were both armed with H&K 417 rifles as well as binoculars and laser range finders and had occupied the roof of what I presumed to be the guardhouse. At about 12 midday the officers and their PSD teams were crowded around in the open getting a brief when an individual opened fire, the first burst was 6 or 8 rounds automatic fire. I realized the firer was close and observed the second 6 to 8 round burst, I yelled out a target indication from the roof and tried in vain to bring my weapon to bear on the window that was shielding the firer. I think the Danish Platoon Commander heard my target indication and he promptly fired into the window along with (I think) a wounded American soldier, the incoming fire from those individuals silenced the gunman. At this time on the ground people were dragging the wounded to cover and performing initial care under fire, (b)(6) asked me if he could go down with his combat first aid kit to help, I told him to stay on the roof as overwatch as security on the ground was diverted helping the wounded, I also told him to throw his kit off the roof for someone else to use, I also threw some of my own kit off the roof to be used. After some time the building below us was cleared and secured, at the same time the casualties were being loaded into SUVs and evacuated to Camp Qargha. There were 2 civilians on the roof with us so when things had settled down I escorted them off the roof and into their vehicle which evacuated the scene, I then moved back onto the roof to provide security. Myself, (b)(6) and a Danish soldier (b)(6) stayed on the roof until the scene was handed over to the ANA and we got the order to collapse the position, on the way out I conducted a quick search for (b)(6) (b)(6) first aid kit, to no avail, we then moved tactically back to our SUV and moved back to Camp Qargha

Statement by (b)(6)

On Tuesday the 5th of August (b)(6) and I were tasked to provide overwatch for a meeting that was to occur on 3 different sites, the first 2 sites there were no problems. We arrived at the 3rd site which was the old Main entry point overlooking route orange, (b)(6) the Danish CSM (b)(6), 2 civilians and myself moved up a rear set of stairs onto the building overlooking the area and route orange, everything was going fine, no one suspicious getting around, the convoy arrived and moved straight onto site and into the bunker, some time went by and the group exited the bunker, one of the civilians then started giving a brief on a project, as it had finished he had asked for questions, there were none, he then asked for some individuals to join him up the front, then a burst from a weapon went off. All of us hit the ground and crawled for a small sand bagged area on the roof, there was the initial fire and then some rounds were fired at the shooter, which was one of the Danish officers and an injured American, myself and (b)(6) took up fire positions and started scanning for threats over route orange, at the same time the Casualties were being dragged into vehicles and driven away I asked (b)(6) (b)(6) if he wanted me to go onto the ground and help treat because I am a qualified Combat First Aider, he said stay on the roof so I threw down my CFA Kit to some of the people treating the Casualties. We both also threw down our personal First aid supplies, (b)(6) then escorted the 2 civilians on the roof down to waiting vehicles, on his return we both returned to scanning over the wall and into route orange for any additional threats, once the last Casualties were moved we were told to move back to the vehicles, before leaving (b)(6) did a look over the area to look for my CFA kit, it was not found, we then moved back to the Vehicles and made our way back to camp Qargha.

15 Aug 2014.



HEADQUARTERS
ARMY INSTITUTIONAL ADVISORY TEAM (UTAG)
NATO TRAINING MISSION – AFGHANISTAN
CAMP QARGHA, KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
BFPO 758 / APO, AE 09320



Date: 13 August 2014

SUBJECT: IA at MFNDU on 5AUG14, Personal Statement

I, [redacted] (b)(6), provide the following information regarding the events that took place at MFNDU on 5AUG14. I certify this statement to be true and correct to the best of my recollection.

- On 27JUL14 during O-group (UTAG) meeting I was informed about an upcoming KLE at MFNDU scheduled for 5AUG14.
- On 28JUL14 during daily KSU coordination meeting in QAA, at 16.30hrs I informed all in attendance about the upcoming KLE and that most likely we would ask for KSU support.
- On 30JUL14 I have received an email from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) asking for my support for his team recon and site survey on 2AUG14. I replied, via email, that the POCs for upcoming KLE is [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6)
- On the morning of 4AUG14 I joined the PM Cell for a recon and site survey for KLE on 5AUG14. We conducted a rehearsal and discussed all aspects of the visit. Later on 4AUG14 from 14.00 till about 16.00hrs we conducted another recon and site survey together with [redacted] (b)(6)
- On 5AUG14 I was an additional member of the UTAG Protective Mobility (PM Cell) Team, responsible to coordinate movement of vehicles throughout the KLE at MFNDU.
- On 5AUG14 I started my mission at 06.50hrs with briefing conducted by PM [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6). After briefing about the scope of our mission we started our movement.
- My task was to direct arriving vehicles from GSU main gate towards HLZ (Point #1).
- [redacted] (b)(6) had the same task at GSU eastern gate (on r.ORANGE).
- Together with me was [redacted] (b)(6), with INTV.
- [redacted] (b)(6) and I were on the main GSU gate from 07.15 until 09.15 hrs
- At approximately 08.15hrs [redacted] (b)(6) was on his way to HLZ (Point #1) and stopped to inform me that there would be a half an hour delay from original plan and that we are going to start with the first presentation at 09.30hrs.
- At 09.15hrs I and [redacted] (b)(6) changed our position and moved from GSU main gate to HLZ (Point #1).

- After presentation, about 09.50hrs [(b)(6)] gave a sign to start movement to the next stop of the KLE and this was location of the main water storage tank (Point #3), and location of the ANOA training range (Point #2).
- The total number of vehicles was about 27.
- At this time I changed vehicles and together with [(b)(6)] start moving to the next stop. We were in the first vehicle together with [(b)(6)].
- Arriving on the Point #3, about 10.00hrs, I and few others from PM Cell directed upcoming vehicles for appropriate parking in vicinity of Point #3 and Point #2. At that time there was a live fire exercise (LFE) on the range supervised by UK mentors of ANOA. FP teams were in place and site was secured.
- After a presentation in vicinity of Point #2, about 10.50hrs via PMR (Personal Mobile Radio) I was informed that we were ready for movement to the next location (Point #4), the Buried Tanker.
- Arriving at Point #4, I directed the vehicles to park on the right side of the road in direction of our next movement, south and south-west from Point #4 towards Point #5 House of the COM MFNDU. Together with me were additional members of the PM Cell waiting for next movement.
- At this location I positioned myself on the junction of street south towards Point #4 and street west-east. This position is on higher ground than position of the Point #4
- I positioned myself to be able to observe a building opposite of the GSU building near Point #4, and to be able to observe area 360° clock-wise, as outer-perimeter security. Also, I was able to observe the vehicles.
- About 11.40hrs one ANA Ford-Ranger arrived and parked backwards near GSU building. There were at least 2 ANA soldiers (wearing red berets) dismounted and holding assault-rifles (M16s), and went inside building.
- I remember that I looked at my watch and thought that this would be over soon because we need to move to the next location.
- On the first sound of burst shooting I went down on my knee, observing towards possible direction of shooting, towards south where the presentation for guests of the KLE was ongoing. At that moment I thought that the shooter originated from r.ORANGE.
- In a matter of seconds I grabbed a body-armor for [(b)(6)] and ran toward the GSU Building.
- At the scene, I looked forward trying to find [(b)(6)]. There were people already giving immediate first aid to the casualties. I heard shouting from inside building, I saw [(b)(6)] [(b)(6)] giving first aid to one person (man in brown suit), and ran to him because he needed a knife, I asked him if he is ok and asked him where is [(b)(6)].
- I turned over and I saw [(b)(6)] holding stretcher with one casualty.
- I ran towards him, after they put wounded person in vehicle I asked him if he is ok, and I gave him his body armor. In that moment I wasn't sure if place had been secured yet.

- I returned toward the entrance to the GSU building but I stopped to help one Afghan official who had been wounded into right leg. His aid told me that he is ok, and that he is going to be transported with his car. I helped him to lie down on the back of his car, and they left.
 - I went down to the GSU building, entered the building trying to find (b)(6) who's voice I heard earlier. I found him, I asked him if he is ok and how many of our troops are inside. He answered that there is one shooter inside the bathroom, dead. There was just him and another member of PM Team inside building. ANA soldiers were around, most of them inside sleeping rooms, heavily disturbed, and one holding two M16 by barrels.
 - I asked (b)(6) does he need help to secure building, and he answered that he doesn't need extra help because there are two others already coming down from the roof.
 - I went out to help. At that time most of the casualties had been evacuated. Still there were a few ANA or LN persons on the site. I helped to collect pieces of CF's equipment found on the site.
 - After some time, I went back to the building to check with (b)(6) He told me that the PM Team will stay to secure the location until QRF come to take over control.
 - After that together with (b)(6) I returned into camp QAA.
 - Upon my arrival to QAA I conducted accountability reporting to (b)(6)
- (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Unified Training Advisory Group
NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan**

(b)(6)

STATEMENT BY
ACADEMY

(b)(6)

AFGHA NATIONAL ARMY OFFICER

On 5th August 2014, I was involved in the visit of ISAF and ANA personnel to the MFNDU site to consider the water problems for that site. During the visit I was with Brig Russell as his interpreter. We started on the KSPAN HLS, where Brig Russell and I gave a ground brief. From there we went to the main water tank which is close to the MFNDU range. There an American Major and Colonel and a CPMD Colonel briefed us about the water problem. During this discussion MG Jalandar Shah challenged the CPMD Colonel 'to be honest and not make empty promises because you will not be able to solve these problems. This is the only chance for us today to get the senior coalition to help'. I translated this for Brig Russell as the translator did not do so.

Thereafter we went to the water tank by the NMAA gate. When we came out of that, we got together for another brief. After about 10-12 minutes someone opened fire from the building. I was sitting along the wall in the shade opposite the building. When he opened fire bullets hit the wall and splashed back wounding me in my back, my left hand and my side. I moved to the gap between the wall and the sliding gate. I did not feel safe in that place as I saw someone in a white guard tower to the right side of the gate. He was pointing a gun in our direction. I said to Maj Gen Bathurst 'let's get out of here as this is not safe'. I went to the place where Brig Russell was in a ditch and I told him I was wounded, but I am OK. I lifted up my shirt to show Brig Russell that I was OK. Some senior Afghans were there as well and we all saw another guard with a gun, along the fence line about 50m away. We went in to the shed. I saw (b)(6) with his leg bleeding on the other side of the wall, through the shed. Then I and an American guy helped him with his tourniquet. After that (b)(6) gave me his notebook, to keep it for him. When I was helping (b)(6) we saw an ANA guy coming towards us from the other side of the fence from the direction of the main gate. The American guy shouted at him to stop and put his hands up. I translated that. He did put his hands up and came towards us. He was the ADC of the GSU Comd. When I came back in to the shed I saw BG Sakhi in the shed. He needed a tourniquet. I went out of the shed and called to an American guy on the roof. He threw a tourniquet down to me. I put it on BG Sakhi's leg.

I then left the shed and took the notebook to Brig Russell's car, where I thought Brig Russell may be, but he was not there. I came back to the guardroom and saw Brig Russell busy with his telephone near the guardroom. Brig Russell asked me to go in to the guard room with him. On the way to the guardroom I was concerned with the situation because of the ANA soldiers standing with their guns. One of the ANA soldiers said don't worry, he is dead. Brig Russell and I found the dead soldier in the lavatory. There were two Danish soldiers there. Brig Russell checked that the soldier was dead.

When we came out of the Guard room, Brig Russell said go and get BG Sakhi. Me and another ANA man brought BG Sakhi to an ANA ranger vehicle. We put BG Sakhi on the backseat. Brig Russell told me to get in the front. He got in the back with two ANA officers. One was his ADC. We then went to the camp. I got out of the car and ran in to the hospital and collected a yellow stretcher. One of the ANA guys took the stretcher from me and put BG Sakhi on it and carried him in to the hospital. Brig Russell said 'you stay here'. I stayed in the hospital with BG Sakhi to help translate. I told the doctor that I am

also wounded, but she said that my wounds were not that serious, and we will help you after we have evacuated the more serious casualties. I was sitting close to BG Shaki holding his drip. There were some others helping him as well. After about 10-15 minutes he was taken out, and then a doctor took me to the treatment room and cleaned my wounds, and checked my body for other wounds and gave me some medicine. He told me to come back tomorrow morning.

I left the hospital, got changed in to my civilian clothes and went home.

20th August 2014

Camp Qargha

Approved for Release

Statement of (b)(6) 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards, Victoria Barracks, Windsor, (b)(6) Camp Qargha, 20140808 1530

Q. What is your duty description?

A. I am the (b)(6). There are 3 platoons and we rotate – one week on QRF, one on guard, and one on force protection.

Q. What was the purpose of the event you attended at MFNDU and what was your role?

A. I was the QRF (b)(6) commander. I was told that up to 12 starts going to the site for a conference. They were bringing in their own force protection.

Q. Who was the host of the event, and who was overall responsible for command and control?

Q. Who was responsible for planning, coordinating and executing force protection measures in support of this event?

Q. Did you have a PSD/CPT Assigned to you? Did you have a Guardian Angel? If so, how many? Were they trained? What instructions did you give to them?

Q. Were the efforts of your PSD/CPT/Guardian Angels coordinated with others, or synchronized as part of an overall force protection plan?

A. All stars have their own CPTs but there is no means of communicating between them. There was no coordination of the QRF with the PSDs/CPTs.

Q. Did you receive a security brief upon arrival at the site that day? If so, how effective was the security plan briefing? Did it cover medical evacuation and the location of the nearest medical treatment facility?

Q. Did you notice anything unusual with the atmospherics at MFNDU...any body language or other behavior that could be viewed as hostile?

A. I didn't notice anything.

Q. Please describe the events that took place from your initial arrival through the final stop where the incident occurred.

A. Our mission was to support the UTAG with QRF if necessary. I sent my QRF corporal out to recce the site the night prior to get eyes on, as they aren't familiar with that portion (by the gate). Each week we probably have one star visit. The day prior, the site was OK'd. The QRF cleared the firing range and handed it over to the mentors at around 0715. At 0800 we secured the KSPAN HLS until the Danes arrived. We cleared the area around the storage tank with a dog at around 0945 and had the Australian sharpshooters with us. The sharpshooters left, but returned some time later. Our plan was to hand over the area to the UTAG (Danes), but we didn't link up. We

Statement of [redacted] (b)(6) 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards, Victoria Barracks, Windsor, [redacted] (b)(6) Camp Qargha, 20140808 1530

didn't know the group was leaving the wire. My team searched with the dog behind the building. When the Danes didn't show up after an hour, the TOC told them to collapse back in. We had searched for IEDs/UXO. The Danes had a PMR (hand-held radio) but we didn't have any communication with them on this day. For the British, the PMR is the secondary means of communication. [redacted] (b)(6) was who had asked for the QRF to search with the dogs. When the initial group came in the QRF was to secure the KSPAN HLS until the Danes came, then the QRF return to base.

Q. In your own words, please describe the actions that took place upon arrival at the final stop.

A. At lunch, I heard the call sign for QRF [redacted] (b)(1) and went to the TOC. My team went to the E HLS. Every three weeks we train on MASCAL – we are very well rehearsed. At 1225 we secured the E HLS. Casualties began to come – first were 3 CAT As. We lined up the casualties and helped with first aid and security. We changed the frequency to SCAGNET [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a in the clear but we could get no communication with the helicopters. The TOC told us they would arrive in 20 minutes. The quads went to get more casualties and they brought two more CAT As and one CAT B. There are [redacted] (b)(1) soldiers in QRF [redacted] (b)(6). An Australian team was driving by and we waved them over to assist with the CASEVAC. QRF [redacted] (b)(6) went to the KSPAN HLS after picking up the Danes. The first helicopters came in to the E HLS. Three landed, we loaded them, and they left. After the helicopters took off, Americans came and reported that there were others down at the KSPAN HLS. A CAT A and 2 CAT Bs arrived and there was more air inbound. CPTs and an American general were trying to get out on the lift. The CAT B was Afghan. His aide wanted to go with him, so the QRF searched him and allowed him to travel. I didn't know the Americans on the KSPAN HLS had popped smoke. [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) did CPR on MG Greene but he passed away. When the additional helicopters arrived, I sent the 2 CAT B on the first and the CAT A (MG Greene on the second) because he had already passed away. The American general and PSD and the Afghan general got onto the second helicopter. We tried to figure out what to do with the CAT Cs. A call sign for Phoenix came up and wanted a SITREP. I had to deconflict with the American general, who was trying to get on ahead of the casualties. The CAT Cs were OK. They waited in the vehicles. I was exchanging information with the TOC. We waited too long so I suggested a road move. We waited around 45 minutes. There were 5 CAT Cs. Three Australian vehicles could take them. The TOC cleared them to go, so I briefed them. The 3 most serious CAT Cs were placed in one vehicle and 2 were placed in the other so they could be treated. QRF medics went with them. I debriefed with my guys, then the TOC, then we did a proper debriefing that evening. I have been here since January 30 of this year. [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6) I am going to be promoted to [redacted] (b)(6) tomorrow.

Statement of [redacted] (b)(6) I Coldstream Guards, Victoria Barracks, Windsor,
[redacted] (b)(6) Camp Qargha, 20140808 1615

Q. What is your duty description?

A. I am the [redacted] (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(6)

Q. What was the purpose of the event you attended at MFNDU and what was your role?

A. I was informed at 1630 the day prior that 13 stars were coming to the location.

Q. Who was the host of the event, and who was overall responsible for command and control?

A. The Danish and the UTAG had overall C2 and we provided QRFs [redacted] (b)(6).

Q. Who was responsible for planning, coordinating and executing force protection measures in support of this event?

A. The Danes were responsible for FP.

Q. Did you have a PSD/CPT Assigned to you? Did you have a Guardian Angel? If so, how many? Were they trained? What instructions did you give to them?

Q. Were the efforts of your PSD/CPT/Guardian Angels coordinated with others, or synchronized as part of an overall force protection plan?

A. The QRF was integrated but we needed better comms between nations. The QRF has PMR (a hand-held radio) and Bowman (typical British radio system). We had no communication with any others.

Q. Did you receive a security brief upon arrival at the site that day? If so, how effective was the security plan briefing? Did it cover medical evacuation and the location of the nearest medical treatment facility?

Q. Did you notice anything unusual with the atmospherics at MFNDU...any body language or other behavior that could be viewed as hostile?

A. The J2 briefed that the inherent threat that was from magnetic IEDs.

Q. Please describe the events that took place from your initial arrival through the final stop where the incident occurred.

A. The night prior we conducted a recce with the Australian snipers and the Danes at the NMA gate. The first knowledge I had of any casualties was when they showed up at the gate.

Statement of [redacted] (b)(6) I Coldstream Guards, Victoria Barracks, Windsor,
[redacted] (b)(6) Camp Qargha, 20140808 1615

Q. In your own words, please describe the actions that took place upon arrival at the final stop.

A. I was the commander of QRF [redacted] (b)(6) and I was in the Immediate Reaction Force room. The guard commander warned me of casualties so I went to the OPS room. People didn't know they were coming. I then went to the medical center. Sirens sounded. I waved other casualties into the medical center. The medical team was formed so I went back to OPS to await tasks for QRF [redacted] (b)(6). I told [redacted] (b)(6) to go secure the HLS with QRF [redacted] (b)(6). [redacted] (b)(6) told me to move to the incident point. [redacted] (b)(6) came in my vehicle. We met up with Brigadier Russell and the Danes at the NMA gate. I discussed with the Danes what had happened. They told me what had happened and that the gunman had been killed. Brigadier Russell talked to some high-ranking Afghans on-site for a couple of minutes. I told Brigadier Russell that they needed to move back and I sent the Danes back. Brigadier Russell went to the ANOA HQ and conducted another KLE with General Sharifi for 3 or 4 minutes. [redacted] (b)(6) was having trouble at the HLS. The TOC told him to go to the KSPAN HLS where Americans were waiting with casualties and several CAVs (NTVs), but I was enroute and went, instead. There was a CAT A and 2 CAT B casualties. MG Greene was on a stretcher. The Americans were throwing green smoke onto the KSPAN HLS and they needed the helo to land. We couldn't talk to the Blackhawks, so we decided to move the casualties to the E HLS. We arrived at the E HLS and I dismounted and acted as a litter bearer and took the casualties to [redacted] (b)(6) (the doctor). The medics took over. I tried to control the situation and disperse the crowd. An American general tried to get on the helicopter. MG Greene wasn't breathing and there were 3 or 4 medics working on him. There were 2 CAT As when we arrived at the E HLS. They left on a helo, then MG Greene went on a helo. We waited with the CAT Cs for about 45 minutes. When it became apparent the helicopters weren't coming for them, we decided to send them on a ground movement with the Australians in Bushmasters.

Statement of [redacted] (b)(6) 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards,
[redacted] (b)(6) Camp Qargha, 20140808 1315

Q. What is your duty description?

A. I am an [redacted] (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(6) I have three squads and three sections along with a 54-man Australian FP company. We support the UTAG, the mentors, FP, and QRF missions, generally.

Q. What was the purpose of the event you attended at MFNDU and what was your role?

A. UTAG, under [redacted] (b)(6) was facilitating a 9 star visit relating to water service. UTAG was to provide FP and the rest of us in the camp assisted in the visit.

Q. Who was the host of the event, and who was overall responsible for command and control?

Q. Who was responsible for planning, coordinating and executing force protection measures in support of this event?

A. A Danish officer named [redacted] (b)(6) who recently took over in the last three weeks.

Q. Did you have a PSD/CPT Assigned to you? Did you have a Guardian Angel? If so, how many? Were they trained? What instructions did you give to them?

Q. Were the efforts of your PSD/CPT/Guardian Angels coordinated with others, or synchronized as part of an overall force protection plan?

Q. Did you receive a security brief upon arrival at the site that day? If so, how effective was the security plan briefing? Did it cover medical evacuation and the location of the nearest medical treatment facility?

A. The FP visited the location of the events, but I thought it strange that there was no coordination. The PSDs conducted various recons, but there was no overall plan.

Q. Did you notice anything unusual with the atmospherics at MFNDU...any body language or other behavior that could be viewed as hostile?

A. There was no particular J2 info or indicators.

Q. Please describe the events that took place from your initial arrival through the final stop where the incident occurred.

Q. In your own words, please describe the actions that took place upon arrival at the final stop.

A. Casualties showed up at the front gate. The platoon sergeant informed me when the casualties arrived. I grabbed my kit and got into a quad (small ATV used for

Statement of [redacted] (b)(6) 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards,
[redacted] (b)(6) Camp Qargha, 20140808 1315

MEDEVAC) and I went to the Role 1 MTF. [redacted] (b)(6) gave a SITREP. I arranged transport between the Role 1 and the HLS. We used a MIST report (9 line MEDEVAC) and input it into JTAP. We got a report that wheels would be down in 20 minutes. There were 6 CAT As that were evac'd to the HLS. The Role 1 usually doesn't take MASCAL. The immediate first aid appeared to be lifesaving. The PSDs/CPTs hindered evacuation so I tried to get them to push out and do site security. An American PSD threw a taped smoke onto the HLS. Vehicles were lined up at the main entry point – twenty plus vehicles trying to get into the camp, but it didn't slow down my evac because the quad was maneuverable. [redacted] (b)(6) was a hero – he remained cool-headed and directed events. [redacted] (b)(6) secured the HLS and passed along info to the OPS room. Also, [redacted] (b)(6) the new doctor performed heroically.

Approved for Release

Statement of [redacted] (b)(6) Qargha Force Protection Company [redacted] (b)(6)
[redacted] (b)(6) Camp Qargha, 20140808 1230

Q. What is your duty description?

A. I am the [redacted] (b)(6) under [redacted] (b)(6).

Q. What was the purpose of the event you attended at MFNDU and what was your role?

A. It was the MFNDU project board visit, according to [redacted] (b)(6) the Brigadier's military assistant. The information is passed through MS Office's calendar function and we were told that there were no FP or transportation requirements on the calendar invitation. We knew Major General Bathurst was in attendance because he is part of the Welsh Guards.

Q. Who was the host of the event, and who was overall responsible for command and control?

A. UTAG was responsible, but I was aware that other groups had people coming in for the event. I don't know if an overall C2 had been established.

Q. Who was responsible for planning, coordinating and executing force protection measures in support of this event?

A. Individual PSD teams were in charge of their own FP and there was no coordination.

Q. Did you have a PSD/CPT Assigned to you? Did you have a Guardian Angel? If so, how many? Were they trained? What instructions did you give to them?

Q. Were the efforts of your PSD/CPT/Guardian Angels coordinated with others, or synchronized as part of an overall force protection plan?

Q. Did you receive a security brief upon arrival at the site that day? If so, how effective was the security plan briefing? Did it cover medical evacuation and the location of the nearest medical treatment facility?

Q. Did you notice anything unusual with the atmospherics at MFNDU...any body language or other behavior that could be viewed as hostile?

A. I didn't notice anything. I mostly remain in the camp. Advisors will normally send back threat reports and nothing had been raised.

Q. Please describe the events that took place from your initial arrival through the final stop where the incident occurred.

A. We had a tasking to clear a couple of areas and the company commander took care of that.

Q. In your own words, please describe the actions that took place upon arrival at the final stop.

A. I received a casualty report – (b)(6) had received a call from the guardroom that a casualty was coming in the main entry point. I thought it was minor, since we hadn't received any incident report. I went to the OPS room and heard that there were 5 CAT As. The Danes had signed out a PMR (hand-held radio) but they didn't send in an incident report, as they had left the radio in the vehicle. If we had received a report, we could have sent the QRF and an ambulance to help with the evacuation. We use the RC MEDEVAC process and the SOI outlines the MEDEVAC plan. We tried to get on ISAF Secret and (b)(1)1.4a channels, since RC-Central has a chat room. RC-East has a MEDEVAC page but we couldn't get the request sent. We called the rotary wing desk at IJC but there was no answer. We also called the CJOC and the shift director and there were no answers. We eventually called our UK HQ and relayed the 9 liner to them and they were able to post it on the RC-East MEDEVAC page and we received an estimate for 20 minutes wheels down. The QRF was sent to secure the E HLS (Qargha South). The company sergeant major began to conduct the MASCAL drill. The platoon commander ((b)(6)) was with the QRF securing the HLS. (b)(6) (b)(6) was on the HLS. We used smoke to mark the LZ. We sent the other QRF to the KSPAN HLS to tell them to cut their smoke, as they were marking the wrong HLS. There were three NTVs south and east of the HLS and they were using green smoke to mark it. The QRF moved them to the other HLS. (b)(6) had been looking for communications to report to someone, so I gave him a mobile phone. He reported that "he's not in a good way." By the time the second MEDEVAC call went out, the first load of casualties was gone. We canceled the next lift and evacuated the CAT Cs via ground movement. In total, there were 9 by air on 2 lifts, and five by ground. They were evacuated in less than 25 minutes from the first call. We processed spot reports (our requirement is within one hour) then developed a storyboard (within four hours – it's our synchronization report).

Statement of [redacted] (b)(6) 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards,
[redacted] (b)(6) Camp Qargha, 20140808 1105

Q. What is your duty description?

A. I am the [redacted] (b)(6) for the FP company. I provide security for UTAG, FP to ANOA, coordinate with the ANSF, provide guardian angels to the mentors, and command Camp Qargha.

Q. What was the purpose of the event you attended at MFNDU and what was your role?

A. I was aware of the 13 star meeting – it was the MFNDU project board and they were looking at water and infrastructure.

Q. Who was the host of the event, and who was overall responsible for command and control?

A. [redacted] (b)(6) from UTAG. This was his visit – he has a UTAG FP team – the Danes and Germans. The Danes had asked for snipers and we provided Australian marksmen. We agreed to secure the KSPAN HLS, as that was where they were to arrive. We also cleared the range and had a FP team for the instructors overseeing the range package.

Q. Who was responsible for planning, coordinating and executing force protection measures in support of this event?

A. All guardian angels were to be on duty. Normally, there are 5 but we increased it to 7. It was only prudence – there was no specific threat. We also upped our posture – we had large plates, helmets and gloves.

Q. Did you have a PSD/CPT Assigned to you? Did you have a Guardian Angel? If so, how many? Were they trained? What instructions did you give to them?

Q. Were the efforts of your PSD/CPT/Guardian Angels coordinated with others, or synchronized as part of an overall force protection plan?

A. Basically, everyone has to take a radio and submit a flap sheet with their roster, location, times, etc. There was no coordination with the PSDs. They don't own anything on the ANSF site, so they wouldn't be in charge of securing it. From my perspective, we were supporting UTAG.

Q. Did you receive a security brief upon arrival at the site that day? If so, how effective was the security plan briefing? Did it cover medical evacuation and the location of the nearest medical treatment facility?

A. There was no safety briefing given on the site. Generally, I have an actions on contact brief but that was not done in this case, as this was a UTAG mission.

Statement of [redacted] (b)(6) 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards,
[redacted] (b)(6) Camp Qargha, 20140808 1105

Q. Did you notice anything unusual with the atmospherics at MFNDU...any body language or other behavior that could be viewed as hostile?

A. The Garrison Support Unit commander had previously asked for maps and wanted to improve coordination. The New Zealand senior J2 NCO tried to give him maps that morning but he waited outside the GSU commander and XO's office for an hour. We later received reports through the mentor that Rafiquella wanted to go to the site for the visit.

Q. Please describe the events that took place from your initial arrival through the final stop where the incident occurred.

A. The GSU provides site security for the entire site. We previously provided them a security estimate of the site. The other units on site provided their own QRF. The sectors are divided like a clock. We provided clearance for the HLS, but discovered the HLS wasn't used. UTAG also asked us to secure the submerged tank and it was done with a dog. The previous night we had arranged for the QRF to link up with the Danes on the site. The QRF arrived on the site at 0945, but the Danes never showed. The QRF cleared it and left at 1145 and returned to base. I had spoken to the UTAG XO to see where the site visit was. Five people were living in the pump room so the pump doesn't burn out. There were up to 76 pax on the visit. [redacted] (b)(6) said he counted 56 pax. In hindsight, I would have been concerned with a slow moving target without protection.

Q. In your own words, please describe the actions that took place upon arrival at the final stop.

A. I got a message from the guard room that a casualty was coming in. A contractor had been on the phone and reported a shooting at the GSU gate (actually it was the NMA gate). I discovered 5 more casualties and went to coordinate CASEVAC. We kicked in the rehearsed process. The QRF was sent out to secure the E HLS. I never received a contact and people gave information as they came in. I phoned KSU (UK HQ) and arranged for overhead aviation support. Brigadier Bruce arrived and I informed him and he linked up with MG Bathurst. The Danes were still on site. He thought there might be a second shooter on site so he wanted the Danes back. QRF 2 went with Brigadier Bruce to get the Danes. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was covered in blood and trying to find MG Greene on the phone. Casualties had left and he saw an American team. He spoke to a LT – MG Greene's PSD. We swung the PTDS and saw vehicles circling the KSPAN HLS. I tasked QRF 2 to get the Americans off the wrong HLS and they moved them to the E HLS. The doctor received MG Greene. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) and the PSD were trying to get MEDEVAC on the phone. The Americans were throwing purple smoke while the British were throwing green smoke. MG Greene was on the second wave. 5 medics and 2 doctors worked on him and there were 9 rounds of CPR. [redacted] (b)(6) declared him deceased at 1304. The Danes secured the crime scene until Brigadier Russell retrieved them at 1234. The Danish FP LT saw the shooter. The GSU commander and Brigadier Bruce exchanged friendly words and he apologized for

Statement of [redacted] (b)(6) 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards,
[redacted] (b)(6) Camp Qargha, 20140808 1105

one of their MPs being killed. They told him no need to apologize. They said that MP was worse than a Taliban. The Afghan generals seemed distraught after the event.

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information. I informed him that we had casualties in this location and that the priority of effort at the moment was treatment and evacuation and I would inform him of all further details the moment I had them. During this time I received multiple phone calls from higher and I gave them all the same answer, this was understandably frustrating to both myself and the higher headquarters as we were all fighting for information at this stage.

We received a wheels-up timing from the PECC and figured it would be roughly 20 minutes until the helicopters arrived. I announced this in the OPS room and passed this information to the staff at the Med Centre. We also tasked the PTDS to overwatch the EHLS. At this stage I noticed a group of what appeared to be American Vehicles at the K-span. We could see our QRF as well as the CSM arriving at the EHLS with the first lot of casualties from the med centre. During this time we also received clearer detail from the med centre regarding the amount and type of Casualties and I updated Souter and KSU HQ.

I observed [redacted] Helo's coming in to land at the EHLS on the BISTAR system from the ops room and casualties were being loaded. We attempted to raise comms with all call signs to get the American vehicles at the K-Span to move to the EHLS however all helicopters departed. [redacted] then contacted the PECC and informed them that we still had 1 x CAT A and a number of CAT B casualties still to be collected and another chalk of Dustoff was enacted. It would be roughly 20 minutes again until these helicopters arrived at the EHLS. It was during this time that I recall the QRF asking for the "Heartstarter" at the EHLS as they were having complications with one of the casualties. The cas were moved to the EHLS and subsequently extracted.

Once all CAT A and B call-signs were extracted we still had 5 X CAT C at the Med centre. I began planning a road move and warned out [redacted] to be prepared to conduct a road move to KAIA role 2 health facilities. KSU then informed us that they would send another chalk of helo's to move these CAT C patients. We moved them to the EHLS and received a wheels up time however after roughly 25 minutes had passed there was still no sign of the helo's arriving. We contacted KSU and were informed that there were in fact no more helo's coming.

I then immediately tasked [redacted] to carry out the road move to KAIA and pick up the CAT C patients from the EHLS on the way. [redacted] then notified the relevant ops rooms and health facilities and front gate at KAIA to warn them of the incoming patrol carrying 5 x CAT C patients. These patients were moved to KAIA role 2 with no further issues.

We then began consolidating our reporting and confirming the casualties details in conjunction with the med centre staff. A timeline was developed by [redacted] on the OPS room whiteboards and [redacted] was tasked with collating a detailed SITREP and providing more information to Souter and KSU. I then began tasking PMV callsigns to extract all mentors and coalition staff still on the MFNDU site back to

camp Qargha systematically. Once we had moved all personnel into Camp Qargha we then conducted an OP TALLY to account for all personnel and then commenced further reporting and the normal after action process.

(b)(6)

15 Aug 2014

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STATEMENT BY [REDACTED] (b)(6) NZ ARMY

I, [REDACTED] (b)(6) have been employed as the [REDACTED] (b)(6) at the Qargha Operations Room, since 1 March 2014. On the 5 Aug 14 at approximately 1218hrs I was in my accommodation room (as I do not start shift until 1400hrs) when [REDACTED] (b)(6) (CISU CPL), came and told me to get to the OPS Room there had been a Green on Blue, as I was running towards the OPS Room, I saw [REDACTED] (b)(6) (new Watchkeeper) and he told me the same thing, that a Green on Blue had occurred.

I got to the OPS Room at Approximately 1220hrs, and received a quick update from the 2IC [REDACTED] (b)(6) on what had occurred. I then immediately jumped into the Watchkeepers Chair and started completing the 9-Liner. [REDACTED] (b)(6) had informed me that rc_e_medevac [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a was not working, nor the RC-E PECC ISAF SECRET phone, and to send everything to KSU and on [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a. At 1223hrs I sent the 9-Liner to KSU (Ax5, Bx5 and Cx5), and then rung them straight away to ensure that they had received it and passed it on to RC-E PECC. I sent that all CAS where GSW (as we had no information from the Med Cell). At 1233hrs the numbers changed to Ax5, Bx1 and Cx5.

At Approximately 1234hrs I checked with [REDACTED] (b)(6) if I could restart [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a to try and get the rc_e_medevac room back open (to see the W/U, W/D weather status etc.) QAA J2 who was in the OPS Room had his [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a up and it was on KSU and [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a. Our [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a went down and restarted and we were then able to receive all updates from rc_e_medvac.

At 1235hrs on rc_e_medvac we received W/U from IJC PECC AE LNO, and I notified the Med Centre and the CAS started to head out to the EHLS. At Approximately 1240hrs the PTDS was looking at the K-SPAN (other HLS for QAA) and we noticed a convoy of CAV's there, as soon as the Helo's started to come in they threw smoke to attract the Helo's (they Helo's went straight to the EHLS (the Grid we and provide to for the 9-Liner and where the QRF and CAS from the MTF where.) We then deployed QRF [REDACTED] (b)(6) to head up to the K-Span to get those CAV's and to see if they had any CAS.

The [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a Helo's loaded all CAT A and CAT B's from the EHLS and departed 1255hrs. Once the Helo's departed we then learnt that the CAV's that were at the K-SPAN had 1x CAT A and 2x CAT B we immediately requested KSU to notify RC-E-PECC (at this stage we still could not ring them) to get some more Helo's. They got a hold of RC-E-PECC and the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a Helo's where 20mins out at 1300hrs.

By this stage the 5x CAT C's where at the med centre and we were planning a Road move to KAIA N (Role 2.5). The Helo's landed at approximately 1319hrs and departed at 1325hrs (1x CAT A and 2xCAT B).

Therefore by 1325hrs we had extracted 6x CAT A, 3x CAT B, and still had 5x CAT C's at the MTF (they were in the Vehicles ready to Road Move to KAIA-N.)

During this time (1220-1325hrs) I received many phone calls from KSU (our Higher HQ) about the Nationalities of the CAS. I did not know this information, the medic's were too busy to assist, and I knew that once the CAS has been extracted then I would be able to get this information. I spoke to the KSU Watchkeeper ((b)(6)), the KSU (b)(6), the KSU Coy Comd (b)(6) and the KSU CO (b)(6), who were all demanding then I request this information ASAP. I simply did not have that info nor could I get it until the Medic's had finished. I sent a runner at about 1330hrs once the medics had returned to the Camp from the EHLS.

The whole time I would pass all information onto the COY COMD, OPSO and the (b)(6)

KSU then rung and wanted a consolidated list of CAS and who we had left, we told them and said there was 5xCAT C left at our Loc, and that we would Road Move them to KAIA-N (Role 2.5), they sent back NO, they would request another Helo packet to uplift them and get the CAS to the EHLS. I rung the MTF and noticed them, then told QRF to remain in place (they were about to move from the EHLS). The CAS got the EHLS at approximately 1340hrs. I asked for regular updates for the time of the Helo's and finally I got a message from KSU that there was no more Air Assists. We then immediately stood to the road move to KAIA-N (Role 2.5) they picked up the CAS from the EHLS on their way. I rung the IJC Med Ops, KANOC Ops (Battle CAPT) and IJC OPS (Battle CAPT) to notify them that 5x CAT C's were on their way and I gave the Battle CAPT's the VRN's off the PMV's that's was conducting the Patrol to KAIA-N. At 1455hrs the CAS arrived at the KAIA-N (Role 2.5). Therefore from 1220hrs-1455hrs we had extracted all CAS to either BAF or KAIA-N (Role 2.5).

I verify that the above statement is true and correct and I am happy to be questioned in relation to this statement.

(b)(6)

August 14

Statement of [redacted] (b)(6) 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards,
Kabul Support Unit (GBR), Camp Souter, 20140813 1345

The first report we received was “contact at Qargha – wait out.” We sent the info on KSU [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a At the same time we were sending info to PAC @ RC-E and IJC. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a is the primary method of communicating. TF2 Fury sent a 9 liner on [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a (TAAC-C) and sent coordinates for the KSPAN HLS. We had good comms through [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a and send coordinates for the EHLS. We also had the feed for the PTDS that had scanned over. We phoned IJC and reported MASCAL and that it was over the limit of 3 CAT As at Qargha. [redacted] (b)(6) who was our former LNO, called the CJOC. We got some questions, such as “What bldg?” from IJC. We were also on the phone with [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) Camp Qargha. A COL from IJC was confused about whether the incident was at Qargha or Souter and why Souter would be calling. We were also on the phone with COMISAF’s office, DCOMISAF’s office, and the Embassy. We tried to talk to NTM-A, who has a BDOC, but they weren’t really a factor in the process. There was confusion at PJHQ with the press based on IJC reports. We tried to get the flap sheets – there was no clear C2 to ensure who was accounted for. We had a QRF here, but didn’t launch them. The BN OPS room for Kabul Support Unit is run by the company on behalf of the BN. Whose job within ISAF is it to respond? Who is responsible for which area? IJC basically owns everything. KNOC and TAAC-C are not responsive. We have coordination authority with TAAC-C but operational control with IJC. With rotary MEDEVAC, we go straight to RC-E rotary. PAC WIJC has an interest, as well. The system worked, but questions remain and C2 of MEDEVAC was clumsy. We need clear lines. Clumsy uncertainty – people didn’t seem to take it seriously. Two and one half hours later, we were unsure whether we had 2 or 3 casualties. Our Soldiers carry a MIST card with our ZAP # and a 9 liner template. We have an LNO at TF Volunteer - our [redacted] (b)(6). MEDEVAC from RC-E was superb.

Statement of [redacted] (b)(6) Senior Medical Officer, Role 1 MTF, Camp
 Qargha, [redacted] (b)(6) 20140808 1425

Q. What is your duty description?

A. I am the [redacted] (b)(6) and I have a specialty (residency) in general practice (family practice).

Q. What was the purpose of the event you attended at MFNDU and what was your role?

Q. Who was the host of the event, and who was overall responsible for command and control?

Q. Who was responsible for planning, coordinating and executing force protection measures in support of this event?

A. I don't know about the planning. The Danish had asked me for a stretcher the day prior so they could put it in the back of the vehicle. I had told them to get with the QRF and [redacted] (b)(6) to coordinate for use of the ambulances.

Q. Did you have a PSD/CPT Assigned to you? Did you have a Guardian Angel? If so, how many? Were they trained? What instructions did you give to them?

Q. Were the efforts of your PSD/CPT/Guardian Angels coordinated with others, or synchronized as part of an overall force protection plan?

Q. Did you receive a security brief upon arrival at the site that day? If so, how effective was the security plan briefing? Did it cover medical evacuation and the location of the nearest medical treatment facility?

Q. Did you notice anything unusual with the atmospherics at MFNDU...any body language or other behavior that could be viewed as hostile?

Q. Please describe the events that took place from your initial arrival through the final stop where the incident occurred.

Q. In your own words, please describe the actions that took place upon arrival at the final stop.

A. We were in the middle of HOTO so we basically had double the staff. There were [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a doctors – [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a general practitioners and [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a junior doctor (between his internship and his residency). Earlier in the morning we had reviewed the MASCAL plan and I had told them that if we ever had more than 3 CAT As we would be in trouble because we only had 3 beds. Also, we need 4 medical people per each CAT A. There had been rumors of a pending training exercise – a Citadel, which was an attack on the compound. When the general brought in the first casualty, we thought it was a drill because there was blood, but no field dressing. He told us there were 5 CAT As coming behind him. The female Navy patient had a life-saving field dressing on her

Statement of [REDACTED] Senior Medical Officer, Role 1 MTF, Camp Qargha, [REDACTED]

groin injury. She would have died without it. She had a mangled leg and a groin injury. Her life was definitely saved by that bandage. The British captain had a very good dressing on his groin injury. A patient came in with a GSW to his abdomen and arm. Another came in with a GSW to his back – his lower axilla, and his leg. I apportioned medics and doctors to various patients. I had experience with one previous GSW and we had practiced MEDEVAC. The patients' ABC (airway, breathing, and circulation) were fine and they were all talking. CAT Cs were coming in and we were directing them to the ward and they were performing self-care. We practice MASCAL monthly. Many of the Soldiers and civilians there didn't have tourniquets or bandages with them. On the scene they had determined that there were five CAT A casualties and they were correct. An Afghan general had a tourniquet but the medic was able to release it and he became a CAT B. Normally, the Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers are the extra labor for MASCAL – such as stretcher-bearers, but the new unit hadn't train on it yet. Also, we had no way to notify them, since we don't have a MASCAL announcement system. One of the doctors had to run up and get them. None of the patients had zap numbers (battle roster numbers). The British use the first two letters of their last name and the last four numbers of their service number. There was no consistency within the coalition with the injury cards and zap numbers. On the camp, everyone rehearses MASCAL and knows the patient flow process. None of the coalition partners had practiced, so some of the patients came in vehicles that brought them to the back entrance, rather than the front. Weapons were also an issue – there were several foreign weapons at the ready and that was concerning, so they medics had to move them to the side of the room. There were many people coming in who were not helpful. The medical people needed help and were willing to take inexperienced hands, but some of the onlookers were unhelpful and really in the way. [REDACTED] was shot through the butt but carried someone in on his shoulders and was cracking jokes. I went to the HLS. Once the patients' bleeding was stopped, I sent them to the HLS immediately, rather than packaging them up nicely. There was no time for niceties, as I knew it took about 20 minutes to get a patient to the HLS and I didn't want the helicopters to arrive before the patients. Additionally, all of them needed a surgeon. I treated the British captain at the HLS. Each of us have medical bags and we took them. The helicopters came up quickly after I arrived. We haven't rehearsed loading onto Blackhawks but that didn't seem to be a problem. There was great difficulty in communicating with the crew chief with the noise. I needed to get some important, non-obvious patient information to him about the British captain's lines that we had attempted to insert, but the crew chief couldn't understand me. Some stretchers are better than others on the Blackhawk and I'm trying to get our ambulance modified so we're using a helicopter-ready stretcher in the back of it. There was no effective communication with the Blackhawks. This was my first MASCAL as a participant at this level. I was told about another group of patients. I sent a doctor down to get another set of medical supplies. MG Greene's PSD had taken him to the other HLS. They then brought him

Statement of [redacted (b)(6)] Senior Medical Officer, Role 1 MTF, Camp Qargha, [redacted (b)(6)]

up to the E HLS – I don't know exactly how he got there – he just showed up. He had non-survivable injuries. He had been shot through the brain stem. His airway was full of blood and there was active bleeding. One medic did a tracheotomy, one medic did CPR, and another medic drilled into his leg to get fluids in. He also had a massive skull fracture and his pupils were fixed and dilated. I believe he had been killed instantly. He arrived at the HLS about 50 minutes after he had been shot. In my opinion the brain stem injury and the obstructed airway were certain to lead to death. He also had an indicator of a pelvic fracture, as his leg was turned inward. The UK medical team was:

[redacted (b)(6)]

The Australian medical team was:

[redacted (b)(6)]

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


- 1 - Access to Bunker outside
- 2 - Dashed from last venue
- 3 - Walking into to Bunker
- 4 - Walking into to Bunker
- 5 - Building location
- 6 - Direction of fire

X - 1F
 O - no room
 A - Area available


(b) (3), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(D)

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(b) (3), (b) (6)

Approved for Release



WALL

Crowded area



Building

Building

Building

Building

Approved for Release

mb
Green
chase

FB
Green
limo

chase

limo

Green Team
limo


Tank

Parking Area

Building

(9)(a)


Force protections from the Coalition forces



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(b)(3), (b)



Trucks staged along Road

Drill and Ceremony Field